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Statement of Problem.

~

Art currently maintains a

~recarious status within Western society.

This can be

attributed to the fact that the lay-public, in general,
does not understand what is precisely meant by the term
"art," nor do they possess the cognitive and perceptual
abilities necessary to under£tand the art of today.
Therefore, the purpose of this study, was an attempt
at establishing a justification for including art criticism
as instructional course content in institutions of higher
education in the United States.
Sources of Data.

Data from aesthetic theory, art

education, ancl anthropological investigation were utilized.
The major contributors in aesthetics included Ducasse, Saw,
Smith, and TeJera.

Those from art education were Kaufman,

Knobler, McFee, Munro, and Pappas.
were Mead and lloebel.

Those from anthropology

Methods and Procedures:
utilizing three 111ajor premises;

The study was conducted
(1)

that there is a lack

of understanding and acceptance of the visual arts by the
greater mass of Western society;

(2) it is thoroughly impos-

sible to involve students in individual works of art beforethere is a preliminary, thorough resolution of their doubts
regarding the nature and validity of art in general; and (3)
that there is meaning to be found in forms of art, which are
at present, beyond the understanding of the merely interested
individual.
In an attempt to verify these premises, art was conceived as having cognitive subject matter.

This necessitated

a precise and operable definition of art; its scope and function, as in the initial three chapters.

This, in turn,

resulted in research regarding this subject matter, and those
elements in Western society which directly influence its
being understood and comprehended.
Major Findings.

It was discovered that (1) a lack of

continuity exists between art and technology, art and one's
environment, and the art of the ~ast in relation to that of
present day;

(2) the average layman does not have the

ability to "deal" with the works of art without the assistance of an informed, third party;

(3) the art curriculum

of institutions of higher education contribute to this
social milieu, by its continuance as a polarized curriculum.

Conclusions.
from this study;

Four major conclusions were resultant

(1) the term " visual art" should be used ,

instead of " art " alone, when r eferr ing to the disciplines
of painting , drawing , sculpture , and architecture;

(2) the

art curriculum of colleges and universities should be
restructured , and integrate courses that wou ld describe
the ramifications of the visual arts in today's world, as
pro posed by Silverman and Lanier;

(3) the general education

curriculum should be replaced with a new " core curriculum ;"
and (4) college and university art departments should seek
a stru ctural relationship between the components of production and history by including aesthetic criticism into the
curriculum content.
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PREFACE
This thesis project, as it was conceived in a
discussion between Dr. Bill Booth, Dr. Roger Jones, and
myself, was for the purpose of establishing a justification for including art criticism/as instructional course
content in institutions of higher education in the United
States.

This directive was kept in mind, albeit in some

loosely constructed fashion, as the research proceeded.
However, as so often happens in an activity as stimulating
as research, there was, to an extent, a departure from
the original plan; some ideas were altered, unexpected
research was undertaken and new ideas were generated.
The resultant product may differ slightly from what was
intended, but it does abide by the "spirit" of the original
concept.
The primary sources of data were single-volume
works collected from the Johnson-Camden Library, Morehead
State University; and the Library of Congress, Washington,
D. C.

Many delimitations were encountered during the

processes of research and investigation.
delimiting factor was that of time.
period of one school year,

The initial

The relatively short

(two semesters), was allowed

for the research, organization, and completion of this
particular thesis.

In lieu of this, there are probably

many sources of data that would have contributed to both
ii

iii

the content and structure of this work that have been
overlooked.

Also, there was extreme difficulty in locating

single-volume works at the University library that pertained
to art criticism and aesthetics per se.

Many works were

listed in the card catalog, but upon extensive search,
it was learned that numerous works had been "misplaced."
The major delimitation, however, was the lack of contemporary research conducted in the area of art education.
As an example, the last Art Education Yearbook was published in 1965.

The theoretical framework of the thesis

was conducted utilizing three major premises;

(1) there

is a lack of understanding and acceptance of the visual
arts by the greater mass of western society;

(2) it is

impossible to thoroughly involve students in individual
works of art before there is a preliminary, thorough
resolution of their doubts about the nature and validity
of art in general; and (3) there is meaning to be found
in forms of art which, are at present, beyond the understanding of the merely interested individual.

These

premises constitute the underlying hypothesis that works
of art require an informed, perceptive, and responsive
observer if the work itself is to be understood and
appreciated.
In an attempt to verify these premises, art was
conceived as an entity, therefore containing specific

iv

subject matter.

Ascertaining the nature of this subject

matter necessitated a premise and operable definition

of

art, its scope and function, as in the initial three
chapters.

Thi.s, in turn, led to research in regard to

the understanding of the subject matter of art, and those
elements within Western society which directly influence
such understanding.
fibable.

This area of research was most pro-

It was discovered that those elements which

influence the understanding of art, in turn affect the
status of art within our society.
From this research sequence, it was discovered
that art holds a precarious status within Western society;
that a lack of continuity exists between art and technology,
art and one's environment, and the art of the past in relation to that of present day.

Also, it was discovered

that the average layman does not have the ability to
"deal" with works of art without the assistance of a
third party, who will tell him what to look at, why he
should look at it, and what it should mean.

Finally, it

was found that the art curriculum of institutions of
higher education has contributed to this social milieu.
It continues to be a polarized curriculum, with studio
art courses at one end of the pole and art history at the
other end.
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Chapter 1
WHAT IS "ART?"
Origin of Terms "Fine Arts" and "Beaux Arts"
The English term "fine art" is a product of the
eighteenth century.

The Oxford Dictionary states that it was

originally used in the plural as a translation of the French
"beaux-arts," and that "fine" as an adjective meaning "beautiful" is often used as equivalent to "beau."

"Fine art," then,

means in plural, the arts which are concerned with "the beautiful," or which appeal to the faculty of taste; in the widest
use including poetry, eloquence, music, etc., but often applied
in a more restricted sense to the arts of design, as painting,
sculpture, and architecture.

The English concept of "fine

arts" can be traced back a considerable distance, to somewhat
similar meanings under different English names, such as,
"polite," "elegant," and "voluptuary" arts.

Under any name,

however, this idea was rare in England until the late eighteenth century.

The main stem of its ancestry goes back rather

to France and Italy.
The term "beaux arts" was current in the seventeenth
century and in 1690, it was used by Charles Perrault in the
title of a book. 1

In French literature, it occurs as early

as La Fontaine's "Songe de Vaux,"

(1657-61).

1 A. P. McMahon, Le Cabinet des beaux-arts, Preface to
an American Philosophy of Art, (Chicago, 1945), pp. 24, 181.
1

2

Ancestoral Background of "Fine Arts" and "Beaux Arts"
The British Royal Academy was patterned after the
Acad~mie royale des beaux arts, to which one must turn for
the French ancestry of the concept of fine arts.
founded by Louis XIV in 1648.

It was

At first limited to painting

and sculpture, it was later unified with the Acad~mie
d'architecture, founded in 1671.

It was composed not only

of painters and sculptures, but also architects and engravers.
This partition of culture among the various academies,
including the realm assigned to the "Acadfunie des beauxarts," did much to determine what arts should be considered
"beaux-arts" or "fine arts."

The emphasis on visual arts

in both French and British Academies is partly responsible
for the conception of the fine arts as visual, and as distinct from music and literature.
The modern history of the concept of fine art leads
one back from Baroque France to Renaissance Italy, and to
earlier academies.

There were academies in Italy, including

one for architecture in Milan in 1830; but they were smaller
and more specific.

The countless literary and scientific

academies in Renaissance Italy were remarkable for their
whimsical names and their lack of interrelation.

There

was no systematic apportionment of the arts among supervisory bodies; there was no national government to have
undertaken it.

3

The Italian academies were successors to the
medieval guilds as institutions for the training of young
artists.

The latter had become repressive by the fifteenth

century, while the academies were allowing individual competition.

T~e earliest academy to be concerned with painting

is said to have been the "Academia del Disengo," founded
by Vasari in Florence in 1562.

Vasari used the expression

"most beautiful arts," as applied to the arts of design. 2
The essential difference between the guilds and the academies, according to Anthony Blunt,

was that "the latter

treated the arts as scientific subjects to be taught
theoretically as well as practically, whereas the guilds
had mainly aimed at fixing a technical tradition."3
Venturi describes the transition from Italy to
France:
"Even the terms which comprehend painting
are changed. Vasari had called them arts of
design, attributing to design their unity.
Likewise 1 he had spoken of 'the finest arts,'
and Baldinucci of 'fine arts in which design
is adopted,' and Scamozzi of 'fine arts.'
It is only in the milieu of the Academy of
France that the term 'beaux-arts' is in general use, and the term when remained. For
unity of design is substituted that of the
ideal of beauty."4
2McMahon, op. cit., p. 26.
(Oxford:

3A. Blunt, Artistic Theory in Italy, 1450-1600,
Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 57.

4L. Venturi, The History of Art Criticism,
E. P. Dutton, 1936), p. 126.

(New York:

4

Emphasis on the scientific, theoretical approach
to painting was an important phase in the struggle of
painting, sculpture, and architecture to raise their status.
This struggle, whose crucial phase was enacted in Renaissance Italy, is summarized by Blunt as follows:
The upshot of all these disputes was that
the painter, sculptor, and architect obtained
recognition as educated men, as members of
Humanist society. Painting, sculpture, and
architecture were accepted as liberal arts, and
are now grouped together as activities closely
allied to each other and all differing, fundamentally from the manual crafts. The idea of
the "Fine Arts" comes into existance this way,
though a single phase is not attached to them
until the middle of the sixteenth century, when 5
they came to be known as the "Arti di disengo."
At the same time critics began to have the idea
of a "work of art" as something distinct from
an object justified simply by its beauty and
which is a luxury product.6
Early discussions of the arts were largely evaluative, often from an educational standpoint.

They dealt

with the question of what skills are worthy of a freeman
or a gentleman, and hence with what should be taught to
the well-born youth.

Also, more searching moral and

religious questions were asked, in regard
and dangers of practicing various arts.

to the values
These were answered

SF. P. Chambers treats "disengo" as equivalent to
"drawing." During the Renaissance, the common denominator
of all arts was drawing, 'il ban disengo,' "As late as the
eighteenth century, the Italians were describing the fine
arts as 'le belle arti del disengo.'" F. P. Chambers,
The History of Taste, (New York, 1932), p. 41.
6 Blunt, op. cit., p. 55, all of Ch. IV.

5

differenLly, according to the religious and moral principles asswned, and 1,.-i th different verdicts about which arts
were wort~y to be taught the superior man.
From the standpoint of aristocratic, secular education, the important criterion for classing an art as
"liberal," polite," or "elegant" was that it be recognized
as genteel and .t1onorable. 7

For this recognition, the

approval of ancient aristocrats was of greater weight
than the beauty or intellectuality of the product.

Many

beautiful and pleasant things, such as chairs and garments,
were made

humble artisians, and hence were not

11

fine 11

in the sense of elegant, noble, or superior.
Ancest:,ral Background of "Liberal Arts"
'.!.'he idea of liberal as distinguished from servile
or mechanical arts has been traced back as far as Solon
(6bh C.. B.C.).

As to the "arts of design" and other vis-

ual arts, they were arts in the broad technical sense of
skill in 1:,aking and doing.
ness:

Their first purpose was useful-

tha.t of the building arts, says Chambers, was

"str.:n•,1th a!1d shelter; the usefulness of the figurative
art was th<; illustration of a moral doctrine and sacred
history.

~rchitecture was ~dmired for being well and

ski!lfully bui:t; paintin~ and sculpture were admired
7"Liueral:" Befit.t.,,·,g, or worthy of, a man of
free birth:
free, no'.: se1.·v: le, (Webster).

6

because they bore some semblance of reality.

Ornament for

its own sake was the conception of a later time.•• 8
The Greek word "techne" and the Latin
implied useful skill in general.

word "ars"

Under the general concept

of "techne," a certain type of art was recognized in'Greece:
"

'

namely, "mousike techne," or art of the Muses.

This is

sometimes translated as "fine art,'' and the particular
arts included are sometimes call "fine arts."

The word

"techne" was often omitted in greek, and "mouiske" alone
meant "art of the Muses."

"Mouiske" included all three

branches of Athenian education, namely, music, grammar,
and gymnastics.
There appears to be no clear conception in Greek
or Roman thought of a group of "fine arts," distinguished
from other arts by their devotion to beauty and aesthetic
pleasure, rather than to practical use.

Certainly, no

group of visual arts, such as painting, sculpture, and
architecture, is so set apart.

The "arts of the Muses"

were "fine" in being distinguished from the humbly untilitarian, manual skills, but were also regarded as useful
from a moral and educational standpoint.

They were not

regarded as devoted mainly to pleasure and sensuous beauty.
The "arts of the Muses" were mainly literary and
musical, with a dash of early science.
8 chambers, op. cit., p. 10.

They gave no place

7

to the visual arts of painting and sculpture, which are
today regarded as fine arts "par excellence."
It is true that no clear conception of fine art
existed in Greece, which is identical with any of those
in modern definitions.

However, many of the ideas included

in those definitions did exist in Greece, under various
names and in various associations.

So it is not correct

to suppose that the concept of fine art is entirely
modern.

There was a disagreement in Greece as to which

arts were "fine."

Moreover, Greek thinkers developed the

notion of liberal arts as those befitting an educated,
free citizen.

This deeply influenced medieval and modern

theories of the arts.
In summary, the term "liberal arts" covered a
group of skills or subjects, variously conceived in the
Greek and medieval periods, but always distinguished as
(a) genteel, noble, aristocratic, befitting a freeman or
member of the upper class, and thus opposed to the "servile" arts;

(b) involving mental rather than crude manual

or mechanical work and ability, hence manifesting a higher
type of mental development;

(c) tending to elevate the

mind of the artist and those whom he serves rather

than

merely providing physical necessities and comforts.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the
conception of art became more hedonistic in tone, less

8

intellectual and moralistic.

It marked off a certain

group of arts as aiming to provide aesthetic pleasure,
by producing beautiful forms for sensuous perception.
This type of art came to be called "beaux'arts" or "fine
arts."

However, it had inuch in common with the older

conception of liberal arts.
The term "fine arts" came to be associated mainly
with certain visual arts.

These were separately grouped

for practice and instruction.

In Italy, they were called

"the beautiful arts of design," arid had their own academy,
which bore the title "Acadfunie des beaux-arts."
To the extent that the modern "fine arts" are
successors to the Greek "liberal arts," exists the strange
spectacle of the visual arts being, first, excluded from
the select list as too manual; second, admitted to the list
through a rise in social and intellectual status; third,
so dominating the list that music and poetry, though
original members, are often omitted from it.

Chapter 2
WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF "ART?"
Semantic Classification
Confusion over both the scope and the context
of art begins with the basic terms "art" and "arts."
The full extent of their ambiguity is not commonly
realized.

First, the work "art" is applied to certain

skills and techniques, and also to the products of
these skills, that is to works of art.

It is sometimes

applied broadly to all kinds of useful skill, including
medicine and agriculture; sometimes restricted to skill
in certain media such as painting, or to the skills aimed
at producing "aesthetic pleasure."

The work "art" is

sometimes used in a laudatory way, to imply high aesthetic
quality in the product; sometim~s in an indiscriminate
way, as applied to all production and performance in
certain fields.
Another source of confusion over the meaning of
art arises from the old problem of the relation between
"fine" and "useful or servile" art.

When art is thought

of in the broad technical sense, it includes both "fine"
and "useful or servile" arts; all branches of applied
science and technology.

However, when art is thought of

in the broad aesthetic sense, the question still remains:

9
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does it include the "useful arts," or only those supposedly
devoted to aesthetic ends?

How much of technology is

covered by the word "art"?

How much is left out?

Many of the terms used to classify the arts into
various groups, such as "fine and useful arts," "major
and minor arts," "decorative arts," and "arts of design,"
are also very differently understood.

Thus our present

nomenclature of the arts is far from being precise or
standardized for technical discussion.
A partial classification of the arts is implied
whenever such terms as "fine arts," "useful arts,"
"theatre arts," "graphic arts," or "handicrafts" are
utilized.

Several other terms, such as "space and time

arts," "plastic arts," "imitative and non-imitative arts"
are also used.

Inclusive arts such as literature are

divided into subclasses such as prose and poetry, drama
and fiction.

Some arts are closely connected, with much

in common such as, painting, drawing, and etching.

Others,

such as music and sculpture, seem farther apart, and it
is more difficult to discern what they have in common,
or to group them under a single heading.
Historically, there has been a sharp antithesis
between fine and useful art; between beauty and utility;
between the aesthetic and the practical.

Plato made a

fairly clear distinction in theory between the two sets

11

of arts:

one which satisfied basic human needs, and the

other, which provided sensuous pleasure.

He was also

interested in another distinction, between what were later
called the liberal and the illiberal or servile arts.
useful arts were put in the latter c:lass.

9

The

This separation

reached its zenith with the nineteenth century doctrine
of "art for art's sake" and the "ivory tower" conception
of art as something esoteric and aloof from everyday life.
From the eighteenth century onward, the word "art"
and its equivalents in other European languages came to
be understood more and more with aesthetic and hedonistic
associations.

It became, therefore, less and less neces-

sary to utilize the prefix "fine" to distinguish the fine
or aesthetic arts from other, more utilitarian skills.
The latter came

to be called, not ".arts," but applied

sciences, industries, technics., technologies, or branches
of engineering.

Hence, the single word "art" or "arts"

gradually replaced, to a large extent the term "fine arts."
The latter term has persisted but with confusingly ambiguous meaning, since it was, and still is, understood as
covering only certain visual arts (painting, sculpture,
architecture, and perhaps the "minor" useful or decorative

9 Thomas Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelations,
(Cleveland: western Reserve University Press, 1967),
p. 42.
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arts):

at other times it has included also poetry, music,

dancino, and drama.lo
In attempting to avoid the contrast between the
"useful" and "fine" arts, and also limit the scope of the
term "a.rt," the term "visual art" came into vogue.

This

basis of classification shifted from the difficult and
controversial or.e of "useful and not useful" to a more
obJective and psychological one; that of, which one of
the five senses is it primarily addressed.
The term "visual arts" was, and is not quite specific enough when the term "arts" is used in its old, broad,
technical sense; for visual arts would then include purely
utili tar:,an bu_ildings, tools, and machines.

If it is

understood that art means "aesthetic art," then "visual
art" is by definition restricted to products having some
aesthetic function.

Their visibility
will not be merely
.. '

incidental, but possess an essential characteristic; power
to attract and interest through the eyes will be one of
their principal aims.

There is need for a term which

definitely groups them together, as apart from music,
theatre, drama, and literature.

An explicit prefix is

needed _i_n contrasting the aesthetic arts.

11

Fine arts 11 is

not the Dest possible term because of its current meanings.

lGMunro, 0p. cit., p. 512.
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"Visual arts" is a term that is both limiting and simultaneously fairly objective.
Far from being a merely theoretical problem the
way in which the arts are defined and classified affects
the practical organization and conduct of the arts themselves.

It is a mistake to think of definition and

classification as "mere preliminaries," coming at an
early stage in investigation.

They come also at the end

and in the middle, in fact all along the line.

Those

made in the early stages of a subject always have to be
revised later, in the light of increasing knowledge.

The

ones made now must be recognized as tenative hypotheses,
sure to need further change in a few years' time.

One

can summarize in them, however, the results of the latest
discoveries up to the present moment, and use them in
turn as instruments in further inquiry.
It is virtually impossible to have only one
meaning for the word "art."
more than one meaning.

·Almost all other words have

The dictionaries may list ten or

twenty definitions after a word, and yet it may be used
without serious confusion, provided that each definition
is used in a different field or realm of discourse.
"Table" means one thing in discussing furniture; another
in mathematics; another in parlimentary law.

14

Classification Using the Concept ''Skill"
Every definition is in terms of other words, and
therefore depends on how these other words are themselves
defined.

Agreement on a definition of "art" cannot be

obtained until there is agreement on a satisfactory definition of some of these other words such as:
"beauty," "pleasure," "expression," etc.

"skill,"

Thus it is

impossible to find a wholly satisfactory definition for
a single, isolated term in a technical subject, where all
are interrelated.

The whole terminology must be gradually

and constantly revised, with the hope of defining all
important terms in a way which is mutually consistent, and
consistent with current knowledge and expert opinion.

As

to any one term, one can only attempt to weight the relative advantages of alternative definitions, and decide
which seems to be the most expedient at the time.

Which

has the least possibility of false or harmful interpretations?

Which will serve be'st as a tool for thought,

research, and discussion within this particular field?
It is virtually impossible to ascertain both the
implied scope of the term "art," and what is precisely
meant by "art," when studied from the vantage point of
semantics and the "end-products" of "art."

Therefore, a

different basis for inquiry must be utilized.
will be that of skill.

The basis

15

The major current meanings of art, as recognized
by leading dictionaries, differ from one another in degrees
of breadth, and in this paper are arranged from the broadest to the narrowest.

All are based on the concept of

skill.
Definition 1: Art is useful skill, or
the product of such skill; especially, a
skill which is developed and transmitted
socially, as a tested set of methods for
adapting means to purposeful ends. In this
sense, art means "any kind of skill adapting nature for human uses."11
This definition is broad enough to include, not
only the "fine arts" of painting, sculpture, and music,
but also all applied science, industry, and manufacturing.
It includes as particular arts all building (whether
beautiful or not) and the arts of agriculture, and navigation.

This sense of "art" is termed the "broad technical

sense." 12
The products of such skilled activity are also
called "art."

Art can mean a process of making or doing,

11 oxford Dictionary, Vol. I, 1888, "art," definitions I, 1, 2, 3; II, 7, 8, 9, lla. S. Colvin, "Art,"
is "every regulated operation or· dexterity by which organized being pursue ends which they know beforehand, together
with the rules and the result of every such operation or
dexterity. I,
12

united States patents are granted to devices in
the following classes: art, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, and new varieties of plants.
"The
term 'art' by interpretation has virtually the same meaning
as the word 'method' or 'process.'
(J. H. Byers, "Criteria
of Patentability," Scientific Monthly, 1945, p. 435).
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and also its products.

To avoid confusion with works of

"fine art," the products of art in this broad sense are
often called "artifacts" or "manufactures."

These terms

covered all human products, whether intended to be beautiful or not.
"Art" in this broad sense is approximate to the
Greek, "techne," which can be translated as skill, craft,
cunning, or regular method of making a particular thing.
It is from this Greek term that "technics," "technical,"
and "technique" are derived.

"Technology" currently

refers mainly to industry, engineering, and applied science,
excluding the fine arts.
made no such distinction.

The Greek conception of "techne"
It included skill in making

either useful or beautiful things, or things combining the
two qualities.

This conception of art as useful skill is

still taken to include both fine and useful arts, all,
being considered useful in a broad sense.

Important inno-

vation in technology is called "invention" or "discovery,"
whereas in fine art it is called "creation" or "original
composition."
Definition 2: Art is skill in intellectual and cultural pursuits, or a branch
or learning conducive to that skill.13
"Arts in this sense means "liberal arts."
gives the following definition:

"Liberal arts.

Webster
(Trans. of

13 oxford Dictionary, op. cit., Vol, I, 1888.
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'artes liberales,' the higher arts, which, among the
Romans, only freemen (liberi) were permitted to pursue.)
In the Middle Ages, the seven branches of learning were:
grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music,
and astronomy.

In modern times the liberal arts include

the languages, sciences, philosophy, history, etc., which
compose the curriculum of academic or collegiate education,
as distinguished from technical or professional education.
The abbreviated term "arts" is ·also used, as in the designation of certain degrees granted by colleges and universities, as master and bachelor of "arts. 1114
The history and appreciation of painting, sculpture,
and architecture are sometimes included as part of a liberal
arts curriculum, at least as elective subjects.
seldom required, and are often omitted entirely.

They are
Only

literature, among the fine or aesthetic arts, is always
included.

Today an "arts" curriculum usually involves

some work in mathematics, and a basic acquaintance with
several other sciences.

This is not, then, a definitely

aesthetic sense of the work "art," for it includes a
considerable amount of science, and may include nothing
in the "fii.ne arts" except literature.

15

14 webster's New World Dictionary,
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 814.
15Munro, op. cit., p. 53.

(New Jersey:
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The term "humanities" is sometimes used instead
of "liberal arts," with similar meaning.
it as follows:

"Humanities.

Webster defines

The branches of polite

learning regarded as primarily conducive to culture; esp.,
the ancient classics and belles-lettres; sometimes, secular, as distinguished from theological learning." 16
Broadly interpreted, a curriculum in humanities is sometimes made to include social sciences, history, languages,
and literature.

More narrowly, it may indicate a range

of choice within the general "liberal arts" curriculum,
with emphasis on language and literature.

It may include

work in the visual arts and music; but that is not always
implied. 17
Definition 3. a. Art is skill in producing beauty or that which arouses aesthetic
pleasure, or the product of such skill.
(In
this sense, "art" is an evaluative, eulogistic term, implying superior aesthetic
worth.)
b. Art is the practice of any of the
fine or aesthetic arts (including music and
literature as well as certain visual arts),
or the product of such practice.18
Both these definitions are intermediate in depth.
Both define "art" primarily as "the application of skill to
16webster's New World Dictionary, op. cit., p. 683.
17 L. Dudley and A. Faricy, The Humanities:
Aesthetics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1940), p. 3.
18 oxford Dictionary, op. cit., Vol. I, 1888.
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the production of what is beautiful, or of what arouses
aesthetic pleasure.• 19
Both definitions limit the scope of "art" by
excluding not only the purely "useful arts" and applied
sciences, but the intellectual skill in letters, philosophy, and pure science which the "liberal arts" undertook to give.
"fine art."

"Art" in this sense is sometimes called
With or without "fine," tha word "art" in

this sense includes music and poetry.

With or without

"fine," it is also used in a narrow sense, restricted to
the visual arts.
Use of the work "art" alone in this sense is
comparatively modern.

The prefix "fine" or "beautiful"

used to be thought necessary because of the very broad
meaning of "art" in general.
necessary.

Now, the prefix is less

Without it, "art" is presently understood in

an aesthetic sense, while most of the old "useful arts"
have been transformed into branches of engineering, technology, and applied science, and are so designated.
A problem arises, however, with the utilization
of definition three.

According to this definition, to

call a thing "art" is to praise it as beautiful, worthy,
or pleasant.

By these two definitions, then, there is no

19 webster's New World Dictionary, op. cit., p.
78.
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such thing as ugly, unskillful, or unpleasant art.

The

essential characteristic of the two definitions, is, that
art or fine art is devoted to the production of beauty or
aesthetic pleasure.

Thus, the meaning of "art" relies

upon evaluation, implying a high degree of ability in
producing beauty or aesthetic value.
Definition 4. a. Art is skill in producing beauty in visible form, or the products
of that skill. b. Art is the practice of one
of the visual aesthetic arts, or the product
of such practice.20
Definition 5. a. Art is skill in producing beauty in visible form in painting,
or the product of that skill. b. Art is
painting, or a product of it.21
In the Oxford Dictionary, art is:
"the application of skill to the arts of
imitation and design, Painting, Engraving,
Sculpture, Architecture; the skillful production of the beautiful in visible forms.
(This
is the most usual and modern sense of art, when
used without any qualifications.
It does not
occur in any English Dictionary before 1880,
and seems to have been chiefly used by painters
and writers on painting, until the present
century.)" 22
Definition five, is one of the narrowest definitions of art, in which a concept that once covered tne
20oxford Dictionary, op. cit., Vol., 1888.
21 Ibid., Vol. I, 1888.
22Munro, op. cit., p. 61.
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whole domain of human skill is limited to the single
activity of painting pictures.

It has not achieved much

currency in technical aesthetics or art criticism.
This definition presents several new problems.
In general, what is "visible form" in art, and what arts
produce such forms?

What does it mean to call certain

arts "the arts of imitation and design"?
what arts are included?

In particular,

Painting is often mentioned;

sculpture and architecture usually; drawing and engraving
occasionally.

Numerous other arts devoted to visual form

are usually omitted, such as ceramics.
In citing the aforementioned definitions, the
premise is that there is no definition which is right or
wrong by the eternal nature of things.

There are various

ideas and groups of phenomena, each important in its own
way, to which the name "art" has become attached.

When

speaking of "art," one or more of these previous ideas
are suggested, with some help from the context to indicate
which is meant.

If the word "art" is used in another,

radically different sense, there is a risk of being misunderstood, and further aggravating an already confusing
situation.
Some writers on aesthetics accept one of the curcent, dictionary definitions of "art," and then present
their ideas about the nature and values of art as so

22

defined.

Summari,~s of definitions by individual philoso-

phers have been made by:

Listowel, 23 Rader, 24 Heyl,25

Parker, 26 and others.
Not all these theories are explicitly offered as
definitions of art.

Some of them are, and others are

more indefinitely worded as theories about art and its
values, or about the processes of making and experiencing
art.

Some of the surveys and anthologies -of quotations

call them, quite interchangeably, definitions, theories,
doctrines, views, ideas, or conceptions of art.

This

vagueness in expression adds to the difficulty of surveying
and listing the recent individual definitions of art, since
it is often impossible to tell what is intended as a defini-

tion and what is not.

However, since art is a complex and

many sided entity, different theories can offer enlightment as tc the different aspects of its nature.
Ir. order to ascertain both the scope and context

of "art," a middle-course of direction needs to be taken,

23 Earl of Listowel, A Critical History of Modern
Aesthetics, (London, 1933).
24 M. M. Rader, A Modern Book of Esthetics, An
Anthology, (New York, 1935).
25B. C. Heyl, New Bearings in Esthetics and Art
Criticism, (New Haven, 1943).
26 oewitt Parker, Encyclopedia of the Arts,
"AeEthet.ics,"
(New York, 1946).
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utilizing exclusively, nei~her definition nor theory, but

a combination of bot-.h.

Initially, a list of established

dictionary definitions must be studied, to discern whether
one of them is adequate enough to serve present needs.
Secondly, definitions and theories need to be examined,
in order to discern what important ideas they express.
Finally, it should be decided, which of the definitions
and ideas should be included as the established meaning
of the term in question, and which should be termed
otherwise.
Following this procedure, and for the purpose of
clarity ·::Jf 1.mderstanding, the scope and context of art
will be defined as follows:
ART:
is skill in making or doing that
which is used or intended as a stimulus to
a satisfactory aesthetic experience, often
along with other ends or functions; especially in such a way that the perceived
stimulus, the meanings it suggests, or both,
are fel~ as beautiful, pleasant, interesting,
emotionally moving, o:i;- otherwise valuable
as objects of direct experience, in addition
to any instrumental values they may have.27
The rational for the utilization of this, rather
than another definition is three-fold.

First, it avoids

the antithesis between the "fine" and "useful" arts.

The

phrase, "making or doing," implies the manufacture of
la.sting object.s, such al, statues and buildings.
27 Munro, op. cit., p. 107.

Secondly,
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it eliminates the relative concepts of "beauty," and
"beautiful."

Art may deal with the painful or the ugly,

but the work of art which does this transmutes the ugliness and is itself a thing of "beauty."

Also, by ugly

works, it is meant those works of art which themselves
finally displease; i.e., works in the aesthetic contemplation of which, for whatever reason, not pleasure but
displeasure is derived.

Also, "used or intended as

. ," puts the definition in behavioristic terms.

To

qualify as art, the product does not need to be aesthe~ically satisfying; only to be used or adapted for an
aesthetic function by either the producer or consumer.
Finally, the phrase, "along with other ends or functions
. ," avoids the implication that the aesthetic
function is the sole or most important function of art.
Therefore, when referring to the scope of art, art shall
include the disciplines of painting, drawing, sculpture,
and architecture, and closely• related disciplines such
as, etching, engraving, printmaking, etc.

Chapter 3
WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF "ART?"
"Beauty" and "Pleasure"
Discerning the scope of art, those disciplines
that are to be included and those that are to be excluded,
does not give forth any information as to the "meaning"
of art; its purpose, function, and distinguishing characteristics.

Art nor the "visual arts," even though they

exhibit, do not state what art is.
If one wishes to understand both art and its
meaning, one must ask, "what is its function?"

Therefore,

in an attempt to ascertain the "meaning" of art and its
distinguishing characteristics, its precise, cognitive,
and affective purpose must be established.
to establish this, the concepts of:

In attempting

philosophers, aesthe-

ticians, critics, educators, sociologists, and psychologists
must be carefully and objectively studied.
Some theories concerning the function and distinguishing characteristics of art are irrelevant to this
investigation because they commence with a different
extension for the term "art."

Hence, a different group

of phenomena, other than that previously proposed, are
described.

Many purpose differentiae which are too broad,

in that they occur in many other phenomena besides that
of art.
25
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There are several related notions; art as expression,
as symbolic, as communication, and as language.
identical notions.

They are not

Saying merely that "art is expression" is

an example of too broad a differentiae; it fails to distinguish art from science, conversation, and many other things.
Some proposed differentiae are too narrow.
is of this sort:

Lange's definition

Art, is the capacity of man to give himself

and others a pleasure based upon illusion and free from any
conscious aim except the immediate enjoyment.28
According to Lange, art is to produce both pleasure
and enjoyment.

As there is no objective meaning of "beauty,"

there is also no objective definition of the term "pleasure."
Different people .are "pleased" in different modes and by
different things.

Also, the term "enjoyment," carries

with it the implication that art should be amusing, light,
gay, novel, clever, and the like.

Again, there is no

objective criterion for deciding what is and is not art.
t,

St~ictly speaking, paintings, sculptures, drawings,
and the like, are not "art," but instead, works of art.
Art is not a quality discernable in them, but instead, an
activity of man; the activity, of which, such things are
29
the products.
Therefore, art is not an activity aimed
28 Rader, op. cit., p. 9.
York:

29curt John Ducasse, The Philosophy of Art,
Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), p. 15.

(New
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at the creation of beauty, which as been the most common
opinion concerning the nature of art.

"Art," being an

activity, rather than product, then implies, among other
things, the critical control of a process of objectification, and not the producing and creating of beauty.

It

then follows, that no matter how close in actual fact may
be the relation between beauty and the activity called
art, no essential connection exists between them.

If being

a product of art has any implications at all, the implications have to do with the skill presumed to be involved
in the process of production, and not with the beauty of
the product.
Assuming that "art" is the activity and not the
product of such activity, the terms "skill," and "process
of production," contain important implications.

The first

implication is that of a product; which denotes the human
activity of production.

Secondly, "product" denotes a

producer, who shall be referred to as the "artist,"

Third,

"product," implies a "good," "service," or "commodity" to
be utilized.

Lastly, there must be those to utilize the

"product" of this human activity.

This group shall be

referred to as the "consumer."
Art as Language
This leads then, to the aforementioned related
notions of art as expression, communication, symbolism,
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and language.

While they are not identical notions, they

do have something in common, and are quite related, in
the sense that they are all human activities, making use
of the means common to all as human beings. 30

In this

sense, the artist produces a visual statement, which in
turn becomes the "product," or the subject matter for
a response or reaction from the observer or "consumer."
In this regard, the visual arts may be considered a language.

As in other languages, there is a source for the

communication, the artist; there is a medium that carries
the information originating at the source, the work of
art; and finally there is a receiver, the observer, the
consumer. 31
If language is expressive, and art is language,
then art, like language, expresses either the meanings
of things, or the intentions of human beings, or the
ulterior consequences or contexts of things and acts.

32

This concept of, art as language, is expressed
by C. J. Ducasse, who declares that:

30Ruth L. Saw, Aesthetics,
and Company, Inc., 1971), p. 143.

(New York:

31 Nathan Knobler, The Visual Dialogue,
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), p. 3.

Doubleday
(New York:

32 victorino Tejera, Art and Human Intelligence,
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), p. 37.
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"art is essentially a form of language; namely the
language of feeling, mood, sentiment, and emotional attitude."3 3

.,

.

According to Veron, art is also essentially language;
but different in the language that occurs through cries and
gestures.

Even though these expressions are natural to both

man and animals, man has the capacity to vary, diversify,
and elaborate on them as animals cannot.

This further aids

in discerning the nature of the term "language" as used in
34
~
this sense.
Veron, even though he may be essentially correct in assuming language to consist essentially in expression, fails in this definition to adequately qualify the
term "expression"

in a manner which will exclude expression

of feelings that are not art.

This is the identical problem

that exists with Ducasse's definition.
Croce, attempts a definition of art, and states:
"Art is essentially language, and a language is essentially
'expression'."3 5
What Croce calls "expression" is a very different
thing from what is usually meant by the term.

From the

immediate context of the passage quoted, it appears that by
"expression" Croce does not mean formulation in words,
33 curt John Ducasse, Art, The Critics, and You,
(New York:
Oskar Piest, 1944), p. 52.
34oucasse, op. cit., p. 21.
35 rbid., p. 42.
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lines, colors, etc., but only formulation in terms of
images, and that the physical work of art is nothing but
a mechanical copy of what the artist has created and holds
in his imagination.

Rather than clarify, Croce has added

to the confusion; namely the confusion of creation, origination, invention, and imagination.

Although expression

in images, to a limited extent, often precedes expression
in physical terms, this is by no means universally or
36
Croce's definition also implies
necessarily the case.
that "expression" and "intuition" are synonymous, which
in fact, they are not.

Also incorrect, is Croce's view

of the physical work of art.

It is his contention that

the physical work of art is essentially an aid to the
reproduction of the act of expression, which seemingly
rest on a very questionable psychological analysis.

As

an example, there is a vast and all important difference
between the expressing of a feeling by actively drawing
a line, and the obtaining of the same feeling by passively
following a line.
Tolstoy's definition of art is that:
"Art is the expression and communication
of remembered emotion, an emotion distinct
from spontaneous expression such as laughing
and weeping; to evoke in oneself a feeling
one has experienced, and having evoked it in
oneself, then by means of external signs, so
36 Ibid., p. 47.
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transmit that feeling th~
ience the same feeling."

7 others

may exper-

Unfortunately, Tolstoy's definition also encounters
difficulties.

A work which will succeed in communicating

the artist's feelings to one individual will not succeed
in doing so to another.

Also, how can anyone discern,

upon viewing a work'of art, whether it is the kind which
will communicate the artist's feelings to the spectator?
How can anyone discern whether the artist actually experienced, and now remembers, the emotion which the work of
art arouses in others?

However troublesome Tolstoy's

definition; it is significant in that it defines the mode
and method of communication, namely, through the use of
external signs.
Of the many definitions surveyed, Sydney Colvin's
definition of art, even though it has a Victorian flavor,
avoids many of the faults of others:
"The fine arts are those among the
arts of man which spring from his impulse
to do or make certain things in certain ways
for the sake, first, of a special kind of
pleasure, independent of direct utility,
which gives him so to do or make them and
next for the sake of the kindred pleasure
which he derives from witnessing or contemplating them when they are done or made
by others. Fine art is also, everything
which. man does or makes in one way rather
than another, freely and with premeditation
37Munro, op. cit., p. 80.
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in order to express and arouse emotion, in
obedience to laws of rythmic movement or
regulated design, and with the results
independent of direct utility and capable
of affording to many, permanent and disinterested delight.•38
Calvin's wording in the definition, is both useful and suggestive.

First, Colvin does not say that,

"fine art is the production of what is beautiful, or
what gives pleasure,"

Had this been in his definition,

it would have been impossible whether the resultant product is or is not "fine art," without evaluating it, and
thus part company with crrjective and scientific description.
Colvin, instead, merely states that fine art is produced
for the sake of a certain kind of pleasure.
or made to arouse and express emotion.

It is done

Its results are

capable of affording delight to "many," not necessarily
to all, or to any particular kind of person.
a slight verbal distinction.

This is not

It makes the whole statement

much more cautious and objective.
A more contemporary, abbreviated, and just as
objective definition of art has been proposed by Nathan
Knobler, in which he states:
"Art is a product of man which has a
defined form or order and communicates human
experience, and is affected by the skilled
control of the materials used in its

38 l.ul.
I, 'd •

,

p. 89.
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construction to project the formal and
communicative concepts that the artist
wishes to present."39
Arts as Communication
Despite the diversity between the definitions
cited, all share one common and very important premise.
All, either state or imply, that art is a form of communication.

If indeed, art is a form of communication, then

communication, in itself, is a work of art; and if art
is thought of as self-expression, then self-expression
necessarily accompanies communication.

Communication,

then, can be referred to as a transfer

of information or

ideas from a source to a receiver.
is required for this exchange.

Some vehicle or medium

The medium required is

generally thought of as "language."

That is, people

observing the same object, and sharing the consciousness
of that object. 40
Assuming that art is a form of communication,
gives rise to the following questions:

"What does the

artistJcommunicate?" and "Through what medium of 'language'
is used in the artist's communication?"
In answer to the first question, to judge by the
evidence of the work of artists throughout history, the
39 Knobler, op. cit., p. 26.
4 0ibid., p. 33.
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subject matter of the arts may be broken down into three
categories:

"the world of perceptual reality," "personal

response to experience, or conceptual reality"," and "the
communication of order."41
mutually exclusive.

These three areas are not

Many works of art combine all of

them, but there are art forms which appear to emphasize
one to the exclusion of others, and it is important for
the spectator to discern the initial intention of the
artist when confronted with a work of art.
A part of the traditional function of art has
been the representation of perceptual reality.
the artist records what he "sees" in reality.

That is,
Much visual

art, however, falls into the category of conceptual reality.
The artist represents what he knows about reality, rather
than what he sees.

Like a child, he records those aspects

and segments of his world which are meaningful to him,
putting together separate elements to form the entire
representation of an experience.
Egyptian art is conceptual.

As an example, early

In depicting a man, the Egyp-

tian artist selected parts of the body and then combined
them to form the complete figure.

The artist chose a

profile view of the head and placed within it a front view
of an eye.

Also, the artist indicated the shoulders in

41 rbid., p. 50.
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a frontal position, and the hips and legs from the side
view.

The resulting image may not satisfy the demands

of other cultures for the representation of the human
figure, but its conventions were accepted by the artists
and their patrons in Egypt, so that variations from it
became the exception rather than the rule.
In contrast to the system of conceptual representation of physical reality is the system of perceptual
representation of physical reality.

This is intended to

reproduce the l,lerceptual ex1,er ience derived from careful
observation of the physical world.
bird. is not always "the" bird.
flash of light.

In this concept, a

It may be a dot or a

The artist sees the world in flux, and

nothing in it appears twice in exactly the same way.

The

key word is "reproduce," in that the artist attempts to
reproauce actual physical entities and realities.

An

example of such would be Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres'
painting of "Louis B1:rtin."
Many works of art present no parallels with the
experience of an observer because they were produced in
a period, geographic location, or culture remote from
his own.

However, t.here are those works of art which make

no r<:·hin,nce to the subject matter of physical realities
of an:,• so.::-t, as surrealism, abstract expressionism, and nonobje~~ivism.

Often these art objects are characterized
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by an extremely sensitive exploitation of the potentials
of line, form, color, and texture.

In the common use of

the word "meaning," it may be argued that these works are
meaningless, even though they may provide anesthetic
response within the viewer, but it is possible to conceive
of works of art in this group as their own subject matter.
Their meaning lies in the complex relationships buil,t into
them.

To this, it can be said, that the artist's aim is

that of the communication of order.
The Sign and Symbol as Communication
The second part of the original question must now
attempted to be answered.

In response to, "through what

medium of 'language' is used in the artist's communication,"
Tolstoy's definition immediately comes to mind, when in
the latter part of his definition, he states; "that feelings
one has experienced, are transmitted to others by the means
of external signs." 4·2

According to Tolstoy, then, the

artist communicates through the medium of the utilization
of signs.

However, Veron states that symbols are the

essential means of communication in the expression of
emotion. 43

Tejera states that man is a creative animal

who lives by art rather than instinct, and as such, by
42Munro, op. ci' t ., p. 80 •

43 nucasse, op. cit., p. 21.
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the symbolising of things, he copes and relates to his
world. 44

The terms, "signs," and "symbols" are used in

the vast majority of definitions and theories that attempt
to describe the communicative qualities of art.

The two

terms are used, very often, in a very indiscriminate way,
implying that both may be somewhat synonomous, which in
fact they are not.
A sign must have a physical or actual equivalent,
while a symbol, though it may

have particular denotations,

is always a conceptual construction, that involves connotations of words and objects, and metaphoria associations
over and beyond their literal aspects.45

According to

Langer:
A sign indicates the existence, past,
present, or future of a thing, event, or
condition. Wet streets are a sign that it
has rained. A patter on the roof, is a
sign that it is raining,
The relationship
between a sign and its object is a simple
one: they are associated somehow, to form
a 'pair;' that is t2 say, there is a oneto-one correlation. 6
Symbols, on the contrary,
are not proxy for their objects, but
are "vehicles for the conception of objects."
4 4 Tejera, op. cit., p. 41.
45 rrving Kaufman, Art and Education in Contemporary Culture, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966)
p. 302.
46 suzanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 57.
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To conceive a thing or situation is not the
same thing as to "react toward it" overtly,
or to be aware of its presence. Therefore,
"it is the conceptions, not the things that
-symbols directly 'mean.'" The fundamental
difference between signs and symbols, is
this difference of association, and consequently 9f their use by another party to
the meaning and function of the subject;
signs "announce" their objects to the
observer, whereas symbols "lead one to
conceive" the objects."47
_The symbol, in contradistinction to the sign has
many universal, variable and broadly conceptual characteristics; while the sign is more specific, unique and basically involved with practical information.

The essential

difference that exists between the two and that divides
them in kind is function.
of the mind, intrinsically.

Symbols function as arbitrators
"Signs announce their objects,"

and all, animals and man, respond accordingly.

"Symbols

lead one to conceive of the object," and for this., man has
the greater capacity.
A Working Definition of Art
In sumation, art as communication has much in
common to all systems of communication; symbols and groups
of symbols are combined in structured relationships to
produce equivalents for human experience.

The symbols

that are developed are separate and distinct from the
actual objects and experiences they represent.
4 71bid., pp. 60-61.

Often
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these symbols and their organization are based upon previous experiences and traditions, but just as often they
are the result of an individuals artist's attempt to find
the means of communicating those aspects of his experience
which he feel-s cannot be expressed with the visual language
of his heritage.
In lieu of this information, as to the function
and distinguishing characteristics of art, the previously
formulated definition of art must be altered, to include
the phrase, "skill in expressing and communicating past
emotional and other experience, individual and social, in
a perceptivle medium."

The definition of art should then

read:
ART:
is skill in making or doing
that which is used or intended as a stimulus to a satisfactory aesthetic experience, often along with other ends or
functions; especially in such a way that
the perceived stimulus, the meanings is
suggests, or both, are felt as beautiful,
pleasant, interesting, emotionally moving,
or other.wise valuable as objects of direct
experience, in addition to any instrumental values they may have.
It is also
skill in expressing and communicating
past emotional and other experience,
individual and social, in a perceptible
medium. 48
48

Munro, op. cit., p. 518.
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Chapter 4
PROBLEMS IN UNDERSTANDING ART
Perceptual and Intellectual Inadequacy
For the observers, the consumer.s of the arts, the
meaning of art begins with the work itself.

The observer

begins where the artist, producer, has stopped.

The

meaning that the layman finds in the art object is dependent upon the work of art, but it is also dependent upon
the viewer's own intellectual and emotional condition, as
well as his ability to perceive the work before him.

Like

the reader of a written text, the observer must recognize
and decipher the symbols and the pattern of symbols before
understanding can occur.49
The artist could express himself without his meaning being comprehended by the observer; art could be
symbolic without succeeding in being understood; the artist
could do his half of the process of communication and yet
not be received; but in speaking of art as language, then
quite definitely, it could not be language unless it is
shared by others, and unless it were hypothetically understandable, even if not understood by them. 50

49

Knobler, op. cit., p. 3.

50 saw, op. cit., p. 142.

41

There will always be art to be done because there
will always be experiences that are fragmentary, un~atisfactory, or in some way not unitary.

Given the dynamics

of human adaption and of social change, the moment alway.s
comes when the art of the past no longer serves to inform us
of current experience or the perceptions of the present.
So it is with works of art presently being offered to the
public.

The artist often leaves the unitiated, and a

vast majority of the public confused and sometimes antagonistic.

When faced with objects which at first glance

may seem meaningless, the observer who seeks to understand
art, and especially contemporary art, must ~ive the artist
the benefit of a doubt, or at least take a second look.
However, the observer must also grant the possibility that
his inability to comprehend the work in question is due
to an inadequacy in himself and not the artist.
The perception of meaning in a work of art, is
not automatic, even though it.appears to be for some works.
The training and effort required of the artist for the
production of his work often required a parallel preparation in the public which expects to respond to it.

At

this point the responsiblity shifts and it is the observer
who bears the burden.

If he is satisfied that his percep-

tual training is equal to the demands made by the artist,
then he can question the content and the values implicit
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in the objects before him.

If not, the serious observer

can react only to what he finds meaningful; many works of
art will remain enigmatic to him until that time when he
is prepared to respond to them.
The present-day viewer of art can no longer assume
that the photographic image is a standard by which other
images are to be judged, a language acting as the measure
of other communications systems, for the viewer finds himself in a multilingual visual world, a world in which all
languages have a value measured by their ability to communicate a significant imag.e of some portion of human
experience.

Both the artist and the viewing public are

today faced with the problems of communication which
rarely affected their counterparts in the past.

Because

they are aware of so much of the world, because they perceive it historically, scientifically, psychologically,
and because the personal perception has been given a value
which it did not have in the past, the representation of
that perception and the comprehension of what has been
represented becomes a complex process.51
However, the public cannot place the total responsibility for its response upon the artist.

It is not

enough to say that the artist must produce an object which
makes the public respond, for the understanding and
· 51 Knobler, op. cit.,
·
p. 49.
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appreciation of art results from an active participation
on the part of the observer.

The work of art exists as

a completed physical entity when it is presented to
the viewer, but it becomes an object of esthetic value
only when it causes a response in that viewer, and the
nature of that response is dependent upon the active
participation of the viewer in the esthetic experience.
The work of art has a statement to make, but it is the
observer who shapes that statement into a personal communication.

Art in this sense, then, is neither communication

nor language unless there is a shared message between the
precipitator of such and the recipient.

When this pheno-

menon of a shared message occurs, then indeed, art is
communication and language, for it then i.implies both
communion and dialogue, rather than monologue.
Art is communicative in the sense of dialogue

'

and communion, it is shared celebration or consecration
of a value, perception, or experience.

The development

or achievement of this value requires intelligence, as
does the process which is barely distinguishable from it
of giving form to this value in some medium.

Intelligence

is communicative in the sense that it institutes cooperation in activities which, however, are guided by mediate
or remote ends in view.

Intelligence attempts to be per-

ception of how things function, not just the experience
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of others, but how they function in physical, or nonhuman contexts.

Intelligence and art are, both, creative

and communicative processes.

Intelligence is creative in

the sense that it invents or is said to discover, an order
in the world which allows the human being to intervene
decisively in the course of affairs.

Art is creative in

the sense that it is expressive, and if it produces change,
it is only indirectly and in moral matters. 52
Although the arts are intended and adapted, on
the whole, to stimulate satisfactory aesthetic experience,
along with other functions, their success in do1ng so, is
extremely variable.

It depends to a great extent on the

training and conditioning of the percipient.

Except for

the blind, perception of the visual arts would seem to
pose no difficult problems, but few persons of normal
vision realize how limited their perception and perceptual
understanding really is.
Perception, the awareness of the world around one,
based on the information that comes through the sense, is
too often considered as a natural, matter-of-fact attribute
of the human being.

The assumption is made that everyone

sees the same thing, and this is not so.

For some time

psychologists and physiologists have known that there is

52 Tejera, op. cit., p. 214.
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considerable difference between the raw information given
to the brain by the senses and one's awareness of the world
based on this information.

Processor J. Z. Young states:

"the once-blind man can learn to 'see'
only by training his brain. By expending a
considerable amount of effort, one can gradually understand the visual experiences of
color, form, space, and textures."53
Young's experiments suggest that the sensations
one receives have no meaning until one knows how to order
them into a coherent perception.

Perceiving something

requires that the observer make a selection of the numerous
sensations transmitted to him at any one time.

The obser-

ver must select those sensations which are significant for
the construction of a particular experience and disregard
those which are irrelevant.
requires training.

As Young points out, this

The untrained observer cannot make

sense of what he sees before him.54
According to Kaufman, animals other than man have
a highly developed receptor system that triggers an almost
instantaneous effector system.

Even when they do not as

in laboratory experiments they evidence no more than the
most rudimentary aspects of interpretive intelligence with
no real qualities of imagination.

There is a practical

cast of mind in the animal that essentially responds to
53Knobler, op. cit., p. 14.
54rbid., p. 14.
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signs and signals but never really in a symbolic
context.
The human mind on the other hand, has developed
an inhibiting arrangement between the receiving of sense
material and the reaction to it as well as an imaginative,
projecting quality.

There is a neuro-physiological base

for this in the synaptic relay of messages to the brain.
This is not of concern in this paper.

What is important

though, is the recognition of this innately human power
that may be called the symbolic system.

Man does not,

in a biological and cognitive sense, react instinctively
to his environment and stimuli found there.

He stops,

thinks, weighs, and counterbalances the choices that
become consciously apparent or that he unconsciously
devises.

His way of knowing is dependent upon his intel-

lect and the symbol-making powers he possesses.

Man's

picture of the world, and his manner of reaction to it
are determined by this inherent inhibition that activates
the fluent symbolic screen in his mind.

This screen has

developed through all the varied strains of man's knowledge, through which man experiences the reality of
multiple dimensions. 55
This is an important concept to remember, for
according to Tejera, what one notices and fails to notice
55 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 299.
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in ordinary life is dependent upon three factors, namely;

interest, one's conditioning, and intellectual life. 56
No wonder then, that the so-called "serious art" divides
people into those who are able to appreciate and understand
it and those who cannot, for one of the chief criticisms
of modern art by the average layman, the "man on the
street," is that he does not know what it is meant to be,
but yet, he knows what he likes.

This is taken by himself

to be a bold assertion of a sturdy common sense, but by
the aesthete to be an expression of Philistinish; one
of those over-simplifications induced by a no-standard
position.

Art

This is also implied in Gombrich's book,

and Illusion, in which the concept is presented that

a work of art contains in some sense of the word, much
more than appears on the surface; that art is for comprehension, that is "understanding," and appreciation.

In

order to do this, however, one must be equipped to "read
the signs," i.e., literal marks that can be "read" or
taken as clues, in order to discern what is there, not
for its own sake and for the sake of its sensible properties, but for its meaning.57

Being "equipped," implies

the possession of adequate intellectual and perceptual
qualities that would enable one to make genuine cognitive
56 TeJera,
·
op. ci't ., p. 16 .
57 E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion,
don Press, 1962), p. 161.

(London: Phai-
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and aesthetic judgements and to transcencl the realm of
sensory judgements so frequently and commonly made by
the average individual.
If "A" says of object "X", that it is beautiful
and "B" says that it is not beautiful, one of them is
right and the other wrong.

If the contradictory judge-

ments were descriptive and not sensory, there would be
accepted ways of determining which of the two was right.
Since the sensory judgement invokes no concepts, one
can apply no test so far as the subject is concerned.
What we can do is fine out whether "A" and "B" are making
genuine aesthetic judgements.
Cultural Illiteracy
The visual arts produced by the contemporary
artist, seem to be isolated from a large portion of society.

Many artists find few among the lay public who seem

to understand the concepts basic to the arts, few who can
recognize the historical ties between present-day art
and the arts of the past.

To the practicing artist, there

appears to be a widespread visual illiteracy, a public
generally incapable of "reading" current visual language
and often extremely limited in its ability to "read" the
visual languages of the past.
Another damanging comment on the general level of
cultural illiteracy comes from the controversial novelist
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and essayist, Henry Miller.

He indicates that it is not

only the manufactured visual vulgarity that covers the
land or its arid commercialism, but the sticky, lost
morass of spirit that is developed where only in the
interstices of society can one sense an honestly open and
fresh human purpose and an unencumbered and committed
endeavor.

He also states that nothing comes to function

in America except utilitarian objects.

One can ride for

thousands of miles and be utterly unaware of the existence
of the world of art.

One will learn all about beer, con-

densed milk, rubber.goods, canned foods, inflated matresses,
etc.; but one will never see or hear anything concerning
the masterpieces of art.SB
58 Kau f man, op. cit.,
·
p.

374 .

Chapter 5
THE RELATIONSHIP OF ART TO EDUCATION AND SOCIETY
Relationship of "Art" to "Life"
Those elements within Western Society that
percipitate cultural illiteracy are; labor and technology,
social, economic, and material mobility, as well as leisure,60 institutions of higher learning, the cultural
antithesis between the useful and fine arts, 61 and the
mass media, 62 and others that are a result of these
that are aforementioned.

However, all these are inter-

related, and have a direct relationship to the status of
art and art criticism within American Society.
The relation of art to life is of the first
importance, especially in a skeptical age, when man turns
to his own creations and examine~ them, not alone from
the aesthetic point of view, but for what they reveal,
for what they validate and invalidate, for the support
they give to the culture.
separate enterprises.

Art and civilization are not

Almost all man does, he does by

59 Tejera, op. cit., p. 204.
60 c1ement Greenbert, Art and Culture,
Beacon Press, 1961), p. 29.
61Munro, op. cit., pp. 47-90.
62 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 385.
50

(Boston:

59
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art, or culture; culture being, as Greenberg states, "all
the characteristic activities of a given people." 63

Ani-

mals have instincts and biological adaption or specialization; but man has his arts, or cultural adaptions.

It

has been rightly said that the intellectual arts are
those that free. men most to be themselves. 64

One must

think of the arts as Veron insisted, not as the fine
late flower of human culture, not the fugitive bloom of
civilizations as they emerge into the sun, but as the
very germ and active principle in culture-building from
the ground up; from the bone tools and pebble tools of
the small-brained men in lower Pleistocene times to date,
the process of man's adaption has been artfui. 65
Beyond this, the arts are the outward manifestations of all the inner happenings of culture.

They are

the symbolic touchstones of the values of that culture
and are reflections of its social order in a very discern66
ing manner.

63

Greenberg, op. cit., p. 23.

64 Mark Van Doren, Autobiography,
Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1958).
65 Tejera, op. cit., p. 123.
66 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 47.

(New York:

52

The "Folk," "Popular" and "High" Cultures in Society
According to Kaufman, there are three existing
categories of social-aesthetic organization within Western
civilization.

He refers to these as, folk, popular, and

high cultures, giving rise to folk, popular, and high
art forms. 67

Even though there is no scientific validity

with which to objectively support the existence of these
categories, most, who are intellectually concerned with
communication through various art media as manifestations
of culture, would generally accept the existence of similar classifications.

There may be individual modification

as to make up or extent of influence, but there is general
agreement that something approximating the three cultures,
giving rise to their particular art forms, does in fact
exist as cohesive and separate entities.

This concept is

echoed also by Max Lerner, who refers to the three art
forms in the same terminology as stated by Kaufman.

68

However, Russell Lynes refers to them as, highbrow art,
middlebrow art, and lowbrow art.

69

The folk culture is the oldest type of group
expression.

It is an indigenous development arising from

67 Ibid., p. 339.
York:

68 Max Lerner, American as a Civilization,
Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 646.

69 Russell Lynes, The Tastemakers,
and Brothers, 1954), pp. 310-333.

(New

(New York:

Harper
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the daily involvements of the average individual within
a circumscribed environment.

Early in the colonial per-

iod of America, with the influx of immigrant groups
bringing differing folk ways and characteristic art forms
to a new country, America gave rise to a specific folk
culture.

All of these have left imprints on the culture

of America, though the internal needs and external conditions that shaped the folk culture have either, to an
extent, disappeared, or have been absorbed as a part of
the larger mass culture.

The delineation of the folk

art was usually intuitive and in direct association with
the sensuous and psychological qualities of the surroundings.

Though there were often utilitarian purposes for

the forms, they were not intrusive.

They derived their

forms from a sympathetic rapport with active and mythical
qualities innocently yet pragmatically, weaving the conditions of art and life into a sensuous symbolic relationship.70

One can illustrate some genuine and representative

American folk culture by pointing to such items as colonial
furniture, the portraits of the itinerant limners, the
ballads of the pioneers, the craft work of the Indians,
the spirituals of the slaves, or the design motifs of the
Pennsylvania Dutch settlers.

Though there may have been

a parallel high culture existing simultaneously, the two
70Kaufman, op. cit., p. 341.
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did not attempt to penetrate one another.

There are only

vestigial remnants of this kind of culture and its art
forms in the United States currently, and the reasons for
such will be presented later.

Lynes refers to the folk

culture and folk art as "lowbrow," i.e., that. culture
which absorbs and maintains without much questioning the
"popular arts," the unrefined folk forms of dress, orna71
mentation, iazz, language, and calendar art.
The popular culture, that gives rise to popular
art forms, or as Lynes refers to them, the middlebrow
forms, i.e., those that fit anywhere between highbrow and
lowbrow, 72 are the most pervasive in contemporary American
society.

These art forms are characterized by a commercial

self-sufficience.

It has developed a media of its own,

where the serious artist will rarely venture.

It comes

in the form of "do-it-by-the-number" crafts kits, "paintby-the-numbers" painting sets, one dollar reproductions
of great paintings, original art work by mail order from
Sears and Roebuck, imitative facades of architectural
structures reflecting past, historical eras, and many
other expurgated and abridged versions of a high order of
intellectual search and spuriously intense emotional
expression.
7lLynes, op. cit., pp. 310-333.
72 Ibid.
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Dwight MacDonald characterizes "popular" culture,
or as he prefers to call it ''Masscult'' as follows:
"It is not just unsuccessful art.
It is non-art.
.Masscult offers its
customers neither an aesthetic experience
nor an emotional catharsis, for these
demand effort. The production line grinds
out a uniform product whose humble aim
is not even entertainment, for this too
implies life and hence effort, but merely
distracticn.
It may be stimulating or
narcotic, but it must be easy to assimilate.
It asks nothing of its audience
for it is 'totally subjected to the spectator,' and it gives nothing."73
Clement Greenberg, another critic borrows a German
work "kitsch" to further describe the conditions.of popular culture.

He comments:

"The precondition for kitsch, a condition without which kitsch would be
impossible, is the availability close at
hand of a full matured cultural tradition,
whose discoveries, acquisitions, and perfected self-consciousness, 'kitsch' can
take advantage of for its own ends.
It
borrows from its devices, tricks, strategems, rules of thwnb, themes, converts
them into a system, and discards the rest
. • when enough times has elapsed, the
new is looted for new 'twists' which are
74
then watered down and served up as kitsch."
The sad fact is, that the revealing glimpses into
both society and culture supposedly offered by "kitsch"
73Dwlght MacDonald, Against the American Grain,
(New York:
Random House, 1962), p. 3.
74 clement Greenberg, "Avant Garde and Kitsch,"
The Partisan Reader, (New York:
Dial Press, 1946),
p. 381.
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are, for the most part, truncated and superficial experiences.

It tends to become a barrier to an authentic

involvement with aesthetic qualities and a more profound
artistic expression.
The third category of social-aesthetic organization
is high culture and high art forms, or as Lynes refers,
the highbrow art forms, the highbrow culture, in which
the people's taste have been developed through intellectual
pursuits and experiences therein, and the fine arts. 75
High culture may not be as old as folk culture,
but it developed as soon as social organization became
more sophisticated than simple communcal living.

It

reflects and expresses the highest achievements and aspirations of a civilization.

The priestly culture of Egypt,

the inspired rule of Rome, the Mandarin dynasties of
China, the Renaissance, the majestic courts of France,
in which all created high art forms that may now be
regarded as pinnacles of cultural achievement.

These

cultures were sophisticated and intensely practiced ones,
separated from the common run of endeavor, based upon the
existence of a priviledged or aristocratic class that had
highly developed social backgrounds in additon to aesthetically oriented educations, in short, cultivated taste.

75Lynes, op. cit., pp. 310-333.
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One can exerpt from de Tocqueville a concise
explanation of the formation of these high cultures:
"It commonly happens that, in the age
of priviledge, the practice of almost all
the arts becomes a priviledge, and that
every pro~ession is a separate domain into
which it is not allowable for everyone to
enter. Even when productive industry is
free, the fixed character which belongs to
aristocratic nations gradually segregates
all. the persons who practice the same art
till they form a distinct class, always
composed of the same families, whose members
are all known to each other, and among whom
a public opinion of their own and a species
of corporate pride soon spring up.
In a
class or guild of this kind each artisan has
not only his fortune to make, but his reputation to preserve. He is not exclusively
swayed by his own interest or even by that of
his customer, but by that of the body to
which he belongs; and the interest of that
body is that each artisan should produce the
best possible workmanship.
In aristocratic
ages the object of the arts was to manufacture
as well as possible, not with the greatest
dispatch or at the lowest rate. The men of
whom it is composed naturally derive from
their superior and hereditary position a taste
for what is extremely well made and lasting.
This affects the general way of thinking of
the nation in relation to the arts • . .
In aristocracies, then, the handicraftsman
work for only a limited number of fastidious
customers; the profit they hope to make depends
principally on the perfection of their
workmanship."76
Even though the priviledged, political, and "elite"
groups have undergone radical change, the aesthetic traditions that have shaped and succored high art for so many
76 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America,
(New York: Mentor, 1956), p. 171.
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centuries remain even in western society today, in the
forms of painting, drawing, sculpture, architecture and
related disciplines; all in varying degrees.

The seri-

ous artist presents a continuing psychological defiance
of the commonplace in insisting upon an engagement with
the disturbing yet generative qualities of his inner life
and that of mankind in general.

The result is an ongoing

creation of art works in the highest tradition, ahead of
the banalities of the commonplace.
The Effect of Technology on the "Folk," "Popular," and
"High" Cultures
The least prevalent type of social-aesthetic organization is that of the folk culture and its folk art forms.
The major reason for this phenomenon is the development
of science and technology.

Kaufman states that in the

industrialized nations of the west, the nineteenth century witnessed the uprooting of folk cultures and the
alienation of high culture, and that only a few examples
of pure folk art remain, namely that of the tribal enclaves
in Africa and the peon culture in Mexico, as a few examples.77

The last part of Kaufman's statement is extremely

important, as he implies that these same elements are
responsible for the promotion of the popular culture and
the alienation of the high culture.
77 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 341.

This is no doubt an
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oversimplification on Kaufman's part.

Rather, what should

be stated is that science and technology are the common
denominators of the many related elements within society
that promote such a phenomenon.
The popular culture can be too easily traced to
irrelevant sources.

The conditions of popular culture,

as characterized earlier, have spread over the world; in
some instances they are deliberately manipulated as propaganda, in others they are the commodities, ideas, and
forms most desired by the greater majority of the populace.
The diffusion of a vast machinery of "homoginized" culture
cannot be denied:

from the socialist realism of Russia

to the controlled propaganda of China, from the twist,
frug or latest discotheque craze danced on a Mediterranean
shore to the, comics read in London, from the mass circulation of magazine covers in the United States to the sentimental postcards from south of the border.

Obviously there

are forces at work that stimulate and support the spread.
The most prominent consideration is the parallel spread
of the Industrial Revolution.
The radical innovations of an unbounded technology
inaugurated many economic and social changes that altered
the groundwork and class considerations of the developmenb
of consequent culture no matter what classification they
fell into.

There was greater productivity, an increase

60

in comfort and leisure, the raising of income on all
levels

but particularly at the lowest level,

There has

been a parallel committmen¼ in economic terms at first,
and subsequently aesthetic ones, to an abundant but mass
and standardized approach to production and consumption
founded on efficiency and profit.

Despite all the gains

that technology can claim, there has been a parallel and
related development, if not an arbitrary imposition of
an inartistic and unintellectual mass culture.

This

threatens the very advances achieved by technology in
value terms.

The inherent confusions which congenitally

seem to arise when the standard of excellence is allowed
to be controlled by an insensitive and uninformed low
common denominator finds its way into all the nooks and
crannies of living as well as into the large public
areas. 78
"Technology," as Max Frisch in his novel Homo
Faber

succintly points out, may be regarded as, "the

knack of so arranging the world so that one does not have
to experience it."

Technology at once becomes a .. bur.den

as well as an opportunity.

The opportunities that can

relieve the bulk of man in his unremitting struggle for
daily bread, creating opportunities for what could be an
intense and creative self-realization but is really only
7Sibid., p. 365.
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a redistribution of time,- can at the same time burden
society with unsuspected illusions and concepts which trap
the average individual and keep him from a really vital
79
engagement with experience.
While technology has been the underlying cause
of the demise and virtual extinction of folk art forms
within the United States, and promoted the incessant flood
of popular art forms presented to the American public;
its affect upon high art forms is of an entirely different
nature.
The development of science and technology has
increased 'the ways in which one can view the world.

Devel-

opments in the sciences have extended the limits of the
senses to a tremendous degree.

The eyes, aided by the

electron microscope, can see into a world of complex and
amazing forms.

The telescope can reach into the heavens

to examine the vast heavens,:

the spaces among the stars,

and the patterns of the nebulae.

The x-ray permits explor-

ation of the intricate inner forms of familiar objects and
creatures.

The oscilloscope reveals patterns of sound and

other invisible energies.

The motion picture camera makes

possible the capture of even the swiftest of movements for
study at leisure.

The landscape of today is not restricted

to a view from a hilltop; it can be seen from a plane far
79Ibid., p. 365.
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above the earth or from a bathyscaph a mile beneath the
surface of ·the sea.

The dimensions of the perceptual

world have been increased many times in the last few
years, and they now continue their expansion into outer
space.

For Renaissance man the forms of the outer world

were restricted to what he could see with the unaided eye.
When the painter of the fifteenth century conceived of a
landscape, it was viewed in terms of trees growing over
him and mountains rising over the fields in distant blues
and violets.
the artist.

Today the world is a different place for
His vision is no longer confined to the

limits of the earth.

He may paint what he sees, but now

what he sees has been extended to the microcosm and macrocosm that science has revealed to him.
Because of the new breadth of subject matter now
a part of the environment in which men live, because of
the relatively recent emphasis on subjective attitudes
and ·responses to experience, there is a continuing search
on the part of the artist for visual equivalents expressive of his inner world and of his consciousness of the
world he perceives about him.

Parallel with the artist's

concern for the visual equivalent is his interest in the
esthetic structure of his work.

At times it is the

sym-

bolic meaning which dominates his art, at times the esthetic,
but most often it is a fusion of the two.
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As in the instance of verbal or written communication, there is a need for adequate preparation on the
part of all parties to the intercourse, dialogue, communication; and for the observer of painting, sculpture, and
architecture.

This means recognition of the problems of

communication in the visual arts and active participation
in the study of the new languages which appear as artists
strive for an active expression of the contemporary life.
Effect of Technology on Cultural Value Systems
Technology, as Marx pointed out, produces class
divisions within a civilization that is characterized by
material productivity, which is the case in even the most
advanced societies. 80

Accordingly, these class divisions

have given rise, historically, to a minority of the powerful, and therefore the cultivated on one side, and on the
other, the great mass of the exploited and poor, and therefore the ignorant.

Formal culture, historically, has

belonged to the first, while the last have had to content
themselves with a folk or rudimentary culture. 81
It has also been discovered that the first effects
of technological innovation have usually been unsettling
and destructive, politically, socially, as well as
8Dc1ement Greenberg, Art and Culture, op. cit., p. 26.
81 rbid., p. 16.
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Inhereted forms lose their relevance, and

culturally.

there is a general breakdown until more apposite forms
arise, forms that are usually unanticipated and unprecedented.

This circumstance in itself would be enough to

account for the present decline of high culture.

It is

also a fact that the source of greatest threat that the
technological revolution offers to the continuity and
stability of high culture is a vastly accelerated rate
of upward social, more accurately, material and economic
mobility.

The traditional facilities of urban culture

cannot accomodate themselves to a steadily growing population, not merely class of newcomers to comfort and
leisure, without suffering deterioration; to the very
extent that industrialism promotes social welfare, it
attacks traditional culture. 82
Technology attacks the traditional culture not
only through the channels of social, economic, and material mobility, which it causes; but it also attacks the
basic values and value systems of the numerous ethnic
groups and socio-economic classes within the American
society.

The

II

Age;. of Anxiety,

11

as the twentieth century

has dubbed, because of its continuing sense of crisis.,
violence, uncertainties, has not permitted any simple or
stable understanding or translation of what the vision of
82rbid., p. 29.
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"the good life" may be.

The vacillating beliefs and

shifting values have not had a shared point around which
to cluster, and it is this focus of attitude, this concentration of a core understanding that is required to render
the beliefs and values most effective.

Modern man no

longer has the commitments of earlier rituals or the devotional attitude of unquestioned views.

The sense of

identification, of meaningful purpose has withered away
in the upheavels of the past century; modern man stands
shorn of his old supports, but, he is bereft of an ability
to erect new ones, and deprived of authoritative guides
by which to steer his way. 83
According to Paul Goodman in his book,
Up Absurd,

Growing

many of the fundamental values that have, in

the past, inspired man into positive action and belief
have been removed from sight or fractured into mechanized
and oftentimes insensitive components.

It is difficult

for people to feel that what they are doing is worthwhile.
The arts in themselves, cannot offset this social malaise;
it is much too deeply rooted in a pervasive relationship
of the individual in society to the characteristic means
of production.

It is economic and political in nature

and art cannot hope to counter these influences in any
84
obvious way.
83 Kau f man, op. cit.,
·
p. 28.
84Ibid., p. 34.
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The values of the contemporary world have found
their way into the diverse styles and forms of today's
art.

It is most clearly evident in the apparent divisions

between the serious or fine art forms and those of the
popular variety.

The latter appear to satisfy the average

individual's "taste," despite the fact that their mass
production and standardization render the critical faculties and the basic "hunger for beauty" futile.
The term "culture" is used to identify the values
of a people from a common heritage, and the term "values"
is used to identify the attitudes, and what is regarded
as acceptable behavior by a particular group of people of
common heritage.

The term "social class" is used when

studying the ways groups of people relate themselves to
other people, to economic levels, and in some degree to
behavioral patterns.

Class stratification is a reality

in this country, but is often ignored by the idealism of
the populaca

Though t4ere is, considerable overlapping,

shifting, in an open society, there are identifiable
differences between groups.

They tend to share what is

called the American culture,
cultural characteristics.

but they have distinct sub-

Each ethnic group within a

socio-economic class tend to vary in cultural pattern.
Though social classes have general likenesses throughout
the country, there are also regional differences, and
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differences if the groups are living in urban or rural
areas.

In describing this phenomenon, the sociologist

Milton M. Gordon has coined the term ''ethclass.••8 5
According to Gordon, as more and more minority
group members move into the middle and upper middle class,
ethnic identification alone becomes inadequate to describe
them, for they identify with the mores of their social
status; as this takes place more cultural diversity will
be found within economic groups.
Gordon also found through his research, two conflicting trends in America.

One, is a pressure for con-

formity, due to middle class orientation and the extent
and intensity of mass communications. 86

The other trend

is that the subcultures of race, religion, national origin,
and economic level are much stronger than has been assumed. 87
It was also learned by Gordon, that most people's primary
group interaction is within their subculture, while their
secondary group activities tend to be within the larger
society, and that most of the professional and business
leadership of the country comes from the middle class core

85 Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life:
The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 51-54.
86 Ibid., pp. 24-26.
87 Ibid., p. 34.
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culture, and from those members of other groups who have
learned this core culture. 88
Two phrases from Gordon's research, namely, "conformity to middle class orientation," and "that one's
primary group interaction is within one's subculture," are
very important; because, according to Gordon, the middle
class has never embraced art as central to its culture,
and that with the many and varied subcultures, there
appears to be, on the part of the average layman, the use
of "taste," a subjective and sensory concept, in evaluating
art forms rather than genuine, objective, aesthetic criti.
89
Cl.Sm.

"Taste" Development
According to McFee, "taste" is indeed a subjective,
and not objective means of evaluation, and is evidenced by
one's like-dislike behavior.

She also adds that the indi-

vidual's "taste" responses are affected usually by the
values and attitudes of one's group, that is, one's core
culture, and is directly related to the personality structure that one develops.

One forms "taste" unconsciously,

often, from listening to others within the immediate core
culture.

McFee also states that "taste" formation is the
8 8 Ibid . , p . 7 3 .
89rbid., pp. 254-257.
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result of the combination of three elements; namely,
individual experience, national culture, and socioeconomic class. 90
Ernst van den Haag examines the problem of "taste,"
but he refers to it as the "economics of taste."

He points

out that the material aspect, the goods and commodities
which originally were only the possession of an elite
small group now can be provided for the many, not because
of quality or leisure time or any intrinsic values other
than that they may be mass produced because of an efficient technology and done so quite cheaply.

"However,

only those things, good things and bad things, are cheap
that are demanded by enough people to make mass production
feasible." 91

This puts culture, which is part of the pro-

ductive aspects of society, on an economic basis.

Though

this may have provided mass groups with greater .. opportunities to experience "culture," it is only on the basis
of shared popular tastes that this can be profitably and
efficiently established.

The lone person with unique,

independent or developed taste that is outside the pale
of popular acceptance is penalized in that one must either
forego that which he prefers because it is either unavailable

cisco:
York:

90 June King McFee, Preparation for Art, (San FranWadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1961), p. 29.
91Ernst Van de Haag, The Fabric of Society,
Harcourt, 1957), p. 70.

(New
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or exorbitantly expensive or he must pay the additonal
price, though the intrinsic material factors may even be
lower in actual value than that of the popular item.
However, the most important aspect of generalized
"taste" development lies in the broad, encompassing and
insinuating social pressures that the individual is subjected to.

The value orientation of parents and peers,

of the mass media, and the many traditional sources of
cultural inheritance are the compelling factors in shaping
the collective "taste" of the individuals that make up
various kinds of groups.

These are in a complex relation-

ship with one another, with the other identifiable deter-

minants and with the growing self awareness that everyone
experiences at one time or another.92
Russell Lynes states in his popular treatise on
"taste;" "taste is one's personal delight, one's private
dilemma, and one's public facade." 93

This paradoxical

delight and delima of "taste"-is often thought of as a
peculiarly inbred individual quality that somehow grew
like Topsy.

However, at the same time, "taste" becomes

a degree of commitment

to particular values which one.

wears figuratively like an insignia on one's sleeve for
others to rate us by.

Often, one "reads" the social class

92 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 382.
93L ynes, op. cit.,
.
4
p..
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of people, sometimes arbitrarily by their "tastes" and
frequently infer other and more potent aspects through the
existence of that same factor of "taste."

Illogically,

"taste" is regarded both as the product of many unconscious
determinants, of long term sets of mind and habits as well
as the spontaneous impulse responding to momentary fashions
and fads on one level and to authentic individual understanding on another.

Because of the intricacy of qualities

and the psychological confusion surrounding the subject
of "taste" it is consigned to its own realm.

Though people

think that everyone harkens to this ideal of democratic
preference, that the entire affair of "taste" is a personal
matter, the actions of the populus belie this belief.
one's private delima spreads to the public facade, or at
least the problem of shaping one's "taste" to conform to

'

what is envisaged as the private image of oneself, vis a
vis the stares and conjectures of the public attitudes
outside.

Though one may insist that his "tastes" are his

own, at the same time, he permits them to be manipulated
by what is regarded as the important "vox populi:"
voice of the people.

the

The commercial society and its

popular culture has taken acute advantage of the situation.
People are appealed to incessantly to buy this or consider
that, to change their indiscriminate ways, to give vent
to their secret desires and generally capitulate to the
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to the mass imposition of values, all in the name of "good
taste." 94
These attitudes of "taste," to reiterate, and
according to McFee, are shaped by individual experience,
that generally occur within one's socio-economic position.

95

In addition to this, however, is the very existence of
change itself, that occurs with advanced bechn6logy.

Tech-

nical innovations and the discovery of new materials and
processes are fundamental determinates of "taste."

They

enlarge the possibilities offering new or an expanded
range of choice.

The introduction of metal into interior

furnishings, the development of cheap printing processes
for reproducing pictures, the structural innovations in
building construction that make use of a wide variety of
different materials, among others, have created a refurbished and vastly different "taste"

in the generai phys-

ical appearances of buildings in the last decade. 96

How-

ever, this is a normal development that has little to do
with the quality of "taste," but simply opens up the
possibilities of choice.

In a similar way, because of

technical discoveries, sculpture, which up to the end of
the nineteenth century was largely confined to stone and
94 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 382.
95McFee, op. cit., p. 29.
96Kaufman, op. cit., p. 383.
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bronze casting,· to chipping and modeling, expanded its
materials and processes to include iron, steel, plastics,
and could be welded, cut, glued, and otherwise worked in
addition to the older academic means.

The question of

"taste," i.e., tl'hat which is "good" or "bad" in art and
art forms, still remains, no matter what the media
employed. 97
In art there is a popular need to have "taste,"
but "taste" has little, if any involvement with the actual
forms of art that are serious expressions of the human
condition.

The inferior artistic conditions and the

stereotyped or questionable images that result are clearly
evident.

As the popular artsspread, the superficial

appearances and the underlying quest for mass success with
mass audiences becomes the determinant of popular and
artistic form.

There is a blending of technics, commerce,

and art that makes the distinctions between "good" and
"bad" art very vague, and unimportant in the final analysis.

The fundamental influences of the environment have

still not found their meaningful interpretation, except
in ways foreign or merely adjunctive to the conditions of
art. 98

97rbid., p. 383.
9Brbid., p. 291.
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Effects of the Mass Media
Another element that promotes "cultural illiteracy,"
and at the same time related directly to technology, is
that of the mass media.

The mass media promotes this phe-

nomenon by attacking the very basic "taste" values of the
many "ethclasses" within the American society.

It has

accomplished this task through the indiscriminate spread
and promotion of "popular art" forms and therefore, the
adulteration of "high art" forms.

Visual sensation is

everywhere present today, and there has been little opportunity for choice, and for a maturing visual discrimination.
Because of the demand for speed and efficiency, there has
been little chance permitting the development of honest
individual taste,
of images).

(a time consuming situation and a waste

The average response to art has become inextri-

cably bound up with the popular mode of visual images.
There is a vague and blurry distinction between the common
visual surroundings and the all too rare qualities of art.
All have been lumped together in a bland and generally
unrewarding fusion of ~alues.

The unique reality of art

has become the esoteric possession of a relatively fortunate few, while the average person has been prey to the
'
1 i· k econ d'itioning.
'
'
tyranny o f a Pav 1 ovian-

99 rbid., p. 413.

99
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Modern man has become the helpless victim of a
fantastic array of sensory experiences.

The designer and

the commercial artist have been more the victim of this
visual jumble than the consumer, for they have had to
create within this crazy cacophony of the eyes.

It is

simple enough for the sensitive person to detach himself
from this optically fantastic menagerie or for the indifferent person to ignore it, but for the commercial artist,
it is the very stuff with which he communicates.

As such,

it becomes an insurmountable obstacle to honest creative
endeavor and becomes a hard, insensitive and crude visual
backdrop of the average, banal, aesthetic understanding
and the aborted formative level of mass artistic appreciation.
Siegfried Kracauer notes:
"Ours is an age of pictorialization.
Wherever we go or stay, pictures surround
and beseige us.
They stare at us from the
pages of our tabloids and popular weeklies,
pass across the scree:p. in a nonstop procession, and, with television seeking new outlets, increasingly invade the last refuges
of introspective, the bars. There is no
baseball game which cannot be vicariously
attended by anybody everywhere; nor is there
a remote work of art that would evade mass
reproduction. Thus, a situation arises in
which we are literally flooded with sights
and spectacles, a vehement and interminable
deluge.100
·
100siegfried Kracauer, "Pictoral Deluge," Transformation I, (1950), p. 53.
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The visual image has permeated our entire society,
from the blatant city streets, the bulletin boards of
schools, the consciousness of how one dresses, abstract
paintings on museum walls, to the severely fenestrated
facades of the new glass skyscrapers; the image, popular
or otherwise, has become a necessity in our culture.

It

comes in all forms, as sculpture in graceless shopping
centers, a colorful record album, a lurid book jacket, or
the self-conscious canvas of the Sunday painter.
American's have become an eye-hungry people with
an insatiable appetite for more, larger, brighter, more
novel, and more lurid images.

Any subtle and sensitive

relationships that exist with "high" art forms, is quickly
drowned amidst the raucous and overwhelming quantity and
quality of the "popular" imagry.

The aesthetic experience

has be vitiated against the massive and the insistent
demands the environment makes upon the eyes and the con~
sciousness.

People have been submerged by the visual and

simultaneously, have been prevented from really perceiving
it.

Instead of leading one to inquire into the contents,

it has dulled the edges of understanding and stifled the
imagination.

Oddly enough, the more one sees,: the less

he is willing or able to practice the "art of seeing," with
all that it implies in personally spontaneous responses. 101
lOlKaufman, op. cit., p. 415.
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As aforementioned, Greenberg, utilizes the term
"kitsch" in describing this indiscriminate spread of
"popular" imagry. 102
enon

Greenberg attributes this phenom-

as the resultant product of technological and

industrial revolution which has urbanized the masses in
both Western Europe and in particular the United States. 103
Because it has been turned out mechanically,
"kitsch" has become an integral part of the productive
system, in a way in which true culture could never be,
except accidentally.

It has been capitalized at a tremen-

dous investment which must show commensurate returns; it
is compelled to keep as well as to extend its markets.
It brings pressure to bear on every member of society.
Traps are laid in those areas, so to speak, that are the
preserves of genuine culture.

"Kitsch" is deceptive.

It

has many different levels, and some of them are high enough
to be dangerous to the naive.

As an example, the Metro-

politian Museum of Art is to ,J;u:tve a major retrospective,
historical exhibit of the work of Claude Monet in April 22,
1978.

In the interim, the museum has granted Springs Mills

Company the permission to reproduce.many of Monet's major
works on such as towels, draperies, bedspreads, comforters,

102Greenberg, op. cit., p. 9.
l0 3 Ibid.
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and sheets, so that this work will "be enshrined on the beds
of America."lO!I
"Kitsch" has not been confined to the cities in
which it was born, but it has flowed out over the countryside, virtually wiping out all vestiges of the folk culture.
It has shown no regard for geographical or national-cultural
boundaries.
There has been more or less a general agreement
among the• "cultivated" of mankind over the ages as to what is
"good" art and "bad."
tain limits.

"Taste" has varied, but not beyond cer-

Contemporary conoisseurs have agreed that the

eighteenth-century artist, Hokusai was one of the greatest
artists of his time.

It is also generally agreed that of the

ancient Egyptians, the Third and Fourth Dynasty art was the
most worthy of being selected as their paragon by those who
came after.

Some people have come to prefer Giotto to Raphael,

but it is still generally agreed that Raphael was one of the
best painters of his time.

There has been an agreement then,

and this agreement rests on the fairly constant distinction
made between those values only to be found in art, and the
values to be found elsewhere, such as "kitsch."

"Kitsch, by

virtue of a rationalized technique that draws on science and
industry, has erased this distinction in practice. 105
l04House Beautiful, (New York:
The Hearst Corporation, Vol. 120, No; 4; April 1978), p. 16.
105 Green b erg, op. cit.,
·
p. 13 .
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The twentieth century has witnessed a remarkable
spread of these so-called artistic works and procedures
of visual improvisation and craft activity.

In the

violence of the mass egalitarian reaction to the cultivated restrictiveness of high art, there has been a corruption of the essential nature of art and an adulteration
of its values; and in art, as elsewhere, all values are
human values, and therefore relative values. 106
Leisure
Technology, automation, and programmed production
have produced still another element that affects the
status of cultural illiteracy, namely, leisure.
Programmed production has caused a decreased
work week, and automation has accelerated the long range
decrease of working time that has been occurring during
this century.
The Darnell Corporation survey of 342 United
States and Canadian companies has pointed out a recent
and decided trend toward a reduced work week, especially
when vacation _time is included in yearly work patterns.
Prior to World War II only one worker in four received
a paid week's vacation.
lOGibid., p. 13.

However, the two decades of 1940
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to 1960, the total working time for the average worker
dropped the equivalent of four weeks.

In the last five

years, an increase in vacation time has developed, with
half the salaried workers receiving a month's vacation
sometime in their career.

Paid holidays have increased

in 25 years, from an average of two, to over seven.

At

present, only one in four works between 32 and 40 hours
107
a week.
The main trend indicates that there will be
more people with leisure time than ever before in the
history of mankind.

The machine has freed vast numbers

for leisure, but they have neither a cultural pattern
nor cultural training to use it in a meaningful way.
The greatest change that industrialism has made
in daily life is to -separate work from leisure in a radical and almost absolute way.

Work has been more sharply

separated from everything that is not work.

It has been

made more concentratedly and purely in attitude, in method,
and above all, time.

Moreover, under the rule of effi-

ciency, seriously purposeful activity, has in general
tended to become assimilated to work.

The effect of all

this, has been to reduce leisure to an occasion more
exclusively of passivity, to a breathing spell or interlude; it has become something peripheral, and work has
l0 7 sylvia Porter, "New Trends in Vocations,"
{Syndicated News Column), Prepublication Review of Darnell
Corporation publications, New York, June 2, 1965.
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replaced it as the central as well as positive aspect of
life, and as the occasion for the realization of its
highest ends.

Thus, leisure has become more purely lei-

sure nonactivity, or aimless activity, as work has become
more purely work, more purposeful activity.108
According to ·Greenburg, in societies below acertain level of economic development, everyone works; and
where this is so, work and culture tend to be fused in a
single functional complex.

Art becomes barely distinguish-

able, in either intention or practice, from the techniques
or production, to healing, and even war. 109
This fact is evidenced in the study of numerous
cultures that are devoid of significant technology.

Among

the more notable studies, is that of the Balinese culture,
10
.
111
conducted by such as, Jane Belo, 1
and Margaret Mead.
In this study, it was found that almost every Balinese
l08

Greenberg, op. cit., p. 31.

109 Ib'd
i.,p.33.
ll0Jane Belo, "Balinese Children's Drawing," Childhood in Contemporary Cultures, ed. Margaret Mead and Martha
Wolfenstein, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955),
pp. 52-69.
111
Margaret Mead, "Children and Ritual in Bali,"
Childhood in Contemporary Cultures, ed. Margaret Mead and
Martha Wolfenstein, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1955), pp. 47-48.
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participated in some way in art.

Also, there was found

to be no extreme differentation between the most gifted
and the least gifted, between the professional and amateur artist. 112

It was also found that a major factor in

the Balinese culture, was the integration of art, that is,
"high art" forms, with daily life.

Work in art was highly

valued in their culture. 113
In contrast, there has been basic value conflicts
in American society between art and one's environment. 114
There has been difficulty in carrying on a leisure-oriented
tradition of culture in the United States, which has been,
. t orica
. 11y, a wor k oriente
.
d society.
.
115
h is

This, in itself,

has been enough to keep the present crisis of cultural
illiteracy in our culture unresolved.

This parodying

delima of values between art and environment, has resulted
in making life as a su~stitute for art and art as a substitute for life commonplace.116
The rise of modern naturalistic science, and technology in the west, has had profound repercussions on the
nature of art, and the people's attitudes toward art.

The

ll2Margaret Mead, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
113June King
.
McFee, op. cit., p. 33.
114

Ibid.

ll5Greenberg, op. cit., p. 32.
116 Brian O'Doherty, Object and Idea,
Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 13.

(New York:
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development of scientific technology has tended to remove
the more purely utilitarian pursuits from the field of
"art," as historically and commonly conceived; and the
field of art has been left with a more specialized emphasis
on aesthetic functions.ll7

117 Munro, op. cit.,
'
p. 106 .

Chapter 6
THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE FINE ARTS
Antithesis Between "Applied" and "Fine" Arts
There is a direct relationship between technology,
its societal implications, with art, education, art criticism, and society per se.

It is this fundamental relation-

ship that establishes the current status of "art" within
American society.
The initial problem that technological development
has bestowed on American society, is that of a redefinition
and reclassification of the term "art;" namely,
does "art" end, and "industry" begin;

(1) where

(2) should there be

an antithesis between the "aesthetic" and "utilitarian"
functions of "art;" and (3) which disciplines shall be
included, and which shall be excluded when using the term
"art. 11

Earlier in history, it was once considered that
art contained a rather extensive range of activities.
There was no basis for distinction between, for instance,
the crafts and picture making.

Aesthetics and utilitarian

functioning were considered as one.

However, with the

advent of the Renaissance, the work of art became an
exceptional thing.

Art and its creator were deemed to

possess special qualities.

A separation marked art from
84
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other craft activities, establishing hierarchies of
prestige, social values, and a need for refined tastes,
Subsequently, the development of art degenerated into a
meretricious style of an official academy during the
nineteenth century.118
In the Renaissance and afterward, the prejudice
against the manual diminished, and less emphasis was
placed on the basis of division, "manual or nonmanual."
The aristocratic distinction between noble and ignoble
still persisted, however; and it continued to be associated with that between "fine"
and "useful." 119

(aesthetic, non-utilitarian)

Still later, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, another change occurred, namely, the rise of democratic ideas and the rising power of the middle and lower
classes.

The basis of the distinction "noble, ignoble"

no longer seemed important.

"Manual and nonmanual," "fine

and useful," seemed much less important than before.

How-

ever, theorists tried to preserve some objective distinction
out of the old complex of ideas.

They indicated that the

contrast between "fine or aesthetic" and "useful" was only
a matter of degree, and preserved it for theoretical
118 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 453.
119

Munro, op. cit., p. 151.
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classicication. 120
Through the industrial revolution and the rise
of applied science, many skills and industries became :.,
highly developed along specialized, utilitarian lines,
with little or no aesthetic aim.

They gradually ceased

to be called "arts" or "useful arts," thus leaving the
term "art" for those skills which did have an aesthetic
aim or purpose and function, as in architecture.

The

principal basis of division was still that of "aim and
emphasis" or "intended nature of the product."
distinction on this basis then came into use:

Another
the arts

previously called "useful" were sometimes called "decorative" instead.

However, terms emphasizing their usefull-

ness, such as "applied" and "functional," were also
current.
During the late nineteenth and especially the
twentieth century, a trend occurred whibh may be described
as either the spread of industrialism into the aesthetic
realm, the making of beautiful products, or the revival
of aesthetic aims in machine industry.

In any case, pro-

ducts with aesthetic aims came to be made and reproduced
by mechanized, mass processes.

This led to a revival of

an old theory regarding the basis of division of art:
of the "kind of process" involved.
120rbid., p. 152.

that

The distinction however,
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was not that of "manual or non-manual," but rather,
"handmade or machine-made."

Historically, handmade methods

had dominated the aesthetic realm, and it was sometimes
doubted whether there could be such a thing as machinemade art.

However, a strong emphasis was placed on "eye-

appeal" and attractive appearance which led to a new
category within the realm of art:

that of industrial arts,

or mechanized, mass-produced, aesthetic arts.

In classi-

fication however, only part of the process of manufacture
was usually included as art:

the designing, inventive

phase.121,
For awhile after the industrial revolutio~ and
through much of the nineteenth century, large-scale
machine methods were applied mostly to utilitarian products.

Expensive things intended to be beautiful were

mostly made by hand, as before,

Hence it was supposed

that only handmade things could really be "art." 122
Simultaneous with this was the "art for art's sake" revolt
of the nineteenth century which was, according to McFee,
directed against poor manufacturing design.

Its pubpose

was to separate art from manufacturing rather than to
improve product design.

When the fine arts as creative

121 I b'd
l. . , p. 152.
122Munro, op. cit., p. 127.
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expression began to develop, they were set apart from the
production of useful things.

Industrial arts was estab-

lished as a separate subject area in schools, where skill
. qua 1 ity
·
.
. d 123
rat h er tan
t h e aest h etic
o f d esign
was emp h asize.
h
This movement further separated the applied and fine arts.
Antithesis Between "Art'' and Technology
The rise of modern naturalistic science in the
west had profound repercussions on the nature of art, and
of people's attitudes toward art.

The development of

scientific technology tended to remove the more purely
utilitarian pursuits from the field of "art," as commonly
conceived; and the field of art was left with a more
specialized emphasis on aesthetic functions.

The develop-

ment of pure science and philosophical explanations based
on science tended to deprive the arts of the need to deal
with many intellectual problems, or to describe the facts
of the universe for the benefit of the young.

Also, the

secular trend of western science, philosophy, and education,
was accompanied by a secular trend in the arts. 124
In observing the works of many who have studied
relatively primitive cultures, at an earlier period in
history, and in relatively remote areas currently, there
123McFee, op. cit., p. 179.
124 Munro, op. cit., p. 102.
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is an overlapping between art and the other realms of
the culture.

No specialized realm called "science,"

conscious of its aims and methods, working along distinctive lines, is evidenced. 125

According to Greenberg, art

and technology ("techne" before it institutionally differentiated into the two things), was not only coeval with
civilization, but was its very life and necessary condition.126
It is also noted by Heilbroner, that because of
this institutional separation of art and technology, there

is, presently, an attitute toward the arts that is analogous to that embedded in the usage the "world of the
socialite. 11 127

The institution referred to by both Green-

berg and Heilbroner, is that of the institution of higher
education.
The "Liberal Arts" and "Humanities"
It has already been noted that the term '"liberal
arts" covered a group of skills or subjects, variously
conceived in the Greek and midieval periods, but always
distinguished as (1) genteel, noble, aristocratic, befitting
125 Munro, op. cit., p. 144.
126 Greenberg, op. cit., p. 133.
127Robert L. Heilbroner, The worldly Philosophers,
(New York:
Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1953), p. 31.
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a freeman or a member of the upper class, and thus opposing
the "servile" arts;

(2) involving mental rather than crude

manual or mechanical work, implying a higher type of mental development;

(3) tending to elevate the mind of the

artist and those whom he serves rather than providing
physical necessities and comforts.
There remains a concept of "liberal arts" or
"humanities," which (in partiality) is distinct from that
of "fine arts."

It is this concept used in higher educa-

tion, to designate the "liberal arts" cirriculum, to
justify the degree of "Bachelor of Arts," that retains the
literary and intellectual denotation which it inherited
from the Middle Ages.128

Though it has changed in speci-

fie content, language and social studies are emphasized
rather than the visual arts.

As subjects for technical

training, they are opposed for being too practical and
manual for a "liberal" cirriculum.

Simultaneously, they

are attacked on the opposite ground; that they are merely
frills, leisure-time amusements, hence out of place in
the new "liberal education" as interpreted by a practical
age.

129
There is still a lingering aura prestige about the

"liberal arts" curriculum, about intellectual occupations,
128Munro, op. cit.,
·
p. 46 .
129 I b"id., p. 4 7.
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which leads people to practice them despite small financial return.

According to Munro, there is a noticeable

stigma regarding occupations which are crudely ·physical
and dirty without the redeeming factor of mental, technical skill or administrative ability.

There still

appears to be a distinction between types of occupations,
as to which are more suited to persons of the upper
class, though more vague and flexible than in the past. 130
The term "humanities" is sometimes used instead
of "liberal arts" with an implied similiar meaning.

Web-

ster's Dictionary defines it as follows:
"Humanities." 1. languages and
literature, esp. the classical Greek and
Latin 2.
the branches of learning concerned with human thought and relations,
as distinguished from the sciences; distinguished from the sciences, esp. literature, philosophy, fine arts, history, etc. 131
Narrowly interpreted, it indicates a range of choice in
the "liJberal arts" curriculum, with emphasis on language
and literature.

It may include work in the visual arts,

but that is not always implied. 132

"Humanities" may be

a synonym for "liberal arts" and for "arts" but dictionary
definition implies more or less of science, and more or
l 3 0ibid.
131
132

webster's New World Dictionary, op. cit., p. 683.
L. Dudley and A. Faricy, op. cit., p. 3.
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less of "fine art."

More and more, it appears, that the

"humanities" are understood as distinct from th,e physical
and natural sciences, as the study of human nature, society,
or culture.

Often included are Psychology and Sociology,

but often science, and restricted to a scholarship of
literary nature. 133
In this then, is the survival of the old aristocratic idea of a gentleman's education, as opposed to an
artisan's; the utilitarian emphasis of technical courses,
with a corresponding emphasis on the non-utilitarian
quality of a "liberal education."
Thus, the distinction between physical and mental
work, being used for the purpose of distinguishing the
"liberal" arts from the "mechanick" arts, the latter, said
to "require more the Labour of the Hand and Body than of
the Mind; as Carpentry and Carving," precipitated the
the emergence of art as a specialized realm, with its own
aims and values. 134

Even though this is a misnomer, in

no group of arts have a monopoly on physical labor, and
none on mental labor, modern Western art is more distinct

133

Munro, op. cit., p. 54.

134 Thomas Munro, "Creative Ability in Art and its
Educational Fostering," Art in American Life and Education,
(Bloomington, Ill., National Society for the Study of
Education, 1941), p. 289.
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from other, neighboring fields of the culture than has
been the case in other cultural epochs. 135
Core-Culture Values
Technology, its effect upon education,

(especially

curriculum construction in institutions of higher education),
results in a situation in which both, working in conjunction
with the other, affects the core values of the many core
cultures within American society.

McFee has implied that

this has been accomplished through the separation of the
"fine" and "applied" arts, which has not been as marked
in other societies as ours presently. 136

In other soci-

ties, the force of cultural maintenance was very strong.
People supposedly knew their roles, and few deviated
from them.

According to McFee, presentday Western cul-

ture is not so well-defined, and therefore, is ahanging
rapidly. 137
Studies of American core culture values are somewhat limited because of the subject is so complex, but
some, relatively consistent values can be
135
Thomas Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelations,
(Cleveland:
Western Reserve University Press, 1967),
p. 145.
136
137

McFee, op. cit., p. 27.
Ibid.
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'd en t'f'
d 13~ 139, 140, 141, 142
i ie.

i

( l a f oreIn th e ma t eria
I

mentioned by footnote, and by McFee, the core values that
are identifiable, appear to be in conflict with!the
supposed goals of art education. 143

A table illustrating

this, has been prepared on page 95.

In this table, three

i

categories are shown, to indicate the differences in values.
The "traditional" values are those that have be~n inherent
from generation to generation.

The "emergent" values are

those that appear to be developing in the process of cul-

.

tural change and the growth of "mass" society.

1h4

The

values in "art education" do not represent the values of
all, but are, rather, tendencies toward the conflict that
145
affects one's learning and understanding "art."·
VALUE CONFLICT I. COl!IMON MAN, GROUP MAN, AND
INDIVIDUAL ARTISTIC MAN.

In an exploratory stu~y of

138 clyde and Florence Kluckhohn, "General Orientations and Class Patterns," Conflicts of Power, in Modern
Culture, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947) 1, pp. 106128.
13 9w. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Hunt, The Social
Life of a Modern Community, Yankee City Series,1 Vol. I
(New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1941).
York:

140Margaret Mead, And Keeg Your Powder Dry,
William Morrow and Co., 1942).

(New

141George D. Spindler, ."Education in a Transforming
American Culture," Harvard Educational Review, XXV (1955),
pp. 145-156.

w. w.

142 Geoffrey Gorer, The American People,, (New York:
Norton and Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 70-1!05.
143 op. cit.,
.
p. 11 3.

'

144 Ibid., p. 1114

I
I

145 Ibid.
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"AMERICAN CORE VALUES"
"Traditional"

11

Emergent 11

"Ideal! Values in
'
.
Art !Education"

1.

common man

group common man

individual artisti~ man
(dfvergentcreative)

2.

expediency and
hard work

security

artistry and
craftsmanship
(quality before
gain)

3.

reason as a basis
for action

group planning

emotion combined
with reason

•

I
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'
graduate students, Spindler, found a strong va~ue
placed
on averageness, as being descriptive of the "ideal Ameri-

'
can type."
on:

The graduate students put a major Jmphasis

sociability, well-roundedness, and ability to"

. do many things quite well but
at anything in particular." 146

. not to be an expert
Furthermore, Spindler

writes,
"Individuality and creativity, or.mere
originality are not stressed in this concept
of values.
Introspective behavior is devaluated (even intellectuals are suspected by
many).
Deviancy, it seems, is to be tolerated
only w~t2~n the narrow limits of sociability
The ideal type described by Spindler's students
are not likely to exhibit the divergent behavior that is
necessary for the "artist."

Studies indicate that the

artistic individual has personality problems probably
caused by the belief that the artist's role is a deviant
one in American society.148, 149
According to McFee, it is for this reason, in
addition to the pressure of conformity that the student
experiences discontinuity, seeing no acceptable place
146 Ibid.
148

147 Ibid.

c1yde and Florence Kluckhohn, op. cit., pp.

114-116.
149

,
I
'
Louis H. Stewart, 'The Expression of Personality in Drawings and Paintings," Genetic Psychology
Monographs, LI (1955), pp. 45-103.
I
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in a practical and utilitarian state of affairs! for his
.
.
.
150
artistic expression.
VALUE CONFLICT II.

EXPEDIENCY AND HARD, WORK;
I

SECURITY;

AND ARTISTRY AND CRAFTSMANSHIP.

The value on

expediency has been growing steadily since the beginning
of the Industrial Revolution.

The tendency has been to

make more and more products in less and less time.

Hard

work, so necessary to the development of our country, has
been measured in terms of the accumulation of things.151
The two values, hard work and expediency, have led to the
measurement of products by size and quantity.

The emerg-

ment value, security, has grown out of the knowledge that
most people can survive economically without working hard,
that they can in fact earn many conveniences and amusements
on a moderate salary. 152
The products of "art," on the other hand, are
valued for their quality, as a result of thoughtful work
and a desire for craftmanship,. as well as improvisation
and invention.

Both time and speed are negated as the

artist struggle to master his media and symbols to communicate his ideas.

Industry, however, can expedite technical

problem-solving with the use of computers, but no machine
can help the artist to solve the problems of designing. 153
150McFee, op. cit., p. 115.

151

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

Ibid., p. 117

I
I
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The Alper study, resulted with an interesting feature.

According to Alper, middle-class children were more

likely, than lower-class children, to want to take their
work home. 154

Thus, the implication that the middle-class

parents, who most typify the core culture, transmit to
their off-spring at an early age, the value of showing
accomplishments.
VALUE CONFLICT III.
EMOTION.

REASON, GROUP PLANNING, AND

Historically, people of the United States have

been told, that their heritage of democratic freedom is
owed to man's reasoning ability, and that logical
thinking is the best way to solve the problems of life.
Science and technological advancements make it evident
that man has progressed in the use of reason in problem
solving.

However, society has not become educated in

.
.
155
the use of emotion with reason.

Art,

b

.
ecause it

depends on kinesthesis and sensitivity, promotes the
integration of feeling and reason.

According to McFee,

this integration tends to be negated in Western society
by the application of masculine and feminine characteristics

154 Thelma Alper, Howard Blane, and Barbara Adams,
"Reactions of Middle and Lower Class Children to Finger
Paints as a Function of Class Differences in Child Training
Practice," Jour·nal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LI
(1955), pp. 439-448.
155 McFee, op. cit., p. 119.
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attributed to its people, especially, that it is not
"masculine" for the male to display emotion. 156
"Art and Personality."

A study was made by Lbuis

Stewart of the Institute of Child Welfare at the Univer~
sity of California on adolescent males and females.

In

this study, self-portraits of forty males and forty
females, of high school age, were judged according to
selected criteria.

Those portraits that displayed the

strongest "artistic ability" according to the criteria
received further analysis.

Because these students had

been in the institute since the fifth grade, considerable
information on their personality structures was available.
The experimenter found that the overall pattern
for the males in this group was "strongly suggestive of
neurotic introversion, with symptoms of anxiety, low
self-esteem, lack of social skills, and isolation from
peers."

For the females, the pattern suggested "creative

and introversive tendencies, which, although accompanied
by lack of interest in social contacts, are not related
157
to anxiety, tension, or maladjustment."
Stewart interprets the findings for the males
as indications of cultural value conflicts.
156 I b'd
J. •
157

,

p. 119 •

Stewart, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

He stresses
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the deviation of the stereotyped idea of the artist from
the average male in American society.

Stewart believes

that many artistic males do not perceive a means of
attaining adult male status and still continue their
artistic work.

These males may be experiencing "discon-

tinuityi" which, according to McFee, arises when an
individu~l is rewarded for.behavior in one situation and
not in another, and conversely, punished for behavior in
one si':uation and not in another, because of its differences
.

l

1.n va :.ies.

J.58

The males in Stewart's study are then said

to be ex!Jeriencing a "discontinuity" between their personal·
rewards from achievement in art, and the lack of opportunity for reward from society.

159

Stewart believes that

the males have the concept of the full-time painter or
sculpture as generally living in poverty.

The economic

anxiety, Stewart feels,

is closely related to ,the male~s

adjustment problems. 160

Because the artistic females in

~his sample

displayed few or no neurotic tendencies,

Stewart, suggests that the introversive males may have
more adjustment problems than females as the ",.
extroverted traits are so important in determing social
acceptance and prestige" for males during this particular
,_.ge per 1. o d . 161
lS8McFee, op. cit., p. 112.
160

rbid., p. 120

159 rb~d., p. 119.

16 1 stewart, O!J. ci~., pp. 81-82.
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The artistic male is further separated from the
mainstream of the culture where academic or practical

'
studies are valued more highly than nonacademic or
"impractical" studies. 162
Art, however, is not far different in intent than
English composition.

Both, are symbolic, and are organ-

ized means of communication.

Letter symbols (organized

through grammar) and pictorial symbols (organized through
.
) are b ot h necessary f rom t h e practica
. 1 ~iewpoint.
.
.
163
d esign
Threat and anxiety reduces the ability of the
'
individual to respond to, and organize visual information,

along with the ability to recall the details of objects
seen previously.
Success experiences increase one.':s ability to
respond to, and organize visual information.

Failure

experience tends to decrease this ability. 164
According to McFee, most cultures at the present
time, including ours, are in stages of considerable change
due to technological innovation and cultural confluence. 165
These factors affect the different parts of the culture in
differing degrees.

Therefore, these factors influence

one's attitudes toward art and his willingness and ability
162

McFee, op. cit., p. 120.

164rbid., p. 125.

163

rbid., p. 120.

165 rbid.
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to participate in art tasks.

Art, not being central to

American core culture, introduces conflicts such as those
between the common man and the individual, expediency and
.
artistry,
and reason and emo t.ion. 166

These conflicts are

a result of differences in values and beliefs within
cultures and core cultures, and are expressed through
both language and art forms.

167

Without verbal and visual means of sharing ideas,
cultures

could not evolve.

While there are nonliterate

societies (those without written language), there are no
societies without art forms, however primitive for com168
municating ideas.
At this point, with the aforementioned implications by McFee, an assessment can now be made concerning
the analogy between art and language.

The analogy is

made possible by the fact that both are based on one's
power of imagining and abstracting.

Art, is more heavily

dependent on the former, language on the latter.

Howe-

ever, imagining itself, involves abstracting under the
influence of emotion as well as need.

Language plays an

important role in one's conception of the world.

This

166 rbid.
167
16S

McFee, op. cit., p. 18.

Ralph L. Beals and Harry Hoijer, An.Introduction
to Anthropold>gy, (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1953),
p. 538.
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is comparable to the role which art performs in teaching
one how to look at the world the way he does.

Therefore,

the untutored are not really untutored; it is just that
they ·see the world in terms of some past scientific
conceptions which have been assimilated by common sense,
or in terms of some past artistic movement, or in terms
of some diluted combination of both. 169
Among the lay commentators of the arts and the
ordinary man, there is little or no consciousness of the
pervasiveness of art in their lives, and little of its
.
170
relationship to what they prize most, their happiness.
Their cheif antagonism to the fine arts in general,
springs from the belief that they are impractical and
precarious financially; a frivolous waste of time which
could be devoted to more useful work and more assured
ways of gaining a livlihood.

+fa young person wishes

to enter the arts, the first question asked at home will
probably be, "How are you going to make a living that
way?"l71
This further illustrates the status of "art," as
commonly conceived by the ordinary man within Western
society, as something apart from life, science, and
169TeJera,
.
.
op. cit.,
p. 199 .
170 rbid., p. 209.
171
Munro, op. cit., p. 48.
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technology.

This status of art, is also implied by the

eminent art historian, Kenneth Clark, who belie~es that
the most creative and fertile minds are in science, and
that art has been, for the present, relegated to a less
important levei. 172

C. P. Snow, the well known English

novelist-scientist believes likewise and states,:
"There are literary intellectuals at
one pole, at the other scientists, '.and the
most representative, the physical scientist.
Between the two, is a gulf of mutual incomprehension--sometimes . . . hostility and
dislike, but most of all lack of understanding. nl73
Even though Snow utilizes the words "li:terary
intellectuals,"

Kaufman, more liberally interprets

it

to include artists and architects. 174
J. Brownski, an English mathematician voices the
same sentiments in a passionate way.

He voices the hope

that science and art can exist alongside each other in
harmony and mutual enhancement.

Just as in the past

"nations have not been great in science or art, but in
art and science," so in the contemporary world there may
be a salubrious interrelationship of the two. 175
17 2 Kenneth Clark, "The Blob and the Diagram,"
Encounter, (January, 1963).
173c. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific
Revolution, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 4.
174Kaufman, op. cit., p. 334.
175J. Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science, (New
York: Random House, Modern Library Paperbacks): pp. 147-149.
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Thus, society has perpetrated an antithesis in the
area of "art," namely:

the "utilitarian" versus and "non-

utilitarian," the ''fine'' versus the ''useful," the ''fine''
versus the "applied," and the "noble" versus the "ignoble"
art.

This sharp separation, in theory, it is now insisted,

proceeds from an unhealthy, undemocratic social condition,
in which a lower class does most of the useful work and
an upper, exploiting class, most of the enjoying.1 76
Edman states:
"The division between fine and useful
produces on the one hand, a practical civilization in which there is no interest in
sensuous charm or imaginative grace, and
on the other, a decorative trifling of the
piddling little equisites, the soft luxeriance of the aesthete whose dainty creations
and enjoyments have no connection with the
rest of life.''l77
Arthur Miller also scolds society because it
does not permit men to be themselves. 178

Social scien-

tists, too, have been critical of this cultural phenomenon.

Griffith, for example, call ours a "waist-high

culture." 179

He cites that ours is a culture of mediocrity,

in which values and practices are contradictory:
176

Munro, op. cit., p. 110.

177 I. Edman, Arts and the Man,
Norton and Co., 1939), pp. 42-43.

(New York:

178 Arthur Miller, Death of a Salesman,
Viking Press, 1960), p. 61.
York:

w. w.

(New York:

179 Thomas Griffith, The waist-High Culture,
Harpers and Bros., Publishers, 1959).

(New
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"We respect the arts in principle, 'but
Deward the illustrator more than the artist,
the jingle writer over the poet, the tunesmith over the composer. We talk of high
standards, but sentimentally reward the,
most appealing instead of the most observing
. . . Democracy is in fact suspicious of
high standards."180
This culture of contradictory values and practices
is attributed to the operation of several forces:

afflu-

ence, prosperity, urbanism, and mass literacy.191

Griffith,

expressing a prevailing artistic criticism of American
culture and society that makes it, follows Ortega y
set,182 George Santayana, 183 and T.

s.

Gas-

Eliot, 184 in

blaming undermined values and standards for permitting
the mass of society to seduce artists into producing what
can be sold in quantity, even without quality.

That is,

those "popular" art forms, the greater mass of advertising
and public illustration which not only manifest_s the lack
of artistic merit of the forms, but also supports the

lBOibid., p. 3.
181Art Education: The Sixty-Fourth Yearbook of
the National Society for the Study of Education, part II,
Ed., w. Reid Hastie, (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1965), p. 3.
(London:

182Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses,
Allen and Unw5_n, Ltd., 1932).

183 George Santayana, The Genteel Tradition at Bay,
(New York:
Charles Scribner's Son's, 1931).
184 T. s. Elliot, Notes Towards the Definition of
Culture, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1949).
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notion that average, commonplace needs will accept an
environment devoid of any real committment to values
beyond the practical and the distracting. 185
Educational Patterns
It cannot be said, however, that there is any
real lack of opportunity to experience the "fine" arts.
There are more numerous avenues of access than ever before.
There is simply no great yearning or groundswell of genuine sentiment in that direction.

This bespeaks, not only

of a personal deficiency on the part of those countless
individuals who exist in a state, relative to the arts,
as one of torpor and apathy, but a lack in the educational
patterns of the schools, which seeks practical or intellectual excellence, yet accepts aesthetic sloth. 186
These educational patterns, or lack of them,
relative to the "visual, fine arts," is seemingly borne
out by the results of a study conducted by Elliot W.
Eisner. 187

The study, which dealt exclusively with grad-

uate work in art and art education, attempted to determine
(a) the number of institutions of higher education offering
185Kaufman, op. cit., p. 46.
186 rbid., p. 46.
1 B7Art Education: The Sixty-Fourth Yearbook of
the National Society for the Study of Education, op. cit.
pp. 274-278.
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graduate programs in art and art education,

(b) the num-

ber of institutions awarding Master's and Doctor's degrees
in art education,
were initiated,

(c) when the various graduate programs

(d) the type of courses typically taken

at each level of graduate study, and (e) the nutnber of
students enrolled part time and full time in programs
leading to the doctorate in art education.

In this study,

no distinction was made between the Ph.D. and Ed.D. degrees.
Three-hundred and fifty-seven of 407 de,gree granting
institutions listed in the "American Art Directory" respon•
I
•
•
188
ded to Eisner
s questionnaire.

.
.
.
Ofth e 3 57 institutions

responding, 120 offered a master's program in art, 86
offered a master's program in art education, 14 offered a
doctoral program in art, and 16 offered a doctoral program
in art education.

The remaining 191, reported that no

graduate study was available in art er art education.
When institutions were asked to indicate the percent of
courses taken in four categories:

studio art, art educa-

tion, education, and other, taken by students in art
education at the master's and doctoral levels, interesting
differences emerged.

On the master's level, 22 institu-

tions reported that graduate students in art education
take less than 40 percent of their work in studio classes,

bert,

188 American Art Directory, Edited by Dorothy Gil(New York: R.R. Bowker, Co., 1961).

I IJ 'J

'!'hi,·t.y-une .insLi•_oti.ons reported that master's

classtci'3.

percent o f

st:uderits

I,
k .
course wor
111 art
I

education, and !O report,,d that at their institutions
students typic~ily take 40 percent or more.

{\t the

doctoral level, one institution reported that, students
take no 'studio art courses. · Another, indicated that over
BO percent of stucj,io courses are take11 typically by its
students.

While seven institutions reported less
than 20
I•

percent of course work is taken in education,' one reported
it was found, of the 16 insti'
tutions offering a doctoral in art education, four of the

70 percent or more.

Also,

.1.nstitcutions accounted for almost two-thirds 'of the total
full-time student population. 189
While the study is dated,

the numbers are signi-

ficant in that less than one-half
.}.;,

of the maj1or colleges

I'

and universities in tl1e United States offer no advanced
degree in art and/or art education.

'I

Moreovet;•, there

appeared
neither a consensus nor a developingi trend in
'
regards to what should be the cu·rriculum contc'ent.
The present rapid rate of increase in t~e mobility
of the American population, and the rapidly increasing

.,

110

, I

shift \jjn ;pp;:>ulation from rural to urban areas, h\1-s created
'I

both

bisic
I 'I .

~alue conflicts in the core culture, a, nd a pres-

sure

Art, as a result, finds itself separated

from ~11~ maine;tream of American culture.

~- ...

Simultaneously, the
•'

rise £~: ecqno~ic status of a vast majority of the people, and
the ma,s 1s ~edia, urges the achievement of status and "happiness"
1

I

►

tllrougq tit~ acquisition of material things.
Therefore, the
' '
' '
great r! ma~s of the population sees no acceptable place for

7

. a' ,prp.ctical and utilitarian state of affairs.
art in
i

Art is

'
'

I

regarqE)B. a~ both financially precarious and an impractical way
of gain'ing a livlihood. Art is regarded as a mere frill and
I
' ''
a leisure-time amusement, and for the present time, is relegated 'to a lel;;ser position in Western society than science
and l;echnol9gy.

I

I,

Chapter 7
JUDGEMENTS CONCERNING CURRENT ART FORMS
'

Barriers to Understanding
Despite the fact that museum attendance, is booming,
that the sale of paintings, in particular, has reached
impressive figures, and the space devoted to the "arts" in
magazines, indicating unprecedented reader interest in
"art" ai:id artists, the "visual arts" produced by contemporary artists seem isolated from a large portion of society.190

It appears, that there are few among the lay

public who seem to understand the concepts basic to the
arts.

There appears to be a widespread visual illiteracy,

a publi~ generally incapable of "reading" the current
visual languages of painting, sculpture, and architecuure.
Therefore, the public is often extremely limited in its
ability to "read" the visual languages of the past. 191
The growth in material and texts ·written on the
subject of "art" may suggest a real desire on the part of
the "educated" public to come to grips with the challenge
'

that "art" offers.

This desire, however, is most often

thwarted by a somewhat inherent cultural barrier, which
keeps the observer from responding to the art object. 192
190 Kno bl er, op. cit.,
·
p. V.
191Ibid.
l92Ibid.
111

1JJ2

The barrier is of three parts.

One, is the assumption

that the average individual can differentiate betwe.en the
I
art object and other objects which do not fit this 'category.

'
Therefore, the average individual forms a limited

conceptualization of what, for him, constitutes a "legitimate"

work of art, and deems "illegitimate" those

works which do not conform to his patterns of acceptability.193
The second part of the barrier exists because
of the limited experience and contact between most indiduals and examples of "high art" works of painting,
sculpture, and building that could be described as
architectural works of art.194

The numerous reproductions

of "high art" to be found in the media, are often a mixed
blessing.

The media, with its reproductions, bestows on

the average individual, the illusion that mere contact ·:,
with art is satisfactory, when in fact, it is not. 195
The third part of the barrier is the feeling of antagonism,
inadequacy, and confusion when viewing works of art which
he cannot conceptually regard as acceptable or "legitimate."1 9 6
In Western

art, this has meant that those symbolic forms

which have tended to be the most photographic and close
193rbid.

194 rbid.

19 51bid., p. VI.

196 rbid.

''
'

I.
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I

I

I

equivalents to their natural forms are the most accep, f' I
,, , 197
table:· 1
I

: In order to offset this special malaiJe, many
I

:.
198
such as; Dewey,
Anatole France, 199 Edman, 200 and
othe;s; advocate disposing of the separation between
I I

the "fine"
and "useful" arts I and integrate the two
I ,I
The purpose of this, according to Munio, is for

areas.,

I

the saike of education; existing for a specialized use,
the us'e being a new training of modes of perc~ption. 201
However,
the conclusion that the "fine" and "useful"
,,
I

arts overlap and have much in common, is so widely
'l

I

I

accepted today, that one would have a difficult time
in finding a supporter for the sharp separation between
I
them.
Painting and sculpture are generally classified
as ",fihe," "high," or aesthetic arts, in contrast, the
,, !

I

average layman has conceived architecture as
,''

art.

a:

·"useful"

m,n a broad sense, all the fine arts have :some utili-

tarian' :functions.

I

The distinction, however, can best be

197 Knobler, op. cit., p. 309.
:,, 198John Dewey, Experience and Nature, ·(Chicago:
The OpT~ Court Publishing Co., ,1925), p. 361.
;, I. 199 Anato~e France,

"On the Unity of AFt," Journal
of American Institute of Architects, January, !l.914, p. 18.
,I I
I I
,

1

2 00I . Edman, op. cit.,
.
pp. 4 2 -43.
201M unro, op. c1.·t . , p. 111.

I
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made in' terms of degree; between arts which are! "more,"
and those which are "less," utilitarian.

This does not

'
imply that the former have greater usefulness in
general,

but that they emphasize utilitarian functions more frequentl:y, along with the aesthetic, and tend to ladap.t their
.

.

pro d ucts more obviously to some non-aesthetic use.

202

Caution, :.. however, must be exercised in making such
a relative contrast.

The following statement, by H. E.

Bliss, is much too simple:

"The arts in which utility is

a secondary consideration to beauty and pleasure are
distinguished as the Fine Arts, or the "Aesthetic Arts." 203
Even if the broader term "aesthetic experience" is substituted for "beauty and pleasure," it is not true that
utility is always a secondary aim in the fine or aesthetic
arts.

Architecture is traditionally classified as a fine

art, however, utilitarian aims are often dominant. 204
Aspects of Sculpture and Architecture
Much of the aspects of sculpture can also be applied
to architecture.

Both are three-dimensional art forms;

both are concerned with the organization of forms in space.
202 rbid., p. 519.
203

H. E. Bliss, The Organization of Knowledge and
the System of the Sciences, (New York:
Henry Hold and Co.,
p. 304.
204

Munro, op. cit., p. 117.
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, I

I

First, architecture is a functional art, can be argued

I

that sc\.llpture functions for a purpose, but the purpose

,, I

,

of the ',sculptor' s art, however, is restricted to symbolic
commun/cation.

Second, architecture and sculpture are

I

structural arts in that the method used to hold the separate elements together is an integral part of ~he design:
For this reason, the materials used by the architect and
sculptor, the strength of the materials, and the way
'

they 'ate joined becomes a primary concern in the conception of an architectural and sculptural design. 2 05
Ideally, function,

structure, and matefials in

architecture should be so interrelated that th~y become
a tightly woven fabric which gives the building its form,
'

-

space, ,and textural variation. 206
has rarely occurred.

This ideal condition

There have been various social and

economic factors which have affected architectfral design,
requiring the architect to compromise ideal solutions for
'

practitjal ones. 207
i Ideally,

the architect should consider! a building

not just as an efficient machine designed to facilitate
the activity of its tenants, but also as an en~ironment

'

205Knobler, op. cit., p. 89.
2 0 6 Ibid.

'i

'

'

2 0 7 Ibid . , p . 9 0 .
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in which human individuals will spend a portion of their
I
!

' ,I

day.

I

Tpe human being, though, has been considered a mere

'

'

'

cog in~
huge mechanism.
'
I

His physical needs h~,ve been

'

satisfied, but little concern has been given to his emotional,heeds.208
, The above commentary on American architecture has
'''

serious, implications, if, what psychologists declare is
true.

Psychologists have stated that there is:need to

'

underst~nd, to find meaning in the world about'us; it is
1

coupled with the need for stimulation and invoivement.
The "will to live," often said to be
1
the great inclusive motive of all livi~g
creatures, is in human beings not simply
the will to stay alive but rather the will
to live by active relationships with t~e
environmP.nt. Being equipped with sense organs
and motor organs and.a well developed brain,
the human individual has a fundamental,incli' nation to deal with the environment. The
motive is not primarily directed toward
serving the organic needs and meeting the
emergencies
of life, Bi:it toward knowing
1
and persons, doing things to them,
1 objects
and participating in what is going on in
the environment. Just_ because this objective tendency is so a11 persuasive it ts
often overlooked and omitted from the list
of fundamental motives, where it certainly
belongs.
It shows itself in the general
1
tendencies to explore and manipulate the
environment and in a great variety more
,
specific interests. 209
'I
'

2 0 8 Knobler, op. cit., p. 250.
2 0 9 Robert Woodworth and
Donald Marquis, Psychology,
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc.,iSth ed.,
1947), ;p. 323.

'
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Office buildings, assembly plants, as w~ll as
other s~ructures designed for commercial, industrial,
and pub~ic purposes, house great populations for a substantial portion of their lives.

The atmosphere in which

people have worked has affected them.

Whatever'may be

said for the buildings that shelter the public and economic
complex, is equally pertinent to the design of residential
architec,ture.
Richard Neutra is a contemporary architect who
has concerned himself with the problems of architectural
design as the creation of environment.

He notes that

people are most conscious of the possible effects of an
architectural environment when presented in extremes.
As examples, he cites the design of certain "fun houses"
in amusement ·.parks, homes, where walls within are built
askew, thus presenting bizarre relationships.

The person

is in an environment different from that which he has
normally experienced, anq. therefore becomes puzzled and
frustrated by it. 210
Louis Kahn, an American architect, is concerned
with the symbolic functon of architecture.

He recognizes

the need to consider the building as a symbol for the

York:

' 21 0Richard Neutra, Survival Through Design,
Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 155. '

(New
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• I
h ouse d wit
. h.in it.
. 211
activity

The symbolic function of

archite~ture depends in part upon the response of the
public, to the forms erected by the builder.

A portion of

this response will most certainly be conditioned by buildings of the past, which have had historical significance
in some aspects of the culture of our contemporary society. 212
In observing the hundreds of government buildings in this
country, one notes that Greek and Roman influence abound
in which the columned temple has been identified with
public buildings.

The Lincoln Memorial, completed in

1912 is an example of architectural design modeled on
Greek antecedents.

If the Lincoln Memorial is compared

with the Jefferson Westward Expansion Memorial, in St.
Louis,, Mo., which was designed by Ero Saarinen, the difference in startlingly evident.

The Lincoln monument is

tied to the past; the great catenary arch of the Jefferson
Memorial has no stylistic precedent.
Expression in architecture is not confined to
monuments,
ture5.

it also includes residential and business struc-

Clothing a municipal office building, a residence,

a library, and a church in the same architectural forms
of the, past sacrifices expressive design to stylistic
211
·
Louis I. Kahn, Structure and Form,
George Braziller, Inc., 1962), p. US.
212 Knobler, op. cit., p. 261.

(New York:
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consis'tency.

,i

However, for many, who live in the so-called

I

1·

"colon:ical" houses

'

'

,

the house expresses security, the total

warmth''of family life, and a continuity of earlier cultural
'
values, which in total, provide a satisfying esthetic envir1

onment.·

One, from such a home, may leave it and proceed

to his place of work, which is a steel and glass tower,
I

and may not feel that there is an inconsistenc~ between
the tw9 totally different environments.

Howev~r, the fact

that this dichotomy exists suggests a lack of cohesion
within '.one's environment and his culture. 213
, Expression in contemporary architecture has not
I
'
'
'
evaded tradition and the forms expressive of its common·
cultur~l heritage.

The fact remains that manyi people can

I

accept eclectic

architecture as a part of contemporary

I

,

life. , 'In general, however, each cultural period has seen
expression in architecture re~ult from the forins and
materials common to the time as; the Colonial,' Classical,
Gothic 1 Tuscan, and many others.

Architectural critics

' '

'

have often condemned eclectic and imitative forms of
architecture, because it does not fine its exp'ressive forms
in the present day world; buildings have been given a superI

,

ficiai; imitative skin that camouflages an infernal design
with~~ anachronistic shell, the inconsistenc~ between
213

rbid., p. 269.

·120
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•i. I
,I I

I
the nature of the building and its appearance has fre-

'I

quentl 1y, been ridiculous and even bizarre. 214
l

! Thus,

architecture, both domestic; i.e., resi-

dential., and commercial should be expressive of a
technol'ogical age and symbolic in terms of the use and
functions within the building proper, but more often this
I

is not the case.

William Morgan, the Architecture critic

for 'l'he
.. 1' Louisville Courier-Journal, cited a recent example
of this particular situation.

Morgan was very critical

of the new Jefferson State vocational-Technic~l School
and Manpower Skill Center, at Eighth and Chestnut Streets,
in Louisville.

He cites, that the two buildings

in no

way re.f_lect the advanced technology occurring·inside.
Rather,' the face of the buildings is a package of dullness anq boredom.

The entirety of the two buildings,

gives tpe appearance of a factory rather than a vocational
traini~g school.

The interiors of both buildings are even

more un:interesting than the exteriors.

He cites, that

instead of studying in a school that provides an educational
experi~hce in itself, and offers some visual excitement, the
student:' is faced with the lowest-cost-per-square-foot
.

decor

o~

the cinder-blocks and oppressively low ceilings.
214 Ibid.

, 21 5 william Morgan, "Boring Vocationa1 Tech Buildings
Do Little But Mock the Lost Past," The Courier-Journal
(Louisville), October 2, 1977, D-6, Col. 1.
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Aspects of Painting and Drawing
Many people believe that the photographic image
is th,e ,"real," most truthful, and accurage way of picturing the three-dimensional world, in regards to the
two-dimensional "high" art forms of painting and drawing
and closely related disciplines.2 16

However, this belief

is no,t common to all times and all cultures. 21 7

Anthro-

polog,is,te and psychologists, including Melville Herskovits
and Carl Jung have reported that primitive men often cannot identify human images in photographs.

The notion

that only those images and forms that are close equivalents
to their natural forms, and therefore, the most accurate
.
218
h as opcurre d on 1 yin Western art.

Even though the

history, of art abounds in examples of two-dimensional
representations of the three-dimensional world that bear
no resemblance to photographip representation, there is

.,

nothing to suggest that these 'latter forms are the work
of ar,t-ists and practitioners that were inadequate, either
currently or in the past. 219
In Europe, for four-hundred years prior to the
nineteenth century, the methods used for representing
216 Knobler, op. cit., p. 146.
217 Ibid.
218
219

rbid., p. 149.
Ibid., p. 153.
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form and .space in the
tially 'unchanged. 220

visual

arts remained essen-

Linear perspective, aerial per-

spective, and shading were the prime methods for indicating
natural space and form.

They had been used so extensively

and for such a long period of time that they took on the
value of absolutes.

It was assumed that all methods of

representation were to be measured by these standards.
Late in the eighteenth century photography was invented,
and subsequently developed in the nineteenth century.
Thus, a relatively simple method for creating

the vis-

ual equivalent of the "real" world was introduced. 221
Simultaneously, a minority of artists began to experiment
with new methods of representation.

Stimulated by scien-

tific and technological advancements, and influenced by
art from the East, and from Africa, these artists sought
to extend the traditional equivalent forms beyond their
representational and expressive limits. 222

Thus, in a

relatively short period of time, from the middle of the
nineteenth century to the first two decades of the twentieth, there arose in succession the Impressionists, the
Pointillists, the Fauves, the Cubists, the Futur±sts. ·and
220
:
Knobler, op. cit., p. 41.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
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others that attempted to discover an equivalent for communicating to others, the world they perceived about
223
th em.
This led to bold innovations which in turn
produced dynamic pictorial relationships.

The artists

sought to express the changes that science and technology was producing on life, through the reordering of art
elements. 224

This resulted in a variety of directions.

The Futurists, were stimulated by the modern qualities
of speed, motion, and the philosophy of force.

These

were analyzed in terms of their visual properties, re..l.
ducing them to complex and flickering compositions that
expressed the contemporary feeling of kinetics and pressure.225

The Constructivists, sought to portray motion

and mechanization through their minutely balanced designs,
hoping to influence the world through symbolic examples
of harmony and equilibrium. 226

Mondrian, Gabo, and Pevsner

sought new forms to express technological and scientific
ideas, which, they felt, dominated society.

Therefore,

they sought new visual organizations, which they hoped
would serve as a spiritual guide toward a more humane and
223 Ibid., p. 43.
2 2 4 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 425.
225 rbid.
226 Ibid.
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I

i:

integrated civilization. 227

Simultaneously , 1 abstract

'
and hon-objective
art entered the scene, believing that
I
,

nonr~~l-~sentational forms were of a more pure: expression
than' the traditional photographic images of realism which
had been so overtly adulterated.228

On the other hand, the

forms and patterns of science and technology, and all of its
'

many:components are the concern of such as Leger.

Still, on

the other hand, the turmoil and insecurity contained in
I

today's world is reflected in the distortions, and abandoned
movement of such as Pollock and de Kooning. 229

Psychology

also :has influenced art in its probing of human motives,
and ~ound a ready recipient in Surrealism.
In much of the art in the fourteenth, fifteenth,
and sixteenth centuries, man looked into art and life to
seek knowledge regarding the power of his environment.
I

However, the high art of the last century demonstrates
just ,the opposite. 23 0
'
one of
subjectivity.

It is an art of introspection and
Nevertheless, despite the diversity

of styl,es and techniques, the artist has created a rather
truthful image of modern living.
The present-day lay-person, therefore, should not
assume that the photographic image is the standard by which
227 rbid.
22 8 rbid.
229Ibid.
23 0ibid.
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I'
'

to judge other images.

He should be aware th•t the visual

world is multilingual, and that there are many, ways of
'

'

i

communi,cating visually, man's experiences.

He

should be

aware that personal perception has been given a value
which it did not have in the past, in that it can be perceived historically, scientifically, and psychologically.
However, according to the aforementioned cultural barriers,
. is
· curren tl y not the c· ase. 231
as pas t u 1 a t e db y Kno bl er, th is
Art and Intelligence or Another Barrier
In addition to the three cultural bar~iers aforementioned, Knobler, Dewey and Tejera state that our culture
makes another serious mistake that also acts ~s a cultural
barrier.

The mistake that our culture makes, is in believ-

ing that non-discursive products are necessarily noncognitive.232

Dewey, for exa~ple, thought of creative or

inventive products as resulting from what he aptly called
233
qualitative thought.
That is, that a work of art is
both interrogative (exploratory) and judgmental (or determinativ~).

It would seem to follow, from what has been

said, that art and intelligence are inseparable enterprises.

Both are symbolic, intelligence in a11 instrumental
231

Knobler, op. cit., p. V.
232
.
.
TeJera, op. cit., p. 172.
233 rbid.
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'

process, and art in a consummatory process.

intelWhile
.
I
'

I

ligence seeks to control what it understands, art seeks
.
th at tow h.ic h it
. is
. giving
. .
to d ramatize
s. h ape. 234

Ideas,

relations, and plans of action based upon observation,
are the subject matter of intelligence, while qualities
I

dramatically related in the interest of expression are
the subject matter of art. 235
Art and intelligence are both communicative pro'
cesse:s.

Art is so in the sense of communion; thrt is a
'

shared celebration or consecration of a value, perception,
or experience. 2 36

The achievement or development of this

value requires intelligence. 2 37

Intelligence is communi-

cative in the sense that it institutes cooperation in
activities.

Intelligence attempts to be a perception of

how things function both in physical and non-human context~. 238

Understanding the manipulation
of things,
; ,.,

involves art.

Likewise, successful and assured manipula-

tion are based upon the arts of experiment and v erification.
1

Thus, works of art are the result of varying degiees of
234 Ibid., p. 213.
235 Ibid.
236

Ibid.

237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
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i

I

I

I

I

I

art aha. intelligence, and understanding a work ofI art
is a like or similar activity. 2 3 9

I,
I

'

It would seem, that the job of intelligence,

discourse, and criticism, is as Blackmur has said, that
of finding ways of enlarging its own and the public's
aethetics so as to contribute to the enlargement of the
aest:tietic experience. 240

Indeed, the trick is to enlarge

the public's aesthetics to the point where it fuses intellectu'al, inferences with the artist's work.
Aspects of Future Art Forms
Simultaneously, an emerging culture is b~ing formed,
that is essentially technological and scientific.

Auto-

mation, speed, travel, experimentation and research in
physics, biology, chemistry, and other physical and natural areas of objective study, as well as in the behavioral
scie~ces, are shaping a culture predicated upon universal
technological principles.

These will create a drastic

redirection in daily living that will affect everyone. 241
It will also create a revolutionary alteration in the
environment.

The art resulting from, and expressing such

239 Ibid., p. 215.
240 R. D. Blackmur, "A Burden for Critics," Lectures
in Criticism, (New York:
Bollinger Foundation, 1941), p.
203. '
24 1 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 338.
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a chang1e can onJ.y be different from what has already been

I 242

created.

The creative artist. because of the aforeJentioned
I
cultural barrier5 and the emerging new culture, will be fur-

l.

. · au d'ience. 243
ther alienated f roman un d ers t an d'ing an d supportive
I

ThereforP, the artist will have two alternatives from which
'
'
to choo,

regarding his actions.

First, the artist could

sell his 7kills and powers of expression to the popular culi
I

ture,

to be used as means of entertainment for the mass
'
public: Many have chosen this alternative, stating that their
art no 1 longer adhered to the earlier traditions o,f internal
I
244
i.ntegr~ty, excellence, and high artistic standards.
Secondly, theI artist could maintain his integrity, excellenc~ and
'

high s,tandards; and with a less well educated an9 far less
sophis,li:icated public, in regard to art, become more esoteric
I

and is~lated from daily life.

245

From this then, is the implication that future
high art forms will be relegated into one of two'areas of
'
concentration.

I

One, that they will succumb to such a

stand~rd that they will take on the character of popular
art fc:irms; or secondly, the high art forms will maintain
their lhigh level of excellence and artistic standards,
242 Lbid.
2«3rbid., p. 345.
244rbic;..
245rbid..
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I:
and because of their symbolism and communicative quali-

I'

1

ties, experiencing a lack of dialogue between ttie' art
work and the viewe:i; be relegated to futher isolaUion from

II:

dailyll'ife. 246

i

Another serious implication from this,~~ that

current art forms will not, in themselves have~ signifi-

i

,I

cant affect on future art forms; rather, the affect upon

I

I

futur~ forms will come through the channel of jUdgements

!

.I

of such forms by a predominately, culturally il·literate
sociely and by a small number of critics.

:

Thisi Iposition

'I

has been taken by such as Ortega, who has argued that the
1

mass, which has assumed political power, and iJJists upon
f

,I

their 1 own commonplace values, has lost respect •for the
I

valuek of the earlier elite that sustained a h~Jh culture.

I

He states:

iI

"The mass crushes everything beneath it,

:

I

I

11

everyrhing that is different, everything that~~ excellent,
indiv~duals qualified and select." 247

It may ~lt be pri!

marily the continued existence of high art thaildisturbs
critibs, who point to the vastness of mediocrity that is
I

'I

I

'I

a condition of modern living; but it could be that they
I
I1 •
fear ~or the future of high art in light of th~ dwindling
i
,I
number of the "elite" who, in the past, have sul,tained
such

art.

iI ,

Dwight McDonald, one of the mostlcritical

246rbid.
247 Jose Orgega y Gasset, op. cit., pp. '~-19.
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of social observers, echoes this aforementioned sentiment.

I

He indicates that the changing cultural conditic'ms fosters
I

a

I ·
pseudo-art
I

art.

.

.

I

•

that is inimical to the interests of "high"
I

!He also indicates the the audience for cultural pro-

ducts lis largely composed of a large body of ignoramuses,
and that high culture may indeed be in danger of extinction.748
This is a serious criticism, and an implication
in whfch
educators, administrators, and art educators in
I
•
particular, must address themselves to, and resolve on
the basis
of clarity of purpose, educational understanding,
I
I

and sensitivity to aesthetic

values. 249 . The importance

of this cannot be overemphasized, as the existance of high

I

I

art in our culture obviously does not always insure its
right~ul recognition from an appreciative mass audience. 2 SO
I

I

It is ,here that art education pas its fundamental obligation, Jnot only in bringing art to the masses, but of
devel9ping a mass body of intense and informed 9pinion
I

and critical appreciation through education. 2 51
I

As such,

the ultimate responsibility for the future of serious art
248 Kaufman, op. cit., p. 351.
249 rbid.
250
251

rbid.
rbid.
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I

I

'I

and the development of an honestly responsive mass audi1

ence rests within the context of education. 252 ;
•If it is tb. be believed, that art is tojbe pro.i

duced and enjoyed only by an elite subculture in our total
society, then one might have reason for believing in the
I

social isolation of the arts.

On the other hand, if art

is considered as a phenomenon of human behavior, creating
symbols for communication and to change the natµre of one's
experiences, then art is related in degree to all society.253
If the latter is accepted, educational institut:ions, educators

(especially art educators), and administrators become

engaged with the problems inherent in societal 'change, in
recognizing art as a major communications system of social
inter~ction. 254
Therefore, unless critical discourse re,lative to
art achieves the intellectual scale of our revolutionary
epoch, art will be deprived of serious reference and fail
to lu~e the attention of serious minds. 255
'

It will result

in a sum total of amateurishness, a lack of talent, and
willfµll absurdity in making decisions regardi~g art. 256
252 Ibid.
253 George Pappas, Concepts in Art and Education:
,
An Anthology of Current Issues, (London:
The Macmillan
Company, Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1970), p. 72.'
254 Ibid.
255Ibid., p. 363.
256

Ibid., p. 364.

i I;

132

I

:I I
I

I

:

I

·: I

I
I
Therefore, the value for art criticism must be j:he effort
!

to re-introduce art into the framework of humanly serious
,r
concerns, and dispell the popular-culture fallal::y that
,

!

I

I

everything concerned with the creation and evalhation of
art can be made immediately discernable to the .so-called
common reader or the Sunday painter. 257

Lewis Mumford,

likewise concerned with the aforementioned problem states:
"Some people appear to be more con,cerned
1with having and doing the 'right' things than
being able to make independent judgemen'ts
from a wide range of possible choices., We
have well-designed products, but many are so
,standardized that only a very discriminating
person will go off the b~aten path to make
independent selections." 58
Therefore, there is a need for an educated critical c~tizenry that will insist on both high artistic
'
excellence,
and also insist on both the aesthetic as

well as.the utilitarian functions of art.
257 Ibid.
,, 258 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, (New
York::,:Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1943)', p. 5.
'

'i
i I

:i
'

'I

I

·i:
'I

Chapter 8
THE NEED FOR ARTISTIC JUDGEMENTS IN THE SOCIETY

;· ; I

Education Implications
, ! Inevitably, in the reviews of culture made today,

society ends up with an "undeclared war between art and
taste:

art being what is offered, and taste the collec-

tive repponse to it." 259

Art loses in just about all

the a~says which contemplate the social conditions for
art.
"As consumption becomes more important
· to our society, advertising will affect our
lives as much as the school or church. Put
more bluntly, . . . in a society where we
•make more than we can use, it is as important
to persuade people to buy superlative as to
familiarize them with the best that has been
thought and said."260
While a number of educators and writers 261 join
the list of those that are despairing of modern society,
many fe~l that resistance can be made.

Griffith, for

, 1' I

example!, a little more optimistic, states that the social
malaise of art could be negated if there were an emphasis
on unde,rstanding and criticism in art and art instruction. 262
'

' i~ 9 Griffith, op. cit., p. 246.
260Joseph Wood Krutch, Human Nature and the Human
Condition, (New York:
Random House, 1959), p. 31.
261Hans Sedlmayr, Art in Crisis,
Regnery Co., 1958).
' 262 Griffith, op. cit., p. 272.
133

(Chicago:

Henry

134
I ,

Ii'

Ii

I

., I

Even t~Jipessimistic Krutch later states that sciciety may
be imptoved if "each new generation is always taught to
I

be discontented with the kind of life which the average
'

I I

. . . . 263
man 1 ives.

By this way, he states, standards can be

lifted even in a materialistic culture .

.'

For some time, the modern artistic assessment of
Western civilization has been servere, but more recently
the faint hope that Griffith and Krutch have voiced have
266
265
been ech~ed by such as Ayers, 264 Meadows,
Feldman,
Hazard·, 2'67 and Kouwenhoven. 268
life Why,te,

Also there are those

269 Riesman, 270 and Lee 271 who state that

263Krutc,
h op. cit.,
.
p. 79 •
264 c. E. Ayers, Towards a Reasonable Society,
Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1960).
1

265 Paul Meadows, The Culture of Industrial Man,
(Lincol11::
University •Of Nebraska Press, 1950).
2 66 E. B. Feldman, "Artist and Mass Culture,"
College Art Journal, XVIII (Summer, 1959), pp. 339-244.
·267 P. D. Hazard, "Problems of the Arts in a Mass
Society,;" Art Journal, XX (Summer,
1959), pp. 203-205.

.

'

268 John A. Kouwenhoven, Made in America,
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1948).

(New York:

,269w·11·
1
1.
1.am H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization of Man,
(New Yo'rk:
Simon and Schuster, 1956) •
1

'

. 270 David Reisman, Nathan Glazer, and Reul Denney,
The Lonely Crowd, (New York:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1953).
271 Dorothy Lee, Freedom and Culture, (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959).
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I

'I

'

the purpose
of this increased education is to promote
I ,
'

within ,the individual, the capabilities necessary in

:I
.I .

choosing intellectual, social, and esthetic independence •
I

To be assured that more people will be able to understand
and desire the best, Ayers urges that that there be
'
increased education aiming at enhancing man's ability to
experience. 272
Barkan, in quoting Bruner, states that "the
dominant view of men engaged in instructional curriculum
is that students gain on understanding of the 'fundamental structure' of whatever subject we choose to teach.

11273

He continues:
"In making this statement, Bruner
does not deny any developmental values
which can be derived from engagement in
the study of a subject. All he is saying
is that the 'key educational task' is to
give students an understanding of the
fundamental structure of any subject we
see fit to teach. When applied to the
teaching of art, this would mean that'
'there is a subject matter of the field
of a r t ' and it is important to teach
it. 11274
: According to this view, art is a discipline in
I

the sci!lle sense that mathematics is a di~cipline, and
272

Ayers, op. cit., p. 241.

273

Manuel Barkan, "Transition in Art Education,"
Art Education, XV
(October, 1962), p. 14.
274 rbid.

I
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11

:j

one should learn to understand art in terms of its funda' !

menta~,concepts.
f

I

275

Still another approach is taken b~

I

Ecker:)
I in which he voices the belief that the essential
, 'I
i

I

ingredient is that education,even art education be both
"qualitative"

·. I

(aesthetic) and "theoretical"

(scientific),

and that both components should operate in all areas of
human experience through a qualitative problem-solving
process in which "qualitative relations are ordered to

:· i

.
. . ens.
d ,,276
desired qua 1 itative

Concerning art as a form

of qualitative intelligence, he states:

': I

'I
1

,

:, i
'

I

"Artistic learning, the result of
solving qualitative problems, will have a
central place in the curriculum only when
art educators can demonstrate that artistic
solutions, paintings, sculpture, and even
city planning have a significance beyond
the immediate situations in which qualitative
problems arise. The significance of art, its
liberating function, is that it frees·one
to conceive of other problems and solutions;
its meaning lies in its relations to past and
future art experiences of men. Artists show
the way with creative solutions to their problems.
But art. experience is wider than the
studio, the gallery, -1;1.nd the art classroom.
Art education can direct its attention to
building those pervasive qualities that ought
to distinguish American civilization. The
development and expansion of qualitative-

275
,
Art Education: The Sixty-fourth Yearbook of
the National Society for the Study of Education, part II,
op. cit.,
p. 226.
'
.

:,f ! 2 76oavid

w. Ecker, "The Artistic Process as
Qualitative Problem Solving," Journal of Aesthetic and
Art Criticism, XXI (Spring, 1963).
1 I'
I

'

'
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"' artistic intelligence must be one of the

·::! primary goals of American schools."277
I,, '
,, '

:, : According to this view, the purpose of art educa1

1:

1

tion is to both experience and understand art as a process
of soiving "qualitative-artistic problems," in order to
devei~p "qualitative-artistic intelligence."278

McFee

also, ::kchoes these sentiments in her belief that art
education for citizens in a democracy should be based
, I'

upon a·curriculum that is sufficiently broad enough
'

to be:useful for all students. 279

She elaborates on

'

this idea with the following statement:
•

1

"Art education should prepare a people
to make aesthetic discriminations, in the
,,, production, consumption, and use of their
,11 products,and also in such matters as urban
' '
'
development and renewal, housing, and the
development of artistic symbols found in
'
,
,Ii the environment of daily life. u280
'

,, I

McFee states further that understanding and dis• '•

!

.

crimination in the visual arts is necessary because, in
a democracy, the environment.can be improved or allowed
;i

I

277

oavid w. Ecker, "Does Art Educate?" Eastern
Arts Quarterly, I (September-October, 1962), pp.
18-1?.:

,I

278

Art Education:
The Sixty-fourth Yearbook of
the National Society for the Study of Education, op.
cit ... p. 227.
I I
I

2 7 9 rbid.
280

'.,'

rbid.
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'
to dec~y,
depending upon the knowledge and interests of

the el~dtorate. 281

This seems to be the underlying thesis

of her ',hypothesis that one of the major purposes of art

''

'

is the maintenance of the culture through mutually understood artistic symbols. 282

That is, art, as it exists

in the ,present conditions of our cities and towns, represents many periods and copies of periods, in assorted
states of preservation or decay.
,

I

The whole expansive

face of American expresses values and attitudes through
'
art for~s
and their conditions.

The art quality ranges

from the sublime to the odious, and according to McFee,
students must have qualifying concepts to evaluate the
entir~ range if they are to make objective aesthetic
'11'

discri~inations as citizens in a democracy. 283
,' In contrast to these aforementioned theories, it

''

has been generally ,is.sumed by institutions of higher education, with regard to art instruction, that both artistic
judgement and art appreciation might best be developed
:
284
out of the involvement with the studio aspects of art.
Recen:t}Y, however, many are educators such as Conant
281 rtiid.
I'

282 Pappas, op. cit., p. 73.

283
,
Art Education: The Sixty-fourth Yearbook of
the National Society for the Study of Education, op. cit.,
p. 7 3.:
'
1
'

I

I

284 Ibid., p. 47.
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''
'I

have urged that an emphasis should be placed on both
appreciation and criticism without the necessary interventi~~iof studio work, even though such work is advisable.
He suggests further that direct contact with original
works ?fart, and analysis of such works might better
fulfii{!the educational potentialities of art. 285
Historically, the assumption has been that education, and art education have provided the individual
; I

with 'the necessary aesthetic and critical sensibilities
with which to appreciate art and its inherent character-

,

istics,'.

This assumption has been too easily established.

If, however, this aesthetic and critical sensibility is
present' in students and the lay-public, then this thesis
'

'

would be redundant.
is not. the case.

However, according to Kaufman, this

He cites that our personal environments

are, for the most part, either down right ugly or depressingly drab.

He also cites that students generally, have

not been effectively encouraged in a critical aesthetics

''

,,

I

and th'~t previous educational experience has not fully
developed the necessary refinement of perceptual and
symbol:~c discrimination, even in the less salutary fashion
of valuing art and beauty. 286

Therefore, it appears that

285 Howard Conant, "The Role of Arts in Education,"
Art Education Bulletin, XVII (May, 1960), pp. 4-14.
1

286 Irving Kaufman, "The Contexts of Teaching Art,"
in Pappas, op. cit., p. 257 .
.: I
I

l

140

11

the typtcal college graduate still accepts

unc:r;itically,

.
h .'. : . 1
.
d
1
1
'1.
I
·
h 1.s p ~.s1.ca env1.ronmen t an cu tura ml. 1.eu, n<?t car 1.ng
about ,';impractical" matters. 28 7

Thus, society has mainI

tained two very naive ideas, namely, bhat the miniscule
output 'cif art objects can modify the environment and
that through
psychic osmosis an artistic influence can
; ., I
"

'

be givE!n off by such objects. 288
1

According to Hoebel, man needs the mirr,ow of the

arts, ·not only to raise his level of existence, but also,
for hiJ!survival as a human being. 289

This implies then,

that one inherits an art culture, which in turn conditions
' II

his "taste':"

However, Ducasse states that a "taste" of

almos:t:,i any sort can be modified and developed by appropr i,

ate and assiduous cultivation. 290

Personal "taste" how-

ever o(ten encounters a problem in constructing a justified
response to a work of art that is diametrically opposed to
one's "taste."

Frequently, and historically, the art that

has ~r.p ven most durable is that which has been opposed
1

to tl'\e: "taste of the time."

291

Because of this, most

287 Ibid., p. 258.
288 Ibid. p. 377.
289 E. Adamson Hoebel, Man and the Primitive world,
(New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., 1949), p.
161. ' i I
290 Ducasse, op. cit., p. 8.
29lo'Doherty, op. cit., p. 151.
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1\1'

i I':,,\ II
peopl~,have been far too willing to acquiesce in the view
!1 :
I I

,

,

that :tl;lere 1.s nothing to be done about artistic "tastes"
but t?ilenjoy or suffer them. 292
'· Contemporary speculation is beginning to assert
that only the systematic building of relevant cognitive

''

and ev~luative maps in .the various contexts of art instruc'I''

tion,is likely to develop a critical aesthetic sensibility
to promote the habits and dispositions necessary to count,: I
eract"the purely emotional "taste" appeals made to the
individual :in a modern mass democracy.
',''

That is, unless

the pupil, through art education fortifies himself with
basic·,i ! critical aesthetic disciplines, he will be unprepared; to judge art, or individual forms of propaganda,
: i

I

''

'

whether expressed in debased popular art, or in the
pointless posturings of the pseudo-avant-garde. 293

It

I'

is with this statement, that we arrive at one of the
I

core ptoblems in art education, namely, the assessment
of th~ !relative worth of the ,wide variety and many faces
1

of art, 294 and because the popularity of art among spectators , is clearly greater than at any previous period of

, .'I

1
'·

, 2 9 2 saw, op. cit., p. 17.
I

, 293solon T. Kimball and James E. McClellan, Jr.,
Education and the New America,· (New York:
Random House,
1962) ,; ,pp. 301-303.
'I
I
'
294
Pappas, op. cit., p. 263 .
• I I
':

,;

I

''
295
Arneric~n history,
it is necessary for distinctions
I I

to be , made
between the acceptance of art as a good invest·,
ment,: ,a_, desirable decoration of a home, or the recognition
of art: as a serious occupation for even those not espe-:
296
cially' talented.
New Objectives
In order to understand the reasons for stressing
'I

the mastery of unifying topics, and for grasping the socalled structure of such a :subject as art, it is necessary
to ex'.aJ!1ine briefly, the character of new challenges
besetting society at this time.

It is not only that the

wise use of abundance and leisure demands a renewal of

''

the ideals of excellence and self-cultivation, but in
addition, heightened powers of discrimination and judge'I

•

ment are necessary in order to control the streams of
,:

I

impres'sions that flow incessantly from the mass media.
Also, the study of art as a source of personalmeaning
I I

and value orientation in a technologically interdependent
society demands greater degrees of aesthetic mastery than
one g.en'erally observes.
I:

29 7

In view of this, and also

295Art Education: The Sixy-Fourth Yearbook of
the National Society for the Study of Education, op. cit.,
p. 6 •i :
:

I

296 I b'id., p. 7.

297Ralph A. Smith, Aesthetic and Criticism in
Art Education, (Chicago:
Rand McNally and Co. ,I 1966), p. IX.

'
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' '
,' I'

I

, :I

tradiljional ideals, the need is now being recognized for
I

i

placing renewed emphasis on the nature of significant
''

conteriti in art instruction and on the logical operations
,1,'

by mean~ of which content is meaningfully manipulated. 298
Logical·operations, it is to be understood, are the processes

'ol:' defining, explaining, evaluating, and conditional

inferring. 29 9

Lest this should sound trite or too general,

it should be pointed out that recent studies concerning
classroom discourse reveal that the level of dialogue
between instructor and pupil seldom exceeds the level of
i

•

!

"taste:" 1 or so-called "common sense," with the result, that
opportunities to develop disciplined patterns of thought
are left
unexplored. 300
,,

Research into classroom discourse

conce:r:: riing art is in its infancy, 301 but personal obser1

vation and experience afford a similar conclusion.
This is also the view of Ralph A. Smith as he
states"

I

"Now, since a work of art is a phenomenon
that generates a plethora of puzzling questions,
298 Ibid.

299 B. Othanel Smith, "A Concept of Teaching,"
Language and Concepts in Education, (Chicago:
Rand
McNall~ and Co., 1961).
1

' '

: I 300Ibid.

301 Robert D. Clements, "Art Student-Teacher
Questioning," Studies in Art Education, Vol. VI, No. 1
(Autumn, 1964).
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I I

,'' it is unfortunate to observe teachers and
pupils failing to structure intelligently,
',, issues which frustrate one's efforts to
1
understand the nature of art.
College
, ,:, : instruction, for the most part, is deficient.
': Since the necessary knowledge and linguistic
skills have not been acquired which would
render problematic aspects of the concept
of art more manageable, it is not surprising
: that high degrees of linguisbic dissonance
" are recorded in art instruction. n302

!',

In lieu of this, art instruction should involve,
as do ,other realms of instruction, the intelligent use
of language which in turn entails a careful scrutiny of
state,ments.

This kind of behavior, also a form of "doing"

or "a:ct!ivity," suggests that there are important verbal
as well' as nonverbal learning contexts in art education.
However,, it should not be expected that this necessary
' 'I

skill will be cultivated until there is significant
changes in the art curriculum and in the preparation of
art x~structors. 30 3
In addition to having a significant linguistic
aspect,:
,, art instruction should be a multidimensional
enterprise in which more is at issue than having pupils
emul~te artistic behavior. 304

There should be a renewed

emph~~;~s on self-cultivation, which according to Smith,

'
is arilobjective that is currently neglected in art
'!
302Ralph A. Smith, op. cit., p. X.
JOJibid., p. XII.
30 4 rbid.

,,
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'

',,i''I

education.

305

In addition, connoisseurship should be

''

,,''

'

emphasized, which calls for devoting more attention to
'I•
>

11

I

the na~~re of what has been called enlightened prefer'

ence and justification.306
New objectives for art instruction further stimuI'

late questions about the meaning of aesthetic insight,
or ways of "knowing" other than scientific knowledge,
namely·perception. 307 Except for the blind, perception
''
of the visual arts would seem to pose no difficult problems, bµt according to Knobler, few persons with normal
vision realize how limited their perception really is. 308
Perception, the awareness of the world about us, is based
on the.: :information that comes through the senses, and is
I: I

all too: often considered a natural, matter-of-fact attribute of the human being.

However, according to Knobler;

. ,
309
this is not so.
,
Professor J. Z. Young, an English physiologist,
has conducted a number of experiments with individuals
I : i
3 0 5 Ralph A. Smith, "Aesthetic Criticilsm: The Method
of Aesthetic Education," in Pappas, op. cit., p. 405.
'

'

30 6Harry S. Broudy, B. Othanel Smith, and Joe R.
" ' Democracy and Excellence in American Secondary
Burnett,
Education, (Chicago:
Rand McNally and Co., 1964), p.
215. l
:

f

1

York:
l,

3 0 7 Philip H. Phenix, Realms of Meaning, (New
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1964), p. 142.
308 Knobler, op. cit., p. 14.
J0 9 Ibid.
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I I

11

born bJlind who, in their later years were enabl:ed to see.
I,,

He states that the once-blind person, now physiologically
normali!does not "see" the world immediately.
"The patient, on opening his eyes for
the first time gets little or no enjoyment;
indeed, he finds the experience painful. He
reports only a spinning mass of lights and
! 'colors. He proves to be quite unable to
pick out objects by sight, to recognize what
they are, or to name them. He has no conception of a space with objects in it, although
,he knows all about objects and their names
··by touch.
'Of course,' you will say,· 'he
must take a little time to learn to recognize them by sight.'
Not a 'little' time,
'but a very, very long time, in fact, years.
His brain has not been trained in the rules
of seeing. We are not conscious that there
are any such rules; we think that we see, as
we say, 'naturally.' But in fact, we have
learned a whole set of rules from childhood."3lO
1 1

The experiments by Young suggest that the sensa-

tions one receives have no meaning for the person until
he is knowledgeable of how to order them into a coherent
'
perception. To perceive something, requires that the
:

observer make a selection of the numerous sensations
transmitted

to him at any one time.

311

Therefore, one

must be both critical and aesthetically discriminating,
in selecting those sensations which are significant and
1
.
. d.ing th ose wh'ic h are irre
.
l evan.
t 312 As Young points
d iscar
,
310J. z. Young, Doubt and Certainty in Science,
(London:
Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 62.
311 Knobler, op. cit., p. 14.
312 rbid.
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: '
out, this
requi:b.es training.

Thus, the untrained observer

cannot,,.make "sense" out of what he sees before him.

313

I
'I

'
l, :What
is being called for, is new objectives in

art and art education, that will solicit inquiries into
the relation of language and the verbalization of con'
cepts and
standards to what is currently considered non-

discur,sive forms of communication and expression, in
other w~rds, "art. "
Modes of Criticism
Qualitative intelligence, critical aesthetics,
logical operations, and the calling for the verbalization
of concepts and standards, means the utilization of that
'

discip~ine commonly referred to as art criticism.

"Crit-

icism" is unquestionably one of the most troublesome terms
encountered when one refers to discourse relative to art.
'

It is sometimes used to refer to any critical statement,
descriptive or evaluative, uttered about works of art,
''

and at:iother times, it is used to refer only to evaluative assertions.

Moreover, the term has either positive

or nega.tive connotations depending on the mean,ings that
I'

that ~ave become attached to it in one's personal
exper:Lence. 314

In this thesis, the term "art criticism"

I
,:•

I

313 Ibid.
314 Ralph A. Smith, op. cit., p. 299.
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I

I
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i,I
I

is intended to imply an aesthetic criticism, that is very

,,,

much iri1 the same nature as that mode of criticism advo316
cated by:
Rosario Assunto, 315 Munroe C. Beardsley,
'
317
318
,
.
319
D. W. Gotshalk,
Frank Sibley,
and Ralph A. Smith.
·,:The theories regarding aesthetic criticism, as
proposed by the aforementioned men contain slight vari-

,'

ations 1, 'but these, are predominantly of a semantic and
numerical nature.

Conceptually, and in regard to intent

and pu~pose, their theories are very similar and virtually
identical.
':

According to Gotshalk, aesthetic criticism

consists of three phases:

the "genetic" phase, which

is the•study of the factors that shaped the work being
'

' '

viewed;,, the "immanent" phase, which is the study of the
major features of the work; and the "judgement" phase,
which is the application of a set of relevant standards
'
to a work, which does not occur until it has undergone
: 315 Rosario Assunta, "Criticism," Encyclopedia of
World ,Art, Vol VI (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc.,' 1961), columns 114-118.
316 Monroe C. Beardsley, Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism,
Inc., •1958).
York:

(New York:

Harcourt, Brace and World,

317 0. w. Gotshalk, Art and the Social Order,
Dover Publications, Inc., 1966).

(New

, 318 Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts," from Joseph'
Margol\s (ed.), Philosophy Looks at the Arts, (New York:
CharJ,.es Scribner's and Sons, 1962), pp. 77-87.
319
,
Ralph A. Smith, "Aesthetic Criticism: The
Method •of Aesthetic Education," in Pappas, opl 1' cit., pp.
404-422.
.
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I

both 't:he "genetic" and "immanent" phases.
':

320

Gotshalk

I

holds 'that this kind of criticism is more of a suggestive

I ,

nature,j 'rather than legislative and judicial, and there!

1

fore, conceived in this manner, criticism can be an
invaluable aid in appreciation. 321

Beardsley, places

the practice of aesthetic criticism in a median position
between the work of art and the discipline of aesthetics
'

as copceived as philosophical inquiry. 322

Beardsley,

distinguishes between three types of critical discourse:
1

non-n qrinative, descriptive statements; nonnormative,
I

interpretive statements, and evaluative statements.323
Utilizing this :method, Beardsley believes that there is
a hierarchy
of reasoning in criticism, namely:
I

genetic

reaso'ning, affective reasoning, and objective reasoning. 324
Beardsl:ey cites objective reasoning as the most relevant. 325
That ,is to say, that objective reasons typically single out
I'

'

characteristics of a work such as unity, complexity, or
:
I
320
,
. ·,
D .. w. Gotshalk, "Explanation, Art Criticism
and Norms," in Ralph A. Smith, op. cit., p. 301.

321 Ibid., p. 302.
322Ralph A. Smith, Aesthetics and Criticism in
Art Education, op. cit., p. 299.
323
Ibid.

;::1

324Ibid.
325

Ibid.
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, 1,I

interis,ity, or some combination of these qualitiies, and

'

i

·1

j

,I

that1aJ work of art tends to be aesthetically good or
I

bad :Jct.th
respect
to its organi-zation, complex'.~ty, or
\
I
;
peculi'ar intensity. 326
'
I,

These two theories are similar but not identical.

i

,

Theref~re, for the sake of clarity and understanding,
I

further elaboration is needed, and for this purpose Gotshalk's theory will be utilized.

Gotshalk proposed that

: I

aesthetic criticism evolved through three phases, the
genet,i~, the immanent, and the judgement.

The genetic

',I

, I.
,, '

p h ase·is the study of the factors that have shaped the
work of art.

That is, the environmental factors such

as the1physica1 milieu, social needs, traditional influ, f•

,I
1

I

j

ences 'and others that create the so-called "cultural
climate" of the artist. 327

This is also implied by

I

'

I

Rosenberg, in which he cites that the first requirement of art

~riticism, is, that one be mindful of the

politjJcal, social, religious,'., philosophic, and moral

',,

'']

I

influences present during the creation of a particular
'

art wo~k, thus establishing its cultural context. 328
'1

i

The second, or immanent phase of aesthetic criticism, is
the study of the major features within the work of art
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid., p. 343.
3 2 BRo~enberg, "Critic ism and Its
Pappas,i op. cit., p. 360.
,,

'

I

'

'

in
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I

'p

I

' ''I
:

I

itselt.:

These features are:

the materials used, forms
'

present in the work, mode of expression, and the intended
'

func~::i.'&n of the work. 329

The aim is a penetration into

: .'I ,

' :

the actual intrinsic perceptual properties of the art
work,, ,because some works are internally less intelli-:,
gible than others; and often, when one comes to learn
what ,is actually in them, critical opinions often change
drama'ti,cally. 330

It is important to note that the first

two P,hases are conducted apart from evaluation, for that
is the activity of the judgmental phase.

The genetic

immanJn;t phases prepare the way for the judgmental.

They

characterize the background of a work of art in such a
way that an objective estimate is possible and that stan' I;

dards:' ,can

be applied. 331

priate and relevant.

These standards must be appro-

However, they are not genetic or

immane'rit actualities, but rather ideals.

Even though

the-genetic and immanent phases are subordinate to the
judgmental, they are simultaneously, necessary and auxr ol

I

'I'

ilia;y·to it, which is the essence of the process.

It

is in:this sense that art criticism is the. fullest
possibie appraisal of works of art as aesthetic objects
329

Ralph A. Smith, Aesthetics and Criticism in
Art Education, op. cit., p. 344.

': 33
0ibid.
331

Ibid.

I'',,
'
I I•
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i

' I,'

I'

I I
; 1, I

I:

; 1,:

according to an appropriate set of standards.332

This

·
·t d"istinctive-nature,
·
·
I,an d not
is criticism in ar t -in-isI

Ii

criti:cism of art-in-its-total-nature with all its rami1

fications and connections beyond the process o~ aesthetic
perce;bion. 333

'
I

• Gotshalk' s theory also greatly resembles the
I

theory ·concerning critical activity offered by.Ralph A.
34
Smit~. 3:
Critical activity, according to Smith, may be

'
described in terms of overlapping phases which!contain
statements ranging from the cognitively certain to the
!
cogn:ilt'~vely less certain. 335 This critical activity
t

I

involves four phases, namely:

description, an~lysis,

336
.
'
'
.
interpretation,
an d eva l uation.
•'

h f"irs t p'hase,
Te

I

description, involves naming, identifying, and·classifying; a kind of taking stock which inventories bognitively
'I

establ~shed aspects of a work of art.

.

I

This category would

I
comprise also, art-historical data, and in the· case of
repre~ e;ntational works, knowledge of cultural history,
, :1

1

II

I

332

I,

rbid., p. 345.

333 rbid.

'

i
334 Ralph A. Smith, "Aesthetic Criticism:
The
Method of Aesthetic Education, " in Pappas, op.: cit., pp.
404-422.
335 rbid., p. 413.
336 rbid.

,,
,1

I
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1

I 'I'
I;

''

1:

I'

I

I,,
I: '
I•

'

'''I

1·

or whatlc,ver is required to identify the subject-matter
depicted. 337
1·

I

This coincides with Gotshalk's gJnetic
I

phase! :and the initial activity of art criticism, as cited
by Rosenberg.

The second phase in Smith's theory is

that of, analysis.

This involves a close look at the
I

''
'
components, elements, and details that make up,a work,
the larger groups or complexes into which they are composed,, ·and the relationships they sustain. 338 I That is,
the materials used, mode of expression, forms and other
intri11sic elements are discerned.
i

I

This is virtually
I

identical with Gotshalk's immanent phase, with'one
exception, that of function.

Function is included in

the third phase of Smith's theory which is interpretation.
1 I

I

.

I

This concern of interpretation is to say something about

'

the ~eaning of the work of art as a whole, as ?istinct
,
.
.
339
I .
from any interpretation of its parts.
There is an
I
I
important distinction however in this phase·. The

'

distinction
is that a work is evaluated not inlterms of
I
'
whether it is

11

good 11 or

11

bad,

11

but rather, it ~s an
'

aesthetic evaluation of either sufficiency or deficiency.

340

i

That is, a work may be sufficientl?,7 expressive to
337 rbid.
3 38rbid.
339rbid., p. 415.
340rbid., p. 417.

I ,1
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11'

l

I

I 'I

,

I

:
I;1

1:.
I

l

'

I

J1 1

warrarit: aesthetic contemplation, or it may be r'egarded
as shallow, and insignificant, and thus, not warrant
, ,
.
341
such !contemplation
.
. 11
Lest it be forgotten, the foregoing only consititutes what is regarded as a reasonable and acceptable
descrip'tion of critical activity.

Neither does it expli-

citly prescribe content nor procedures for doing criticism.
Also,: critical phases are distinct from critical procedures
.
1 cri·t·ic. 342
an d t ec, h.
niques uti·1·ize db y t h e pro f essiona
In response to the foregoing theories of Gotshalk
1

and Smi th, Sibley, offers an alternative method of cri tical activity, in which he suggests methods and procedures
that can be utilized in art instruction.

343

critfchl activity involves seven processes.

Sibley's
Number (1)

is the, pointing out of nonaesthetic features in a work
of art'.

That is, by indicating one thing, the 1 learner

is compelled to direct his attention to something other
than WAat he is observing.
'

(2) the pointing out of the

'

of the' aesthetic features of a work.

(3) the linking

of rema:t.ks regarding the nonaesthetic and aesthetic
aspeqts.

(4) the utilization of genuine metaphors and
341

Ibid.

342 rbid., p. 418.
3 43 Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts," in Ralph
A. Smith, op. cit., pp. 336-339.

1
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•1

',,

' ''
,I'
simii':i'.es in descriptive discourse.

(5) the utilization

'
.
of contrasts
and comparisons.

the utilization of

ii,'

reiteration and repetition.

(6)

(7) even though it is non-

~erbal, the use of expressive gestures. 344
Purpqse:s of Criticism
If there is a legitimate function that schooling
in cripicism,

(in this case aesthetics criticism), can

''
'

proviqe; it is, for the person who has practiced this
activity, analogous to the function of the professional
guide who conducts the traveler through a foreign city,
''

and points out the important sights.

The person schooled

in criticism should possess an extensive and intimate
acquaintance with works of art.
'

His faculties will have

'

become. sensitive through much observation and comparison.
He wil'l be able to discern facts and differences in works
''
of art which could pass unnoticed by others. It would
also allow:him to take the untutored "consumer" of art
upon a'"tour" of a given painting, sculpture, or architecbural structure, and call to the consumer's attention
345
.
t h ose 'f eatures tha t h e wou ld ot h erwise
over 1 oo k .
·
,1
" Concepts used in aesthetic discourse, according
to Sa\\(; direct one's attention to the important features
I;,''

344

Ibid.

345 aucasse, op. cit~ p. 8.
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I,
:
of th¢'.'(.Jork being viewed. 346
''
'J, I

These features are important
'I

:,

'

in the 1 : ~ense ):hat if they were not noticed, th'e work would
I

'

;

..
not b,::, 1 : apprecia
t.e d . 347

: :, I

Appreciation includes not only cor-

,

rect e~aluation, but also complete perception if one is to
derive;Jesthetic satisfaction from works of art, which Knob•

I

'

ler s~~tes is a complex combination of attitudes and perceptual a~ilities. 348

This aesthetic satisfaction can be

':

analog~\ls to th<> enjoyment of a fine wine.
'

In order to

I I

enjoy th~ wine, one needs only the capacity for "taste."
However; if one desires to enjoy mot merely the taste of

''

the wine, but also the "fineness" of it, then indeed for
this helneeds learning, since the pleasure he seeks is not
the sensuoue pleasure merely, but also the "intellectual"

I

\I

.

pleasure' of recognition, comparison, and judgement.
Because: the wine he tastes is rare, old, ·and famous the
I'

I

"connoisseur" derives a keen pleasure, but distinct from
' I
,
that derived from the taste of the wine by the average
.

.

. •

ind1v1d9al •

349

.'

'iArt criticism can be of great assistance to art
appreciation, but. should not be considered as a substitute
•1 !
for ap~ieciation.
Criticisr.1, using the means of the stanI

dards

of' !

interdimensional competence and of universal

'
· ,', 346 saw,

op. cit., p.

197 •

•, I

' 1347 rbid.
, ; 348

·,1

'349

Knobler, op. cit., p. 5
Ducctsse, op. cit., p. 227.
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: I ,

,,

:Iii

. I
termina~ ac h ierement, can separate a vast quantity of

,

I

those inferior works of art of the popular variety, from
I,;, I
(
,
,
,
350
those ,tnat are more rich in universal values.
1
Such
1
1
jl [
·
inferio~ works often provide agreeable illusions and
'
'
pasti~elto persons who wear sufficiently .heavy aesthetic

;, I

1

blinkers.
It is for this reason that such works can
' '
351 These
assist :rn
' blocking the paths of appreciation.
'

'

I

works can overpower the mind and raise a high wall.,,
'i
I
.
between the ma'ss of men, and man's superior artistic
achieve~ent.
, I'

The purpose of criticism therefore, is to

reduce::t;he size of this wall, and to keep alive in as
many as possible the concept of what constitutes· a superior
·:,'
352
work of 1 'art.

" I

, :In addition, art criticism, of the aesthetic
type, as proposed in this thesis, can be of considerable

'' !

use in'artistic creation.
'
'

Although creative activity is.·
•

I

I

based on, a number of factors, it is rarely, if at all,
'

an automatic p,i:-ocess.
I

I

ance. 353:

It also•_,employs reflective guid-

An artist may choose subjects not well' !>uited

to his .talents or be unaware of certain possibilities
''

of his'

ji:,.'eculiar
1

idiom.

He may become careless and unknow-

I

ingly re·lax his standards, or become puzzled by the general
5
·I il.3 oRalp h A • Smi. th ,
1

I

'351 Ibid.
;352Ibii:l.

I

,

} 53 Ibib., p. 356.

op.

C.lt . . ,

p. 355 .
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',',,

I '1'

''

'i

'

''
,' I,

. ·:
'
'
'' ''
'

I

I

'

direcb.i,on of his growth.

Through analysis and criticism

of specific works of art, he can illumine all these
things'..1 354 If artists refuse to learn from critical
I 'I I
I'
analyse·s of their work, they frequently do learn from
355
penet:ra•ting analyses of the works of other artists.
Furthermore, good criticism can disseminate a body of
ideas and foster an atmosphere favorable to the artist's
best ,creative work, by developing a wider and more discrimfnating audience for the arts, which would demand
the r,elish the best that the artist can create, and
reject:the conterfeit works of spurious talents. 356
Finally, art criticism can be of considerable
use as 1 a source of knowledge.

This is particularly

appare,nt when one remembers the full range of art and
art criticism that has been aforementioned.

These phases

' can contribute richly to one's knowledge concerning
clearly,
357
Although
the origins and properties of a work of art.

the so+e aim of the judgmental and evaluation phases is
I

i

I

not t?'enunciate propositions that are universally valid,
it can nevertheless formulate estimates of certain dimensionaf 1yalues of works of art which have a general
354 rbid.
, ,I

355

,

Ibid. , p . 3 5 7 •

356 rbid.
357 rbid.

l

159

11

I ':1

I I

I 1,

I ii:
va l l..d.1.ty. 35&

Therefore, criticism is both a science and

: I

a philcisophy:.
I

It is a science in a sense that it

is a

'

'i
body :o;~
statements based on experience and capable of
I'

verification by competent observers. 359

Criticism is a

philcis'qphy in the sense that it proceeds in terms of
broaq ~ssuinptions, and using intelligible direction,
propoi'es what art should offer human beings. 360
However, according to Smith, pupils, at least on theoret-

·l
ical 'gicunds, are presently not required to regard things
disce.ri-i.ingly.

Nor is the student expected to give a,

explanation of a work' 1s merit in terms of a critical
theory;.. ,361

This is a significant implication, for it

should'be obvious that knowing how to defend an aesthetic

>1

judgewent is a radically different affair than merely
allowin:g art to elicit personal feeling responses. 36 2
Thus,,' 'aesthetic criticism and aesthetic evaluation have
disti,nc'tive aspects in regard to the educational process,
and both art and art education should be cognizant of them. 363
i

This :is' also Jerome Stolnitz' s contention in his work,
: \ 358rbid.

359Ibirl.
360Ibid.
36libid., p. XII.
362 Ibid.
,: ' 363Jerome stolnitz, "The Educative Function of
Criticism," in Ralph A. Smit.h,
p. 365.
1'

160
':

''' ,,'
I

"The Educative Function of Criticism," in which he cites that
"!
' 10
'

I
'

ther~ .is an educational function in criticism,

and that

'

' H I is the improvement of one's aesthetic percepfunction

,,'I

tion. ,3:64
,,

Criticism, therefore, should make aesthetic

, 'J, I

percep~ion more discriminating.
see what had not been previously.
'

'

;: i

It should enable one to
It should give one

'

a sense of the works "aesthetic intention" so that no
illegitimate
demands are made on it.
,, I
'

365

Therefore,

I

the edricative function of criticism is not simply to
impar~!knowledge, but directly and indirectly, i t instructs
percep~ion, thought, feeling, and imagination, so that

'I

,

I I
'
one can,
o b serve
a work of art more sympathetically and

. l y. 366 , T h'is view
.
.
k nowi_ng,
regarding
the educative, pur:,' I

I

'I

pose of: criticism is also held by Stuart Hampshire, as

'
he states:
'

I

"One engages in aesthetic discussion
, 1 for the sake of what one might see on the
:' I way. , . if one has been brought to see
•what there is to be seen in the object,
'the purpose of discussion has been achieved
:,
. , . The point is
bring people to
': see these features. 113

~9

• 1 I 364
'
, I
Jerome Stolnitz,

"The Educative Function of
Criticism," in Ralph A. Smith, Ibid., p. 365;,
' '

, I 365 Ibid.
'I

! 366 Ibid.
I

• ,, I

6

',' 3 7 stuart Hampshire, "Logic and Appreciation,"
in Wil,liam Elton, Aesthetics and Language, (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1954), p. 165.
'i: i

161

''

I
. 'I

. ' ' .'

I I!'

Thus, aesthetic criticism is educative in its
,I

own way.

: Ii

But, "the common reader," the person who takes

some t,~terest in art and wants to increase his ·interest,
1

must'take responsibility also, for criticism in itself
is not sufficient.

It is no substitute for direct aes-

'

thetic• !awareness.

According to Stolnitz, criticism is

I

educative, only in its end product, felt aesthetic experience, and when the percipient makes the effort of aesthetic
atte~tion and sympathy.

368

This calling for an aesthetic criticism, and the

'
reasons
thereof, is summarized quite adequately by the
'

following quote by Lucian:
''

"A work of art requires an intelligent
spectator, who must go beyond the pleasure
of the eyes to express a judgement, ~g~ to
argue the reasons for what he sees."
More than any other group, instructors of art
and art education can direct students in the practice of
careful aesthetic judgement, in frank, thoughtful selfI

expr~~sion, and in honest and humane feeling.

According

to Beck, careful aesthetic judgement can circumscribe
"kitsch," and that education for thoughtful self-expression
I

ii

I

will d~crease the numbers of the incoherent, that honest
368

Je~ome Stolnitz, "The Educative Function of
Cri tic'ism," · in Ralph A. Smith, op. cit., p. 368:.
,

·

'''

369 L

.
. Pappas, op. ci"t ., p. 404 .
ucian,
in

'''

162

will increasingly replace conformity, and compas'J•)

.
'I I f ee 1·ing will stand against the extension of those
sionate
: 1, I
.
are mirrored by the new imagists in art. 370
cruelities
that
, I
:

'

I

i
· i

370Robert H. Beck, "The Social Background of Art
Educat·:llon," in Art Education:
The Sixty-Fourth Yearbook
of the' !National Society of the Study of Education, Part II,
op. cit., p. 10.

"

'

';

I,,
' :

I

i

''

'I
'I

Chapter 9
ROLE OF THE ART CURRICULUM IN
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
r

'I

'

"Visual Arts",
In the beginning of this thesis, it was noted

that,~bth
"ar~" and "fine art" were sometimes used in a
, I
narrow sense that excluded architecture, music, and litera-

,

'

ture.·

This was termed the "visual aesthetic" sense of

' I
"art':'',,and
"fine art."
I

I

"Art" when used in this sense, and

used alone is popular because of its brevity, as in "art
school)" "artihistory," or "art museum."

College ·art

departments d~sire it because it puts their subject at
the ~'~Jd of alphabetical lists. 371

In popular usage, the

, l

term, ",cirt" does no great harm, but in a technical dis, ,•1

cussiori it was found unwise to use "art" alone in this
narro~lsense.: It was also noted, that the visual arts
were iredominantly excluded from the Greek's "arts of

. i

.

the Mu'ses," pushing out two of the original occupants,
•

I
'

music'cind literature.

I

tion

oi

, ·. I

Also, it was noted that the restric-

the concept of "fine art" to a few visual arts

was ari: \historical accident.
• i

I

It ma~ be remembered that the concept of "fine
'

art 11 ~duld be:interpreted in a narrow visual sense or a
. :

I

,:; I
I

1,;1

371Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelafions, op.
cit., p. 132.
163
.'

I.
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'

I'

'

''

, 'I

i: I

I

I,'

I

.

'

'

.

broad aesthetic sense, which implied an antithesis as to
'
those arts that were "fine" and those that were "useful."
; :: i
Therefore, the. first proposal for the institution of
higher education is to set an example in terms of defi'

'

nition and classification, and utilize the term "visual
'
1
arts 11 .ihstead of "fine arts." It should be used instead

l

of "art," alone when "visual art" is meant, as in college
,

I

I

I

catalogues.

Restricting the term "art" to visual arts

involr,es a sharp separation from music and literature.
: ''
It may be argued that music and literature are visual
arts,: ih the s'ense that musical notes, phrases, etc. ,
can be perceived by the eye, thus "read,"

but they are

also a~ditory, when words are read aloud or spoken, and when
' ''
writt~~· notes are played on musical instruments. This
is us~ally covered by calling them,

"combined," "mixed,"

'

or "audio-visual"
arts.372
• Ii I
An Alternative Course of Study
'

has been noted previously, by; McFee, 373 GreenB74 ,
375
376
.
377
berg,
0 Doherty,
Munro,
He1.lbroner,
, and

'!, It

, 372 Ibid.

:

'373June King McFee, Preparation for Art, op. cit., p. 33.
, 374 c1ement Greenbert, Art and Culture, op. cit., p. 5.

: i I 375Brian
I

O'Doherty, Object and Idea, op·. cit., p. 14.

·376Thomas Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelations,

op.

cit., p. 106.

op.

cii.tl,

'!

''

377Robert L.
p. 31.

Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers,
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Ii

i

[ :1 8
Tejera~ :37 that technology has created basic value conflicts betweeh art in American society, and one's environ; I '
13 7 9
.
.
l 1. f e a su b stitute
.
ment., ·I
It h' as resu l te d in
ma k ing
·
I
300
for art, and art a substitute for life.
It has

I

.

tended to rembve the more purely utilitarian pursuits
j: I
j:
.
381
from .the fielci of "art" as historically conceived.
All ~hi:s, in furn, has resulted in a situation where the
av.er~g~: laymar has little or no consciousness of the pervasiveness of! art in their lives.

Art has, to a large

I

extent·, been regarded as a frivolous waste of time and
I

L.

I

impractical. 3182

Accordingly, as cited by Heilbroner, this

separation of! art and technology, and art and life is mirrore~. :i:n the [curriculum construction of the institution

I

: I I

383
of h±g~er
education.
.
'
Illusftrating Heilbroner's contention, is the

_,
1

curriculum construction in art in general education, .,which
I

'

'

presents the !following alternatives:

(a) basic sbudfuo

cour~e~ invo~ving painting, drawing, design, sculpture,
378

I

v~ctorino Tejera, Art and Human Intelligence,
op. cit., p. 1199.

. ''

: l I 37 9McFee, op. cit., p. 33.
1

38O o•looherty, op. cit., p. 14.
381Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelations, op. cit.
;

I

I

383

,, ,,

.

382 Tejera, op. cit., p. 199.

I.

Heilbroner, op. cit., p. 31.
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''

'

Ui

and t.,.e crafts;

(bl historical art survey courses and

1

art ~pP,reciat~on courses;

(c) a humanities course in

which: Hisual,l .musical, and verbal arts are related and
prese;n.ted in a sociological context.

In this general

scheme, it is important to note that there is no provision ;JJde, in a general context of courses, for helping
the student in developing an awareness of the visual arts
'

I

in his limmedi~te environment and helping him to become
more

ls~

1

nsitivl to the dynamics by which they operate.

i ',;

Ronalb Silverman and Vincent Lanier have also

recogr.;zed thfis inadequacy in the art curriculum, and

. .

I

prop9s~ that i'1 fourth course or series of courses b"?
offerec,.

The courses are primarily verbal, but often

(';:

maniEJul:ative, 1 a.nd attempt to describe the ramifications
of tl~e ,visual/ arts in today's world. 384
'

I

I

They offer the

follow~ng as lthe content of such a course:
''

.

I

'

, 1.

I

iI

2.

Art in the home: '~xamining the aspects of
the pupil's home in which visual aesthetic
jhdgements are made, and discovering ways
ih which these judgements can reflect a
h~igher degree of understanding of the
m;echanics of art.
Art in the community:
investigating archit1ectural, industrial, and commercial-art
p~oducts and activities existing in the
1bcal community.

I

I
384 Robert
Silv,erman and Vincent Lanier, "Art for
1
the Adolescen t;·" Art Education:
The Sixty-Fourth Yearbook
of the, ·Nation'al S_o_c_ir.e--,-t-y~f~o-r-""'t....h-e-~s""'t-u-d""'y--o~f,.....,E=d..,,...u_c_a_t,......1_0_n_,_o_p____
cit. r, Pi· 122.
I•' 1
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3.

Art in communications: analyzing the art
abpects of cinema, television, and printed
m'aterials.

''

I in
· po 1·itics:
·
.
.
Art
reviewing
t h e ex t ent o f
ahd the means for presenting political statemknts in prints, cartoons, paintings, and
sbulpture.

I 4.

!I

i·

·

.
th e scope an d
Art as a vocation: exp 1 oring
n~ture of oc~~~ational possibilities in the
v,isual arts.

s.

I

'

Thus,! the second proposal for institutions of
I

1

high~r ;educatlion would be the development of a course or

. .

I

series of cou!ses, very much in similar construction,
'

I

I'

and int:ent and purpose as that proposed by Silverman and

I

Lanier:.
:
.
11:um
Core C urr
icu

.

I

Earli1er in the thesis, it was pointed out that

the cu:i)ricul+ content in the liberal arts college varies
I

i

i

.I

I'

consid~rably

It was noted th~t the history and appreci-

i

ation of painting, sculpture, and architecture are some-

:

I

times .i:nclud~d in the liberal arts curriculum.

,

I

However,

they are seldom required and often omitted entirely. 386
i
1
Only the lite rature is always included. The facts make

I
..
I
those who understand
:; i

the de·gree, Bachelor or Master of Arts, seem a misnomer
for

"art" in an aesthetic sense;

for ~tudents 1can secure these degrees and"·know little or
i I
1
:

385

IJid., p. 123.

<,
I 386MJ:p.ro,
cit.,' ,~. 53.

The Arts and Their Interrelations, op.
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I

'

i
nothing, about iart.

"Liberal arts" is still understood

in the medieval way, in that it involves some work in
math~ma:tics a~d some science, but usually not enough to

'
I
' aware
one

ma k e

. cu 1 tura 1 contri'b ution.
.
387
o f t h eir

Using 1 the term "humanities" for clarification,
'

is o~ 'very lilttle assistance.

It may include work in

the visual arlts, but that is not always implied. 388
terms,

Both

"liber~l arts" and "humanities" can be construed

to include moire or less of science, and more or less of
art.

·More a)~ more,

"humanities" are being understood

as distinct fJrom
physical or natural science and mathe.. ,
ma tics; as thj~ study of human nature, society, and
389
culture.
!sociology and Psychology are sometimes
included, butl · often the humanities are regarded as antithetical to alll science, and restricted to scholarship

I:

0

·
. sort. 390
o f a 1 iteraryl
,and aest h etic
HoweJer, the term "liberal arts" carries with
it the connoJdtion from medieval days; that is, the "fine"
arts separate/d from the "applied" arts, that is, the latter are pracJical, and the former only worth while in

I

388

'

1

L. oudley and A. Faricy, op. cit., p. 3.

389
,
Munro, The Arts and Their Interrelations, op.
cit., p. 54. ,i
390Ib~d.
,1
i

I'
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1,

,I
''

;Therefore, because of this disparity, we
I'
arrive1at
the' third proposal.
:

I

, '

I

The third proposal is that

I
'

instit1:1tions of higher education should replace the liberal
1

arts,:or gen~ral education curriculum with a new core cur• 1 um,
I
emphasizing the arts and sciences. Current
ricu
I
II
.
is regard, is reflected in the curriculum
thin~ing i n tlh.
I
:

changes which have been adopted by Harvard University,

.;

I

to commence in the fall semester, 1978.
1

Harvard Univer-

I

sity has decided to replace its general education program,
I

that h'as beeri in existence since 1945, with a new "core
I
I
curric ulum." ' This curriculum, has as its purpose, the
0

specia~ emphasis of the arts and sciences.

'
I
I.
to empnasize :five areas in particular:
:

'i

It is designed

(1) art,

(2) his-

I

tory,· ,·(:3) soe,;ial and philosophic analysis,
I

(4)

literature,

'

(5) sci1ence a-:nd mathematics.
, ,I

Their rationale for this is:

;

"to ha1/e students acquire a basic literacy in major forms
'I

of

.
l
.
.
,,391
intel ectual discourse.
;1

I

;

Aestheit'.ic Cri,ticism in Curriculum
That the nature of art is complex is axiomatic,

' '
I
and hardly
bears
repetition.
I I

I

That art is an open system,

tmpredictable; anu. unforeseeable, is being hammered homP

'

'

with re~ularity by artists.

'' i

i

The presence of alternative

aesthetic theories, ant'. the absence of a viable unified
, 39 :;_"Harvard Weighs Reform of Educational Curriculum,"
The Chroniclelof Higher Education, March 6, 19~8, Volume XVI
No. 2_) J?· 1.
. :

'

'
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I

I

''

I

'\'

I

',,

theory,· has baffled and amused artists, has pl~gued aesI

; 1

thetic:i!ans, art critics, and art educators.

' I

I

'' :'

.'

However, all

these Jroups .are engaged in the utilization of ·:theories
:
I
I
'
I
'
392
and criticisnl, to varying degrees.
In a sen'se, the
artist needs lthe fewest theories.

He makes his works,

''

' 'is the aesthetician' s task to see whether his
and it:

I

i :•

theories pro8erly account for the qualities in the works.
I'

:

1'

''
The ~f!~orts
4f the critic hinge on applying appropriate
criteria to Jorks of art.

The art historian, even the

I

one who rest~icts his task to description, is following
a particular mode of empiricism.

The art educator cannot

avoid, theory,· because he must be guided by it; hence, he
'

must s:ynthesize the knowledge in art of the artist, and

, :

I

the knowledge of art of the aesthetician, the critic,
and the art ~istorian.
Art education and the art curriculum, in terms
I

of its.construction have been anchored almost entirely
'

'

'

<

:

:

in reJ.Jation to the artist, that is, studio art courses,

: :I

:

and only slightly in relation to the art historian, that
is, art histtjry survey courses.

The art curriculum,

accor~+ng to Barkan is faltering, because we have not
learne4 to use aesthetics and criticism, nor do we
'

'

prop~~fy use[the art historian.393
'

.,

'

'

I

392 A'seminar in Art Education for Research and
, . I
Curr·iculum Development, The Pennsylvania State University,
Edward L. Matt1.l, dI°rector, 1966, p. 243.
1

393 Ibid.

'.'

'i

'I,
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I.I
!'

According to Barken, the artist can afford to
be skeptical lof theory, but not the instructor of art;

l I

h1a t ever s k epticism
. .
.
t or d er~ves
'I
f rom
t h e art instruc
f or w•,,
I
I

I' I
I
394
the artist, operates to the detriment of his instructor.
I'
I'
According to 1Stephen Pepper:

i
I

: "Utter skepticism,

. , turns out to be
When a man declares,
., , 'nothing is known at all, ' he does not
seem Ito be committing himself to any cognitive
resp6nsiblity.
He seems to be playing safe and
reli~ving:1himself of all demands for evidence.
Actually, he is just as responsible as if he
declared, 'I know all things and their nature
is such and such.'
He must produce evidence
for his sweeping denial of the trustworthiness
of evidence; otherwise, ~~ 5re is no reason to
accept his declaration."

i ' a species of dogmatism.

I

1

'!

,

· Therefore, according to Barkan, art curriculum

I

'

I

will 1c~ntinue, to falter until we accept a respo'nsibility

, ,

I

for rationali;ty. 396
'

Excur.sions into the historical transformations
I

of tl"\e, '.curric'ulum goals in art education illustrate
,

I

the absence of the tradition ojj studio art from art edu-

' I

I

cation:.1 This'' has led to the bifurcation between practices
'
1
397
in the field :of art in the culture and in art instruction.
394 Manuel Barkan, "Curriculum Problems in Art
Education," A Seminar in Art Education for Research and
Curriculum Development, op. cit., p. 243.
' ' '! 395 l
st~phen Pepper, in Edward Matti!, Ibid.
'1 I
I
!
396
Ma'nuel Barkan, in Edward L. Matti!, Ibid.
I

'1

I

''

'
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I

I'

This problem in art education is a major concern of
,, I

:

EdmundiFeldman.

According to Feldman, the pril!lary goal

of art: educaJion should be to confront students with
:•

I

unending queitions about human meanings in their own
'

1

life-centered problems.

398

This was also the essential

premi$~ of silverman and Lanier.

If such a quest were

:' '

pursued, art instruction would lead to an education in
, :

I

'

I

'

'

'I

humanistic in'quiry.
'

The art educator would ask:

"Do

we fa·shion ou:r instructional mate±ial around such important
I

and ex!==,iting 1questions as the life of man in cities, in
I

neighborhoods, in domestic dwellings, and in public
buildings?

D~es the world of industrial design 1, package
I

design',1 and product design, enter into art insttuction

. any
. systematic
I . way? II
in

•
h
ld h ave important
.
I
This
sou

:

'
implications
tor the art education curriculum in colleges
I

and universities,
if, the nature of our culture is reflected
.
'
I

in the 9ualit~ of the things we use and produce, em stated
by McFe~.

399

'

'

!

•'

,; Implied in this conception of curriculum structure,
is the ~eed to reconceive the meaning of the work "activity"
in the ~omenclature of art education.

The idea of activity

as inquiry-moving activity would no longer be restricted

!

I

to studio production activities as the primary moving
' 'I
I
'I

., , 398

l
Ed!jlund Feldman, in Edward L. Matti!, Ibid.
I

399Mc~ee, op. cit., p. 19.

:

'

,,
'

' '
'''
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I'

I'

'

I,

:i'ii I

I

' I

I•

I

acti".t½ies fo1r inquiry in and about art.

Rather, activi-

ties a'ssociat'.ed with critical and historical analysis
I
, I
woulq 11:jecome jduly recognized and consciously ut:,ilized for
I'

their:rdoving .powers.

There would then be an array of

differe,nt kin'ds of inquiry-moving activities such as:
0

paintiWg, scu Iptur ing, examining, comparing, describing,
· d . I'\
JU ging,

.
..
eva 1 uating,
an d writing.

'

'

:; i

There'fore, we arrive at the fourth proposal for .
1

.:I .
·
.
.
the institution
o f h"ig h ere d ucation,
in
regar d s t o art
and art education.
I

The fourth proposal is, that art

:

departments should attempt to seek a structural relation, '

!

ship between the components of studio art (production),
and art· survey courses (history), by including aesthetic
'I:

criti~ism in the curriculum content.

If this were

attempted, then the curriculum content components would
b e:

, d uction,
.\
pro
criticism, and history.
I

,

The professional

'

'

scholars in a±:-t, the artists, the critics, and the histori;

ans w~uld then be the models for inquiry, because of the
,

Ir
•,I

,

I

kind of 1 human:meaning questions they ask relative to art
and li!fe.
,

Their particular ways of conceiving and acting
I

on the~e questions are the kinds of questions and ways
I

of acting that art instruction should seek to teach students,. ': The a:ttist and critic would serve as models for
'
I',

'

I

quest.ions

''
that
I

could be asked about contemporary life.

The historian would serve as a model for questions that

174

might be asked about art and life in other times, other
societies, and other cultures in order to illuminate the
meaning of the past for a better understanding of the
present.

Thus, the role of criticism would be that of

an integrating force between the currently polarized
components of studio art and art history, both separate
and apart from art education.

Art as an organized field

of study, according to Wold and Hastie, has maintained
two distinct and yet inseparable bodies of knowledge.
One, relates to the creation of artistic forms, the doing
or making of art; the other, gaining an historical retrospect of what has been made or done.

However little has

been done in relation to critical analysis of works of
art, that is, looking and making qualitative judgements
about it, whether it be high art, popular art, or other.
400
wise.
There is some evidence to support the claim that
art education in the past has taken the cue for direction
of its efforts from the prevailing values of the moment
in the general education enterprise.

401

Previously,

'·'·

there was a preoccupation with individual psychology
400

stanley G. Wold and w. Reid Hastie, "From
Research and Theory to Teaching Practice," Art Education
The Sixty-Fourth Yearbood of the National Society for
the Study of Education, op. cit., p. 337.
401 rbid., p. 334.
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and art for personality integration.

402

In the past ten

years'however, the primary accent upon art has been for
development of self-expression and a general creativeness.
Now there is evidence that the modd is changing as art
instruction becomes centered upon the "refinement of the
capacity for aesthetic response and expression" through
intellectual understanding as well as making works of
art.403
However, art and aesthetic criticism should hot
be dismissed as an academic and educational gambit.

The

question should not be whether this kind of material
should be taught, but rather, to what extent will it promote one's aesthetic development.

Aesthetic development

generally implies:

(a) the improvement of taste through

refined perception,

(bl the improvement of the standards

by which taste is justified, and (cl the quality and
quantity of subjective enjoyment and satisfaction derived
from art objects. 404
Therefore, because some of the propositions in
both art theory and art criticism have cognitive status,
both could be the means for safeguarding the body politic
402

rbid.

403 rbid.
404

Harry S. Broudy, in Ralph A. smith, Aesthetics
and Criticism in Art Education, in Ralph A. smith, op. cit.
p. 41.

176

.
lf . 405
f rom .1-tse

Just as science is society's defense

against distortions of intellect by prejudice and special
interests, so high cultivation in art is society's defense
against undisciplined feeling swayed by parochial inter-

. . d experience.
.
406
ests,an d 1 imite

If art does indeed make

some connection with reality, i.e., with the import
0f life, then art education and art criticism at a high
level is as essential to individual development and social
health as in science and industry. 407
The field of art education and art criticism, in
the aesthetic sense, as proposed, should concern itself
with educating people for greater control and understanding
of those visual-timages termed art.

It has involved edu-

cation in studio practice as well as education in art
history, but also should concern itself with a critical
study of art (to include architecture and design).

It

should, therefore, according to Hausman, educate,,for
knowledge, understanding, and application of aesthetic
.
·
·
1 forms of ones
, experiences.
.
408
d imensions
i· n t h e visua
Aesthetic criticism, through aesthetic education may be
construed as a special form of value education.

It may

405 Ibid., p. 43.
4 0 6 Ibid.
4 0 7 Ibid., p. 44.
408 Jerome J. Hausman, in George Pappas, Concepts
in Art Education:
An Anthology of Current Issues, op. cit.,
p. 28.
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be described as having enlightened beholding in the
aesthetic domain of human experience as its principal
aim.

Beholding is enlightened whenever a response or

judgement is grounded or justified by relevant criteria,
and this implies a learner who goes beyond sensuous
pleasure to express judgements and give reasons for what
he sees. 4 o9
If it is true, that individuals are more likely
to see reality through the images of art than they are
by attending to reality itself, then ways must be found
to understand the proper place of art and its effects in
human life, because the messages in art are less than
410
explicit.
Therefore, because of distortions and
ambiguities, the untutored mind will fail to understood
the relevance of many works of art.

Furthermore, art is

nothing, if it is not persuasive enough to seduce the
411
.
.
.
f arms as mo d es
1 f or emu 1 ation.
.
popu 1 us into
accepting
its
Furthermore, the effects of art can be either facilitating
or inhibiting to human thought and aspiration. 412

Thus,

409Ralph A. Smith, in George Pappas, Ibid., p. 406.
41 0Jacques Barzun, The House of Intellect, (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 17.
411
George Steiner, Language and Science, (New York:
Atheneum, 1967), p. 10.
412wilbur Schramm (ed.). The Effects of Television
on Children and Adolescents, (New York: UNESCO, 1964).
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decisions about the meanings and import of works of art
.
413
have practical consequences,
and in a democratic
society, such problems are best dealt with by educating
a large portion of people to enlightened and objective
414
judgement in the aesthetic domain.
This objective and critical aesthetic judgement
is especially important in our advanced technological
society, for man has been traditionally been called a
culture producer, and claimed the title, "Homo Faber:"
the maker of tools and images.

But with continued advances

in technology and science, he assumes a more critical
function, and of, "Homo Arbiter Formae:" man the maker
. d ecisions.
. .
415
o f esth etic
413 Ralph A. Smith, in George Pappas, Concepts
·in Art Education: An Anthology of Current Issues, op.
cit., p. 407'.
414 Ralph A. Smith, in George Pappas, Ibid.
415 Jack Burnam, in George Pappas, Ibid., p. 385.
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